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ABSTRACT
THE ETHNICITIES OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE LIMITS OF CULTURE
FEBRUARY 1998
JOSEPH S. YEH, B.A., TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY
Ph-D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
The cultural difference between the philosophies ofWest and East has been assumed
for so long that it has attained the status ofa fact. Recent developments in social and political
theory have undermined this facticity by pointing toward the processes which produce such
tw
facts,” convincingly arguing that there are vested social and political interests which lie
behind the designation of cultural “others.” The presumption ofthe fact of cultural difference
is thus hardly innocent observation. The critique of Orientalism, as instigated by Edward
Said, is useful but limited in this regard, and this dissertation is an attempt to further the
critiques of Orientalism by investigating the central but previously unexamined, concept of
culture which underpins such critiques.
This dissertation specifically examines the presumed split between Western and
Chinese philosophy by carefully tracing part ofthe history ofhow Chinese philosophy comes
to be understood as Chinese. For this purpose, it analyzes the work of a sampling of
prominent and divergent “Western” thinkers on the “problem” of China, demonstrating that
what lies behind the history of the Westem/Chinese “difference” is a process of Western self-
identification concomitant with a certain cultural desire. The assertion ofa difference in
philosophies ultimately speaks more about Western cultural desires than about the "nature of
v
Chinese culture and thought. The results of this line ofthought are then applied to the
concepts ofdemocracy and gender, played out against the tableau of the presumed “cultural
difference’' between the West and China.
This dissertation can thus be seen as arguing against the notions of culture and
cultural difference as they appear in their current manifestations in liberal multiculturalism.
Although seemingly opposed, the insights ofFoucauldian theories of discourse and Lacanian
analyses of subjective desire are utilized for this analysis. The conclusion, an argument for an
understanding of culture and cultural difference which adequately captures the deep
interfusion ofhuman populations and its agonistic quality, is an attempt to escape some ofthe
deadlocks faced by contemporary multiculturalism and to point to the directions which the
ongoing diminishment of global distance compels our self-understanding as “cultured”
subjects.
vi
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NOTE ON ROMANIZATION
There are many methods ofrendering Chinese words into alphabetic orthography. A
brief glance at the historical documents (written in European languages) which contain
romanized Chinese words will show that there is no consistent, singular system for doing so.
The two most predominant methods ofromanization at present are the Wade-Giles and
Pinyin methods. The two are fairly similar on certain sounds, butjun zi in Pinyin would be
chun tzu in Wade-Giles. Names also change significantly: Chiang Kaishek (Wade-Giles)
becomes Jiang Jieshi (Pinyin).
Rather than impose one singular method on all texts and names, I have opted to
simply follow the following rules:
1 ) The names of authors are preserved as they have been found.
2) Names familiar in Wade-Giles have been left as such.
3) All Chinese words used by me are in Pinyin.
4) Romanizations which are neither Pinyin nor Wade-Giles have been noted.
With these guidelines, I do not expect the encounter with Chinese terms in English to be too
confusing or complicated. After all, I believe that there are certain English philosophers (such
as Hume) whose texts remain in their original orthographic format.
IX
CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARIES
1.1 Multiculturalism and Philosophical Purity
Ever since Plato attempted to rescue philosophical praxis from the clutches of
sophism (on the “other side of the world,” Mencius spoke out against words which
would “show animals the way to devour men” 1 ), it has been possible to discern, beneath
the official facades and disclaimers, the traces of a meticulous and unceasing effort to
preserve the sanctity and purity of the “queen of the sciences.” Although this effort is
most often upheld as a necessary theoretical consequence of the unassailable desire for
knowledge and truth, we might do well to remember Nietzsche’s dictum that: “Every
philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word
also a mask.”2 Thus, regardless of what philosophy professes to be in search of, this
earnest declaration of nobility of purpose is itself always grounded by other concerns and
assumptions which are rarely questioned. The question emerges then, as to just what is
being masked in the philosophical declamation that what is done is for the sake of truth.
The answer to this will, of course, depend upon the historical and social contexts
within which individual philosophers write and think. A great deal of contemporary
philosophical work has thus been done in order to sketch out the unwritten and
submerged currents of thought which, although unacknowledged, nonetheless provide
the constitutive conditions for official philosophical doctrine. This critical work, which
1
Mencius, Mencius
,
D. C. Lau, trans., (London: Penguin, 1970), 3B.9.
2
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, R. J. Hollingdale, trans., (New York: Penguin.
1972), §289.
can be perhaps given its most profound historical moment in Marx's critique of the
political and economic thought of his time, has provided useful and penetrating insights
into the makeup ofhuman societies and the sociopolitical currents which operate within
them. This work of critical scrutiny has developed to such an extent that contemporary
critical theory addresses every aspect ofhuman life, whether it is focused on the “fact” of
naturally sexed and gendered bodies, the segregation of the human population of the
world into “races,” the separation of individuals within societies by “class,” or even the
idea of “cultural difference” and the possibility of communication between cultures.
This dissertation addresses itself to the issue of cultural difference and the
possibility of cross-cultural communication, and will also, since “everything is in
everything,” be concerned with problems of race, sex/gender, and class. But the primary
focus of this dissertation will be “culture,” particularly as a certain (Chinese) culture
intersects with the West on the terrain of philosophy. The attempt will be made to
isolate “culture” and philosophical deployments of cultural difference, not because
matters of race, sex/gender, and class are unimportant, but because I am attempting to
work through some of the implications of cultural difference and thus wish to explore the
uses and abuses of culture and cultural difference by philosophy in cultural terms, before
bringing in the problems and insights raised by work done in other areas. After
accomplishing the main work along the lines of a cultural analysis, some suggestion is
given, in chapters four and five, as to the ways in which this cultural analysis can help to
shed some light on issues of race, sex/gender, and class. They are, unfortunately, only
suggestions, and it is my hope that further work will be done to integrate these seemingly
divergent foci of analysis. I do wish to make some preliminary remarks on the
2
intersection of race and culture, however, in order to bring to light some of the
problematic aspects of the concept of culture which the next chapter attempts to address
in greater depth.
1.2 The Racial Ground of Culture
The point of intersection between race and culture lies arguably in the tricky
notion of ethnicity. Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States an
important and insightful text in the literature on race, notes that “ethnicity” is a “muddy
concept” which emerged from the ashes of the downfall of more biologistic theories of
race.
3
The newly formed “ethnicity paradigm” designed to combat the biological
theories of race propounded in the nineteenth century stressed the fact that race is a
social
,
not biological category and, as such, was merely one component among others
which contributed to the determination of a group ethnicity and identity. Within these
theories, ethnicity itself, “.
. was understood as the result of a group formation process
based on culture and descent”4 Thus, the determination of “ethnicity” is given its
founding trajectories along the twin lines of (biological) genealogy and culture.
Although Omi and Winant themselves ultimately reject the ethnicity paradigm as itself
rife with theoretical failings, preferring instead their own theory of racial formation, we
must note here that the tangled intersection between race, ethnicity, and culture persists
even up to the present time. For when newspaper and television “news” reports refer to
groups of people which were once designated as races, all too often the racial
3
See chapter one ofMichael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States, (New York: Routledge, 1986).
4
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, (New York.
Routledge, 1986), p. 15.
3
designation is abandoned in favor of an “ethnic” designation which does the same work.
In common parlance, Hispanics and Blacks are no longer races but rather “ethnic
groups or “ethnicities,” even though the meaning here of “ethnic group” functions in a
homologous fashion to “racial group.” Further, Omi and Winant note that part of the
resistance to the ethnic designation has been precisely the adoption of more racially-
defined social categories for the purposes of demanding equal access and rights under
law. My concern here, however, is precisely with the cultural component of ethnic
identity, a component which presents practical and theoretical difficulties which belie its
facile usage in everyday language.
What is a culture anyway? And what sense does it make to speak of a culture
as though it were independent of race? By referring to Blacks as an “ethnicity,” a
curious homogenization occurs, whereby the concrete differences in the ways of life of
Blacks in one nation-state or another and indeed, even within a single nation-state,
become reduced to the singularity of a monolithic “Black ethnicity.” Furthermore, the
theorizing of this singular Black ethnicity suggests a certain uniformity to “Black
culture.” Without this cultural component, the only significant determining factor for
Black ethnicity would be biological descent; ethnicity would then be clearly synonymous
with race. There is thus a connection between race and culture which must be examined.
Walter Benn Michaels argument, in his piece “Race into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of
Cultural Identity,” that race and culture are fundamentally connected, is compelling and
merits a close examination here:
...the accounts of cultural identity which do any work require a racial
component. For insofar as our culture remains nothing more than what
we do and believe, it is impotently descriptive. The fact, in other words.
4
that something belongs to our culture, cannot count as a motive for our
doing it since, if it does belong to our culture we already do it and if we
don't do it (if we've stopped or haven't yet started doing it) it doesn't
belong to our culture.... It is only if we think that our culture is not
whatever beliefs and practices we actually happen to have but is instead
the beliefs and practices that should properly go with the sort of people
we happen to be that the fact of something belonging to our culture can
count as a reason for doing it. But to think this is to appeal to something
that must be beyond culture and that cannot be derived from culture
precisely because our sense of which culture is properly ours must be
derived from it... it is only the idea that the appropriateness of culture can
be derived from race that makes it possible to think that a certain culture
is the right one for a certain people. The modem concept of culture is
not, in other words, a critique of racism; it is a form of racism. 5
Michaels point here is that our modem idea of culture must contain something more
than just culture, for otherwise it would not make sense to talk, as we often do, about
“losing our culture" or “regaining it." For there is, embedded within this logic of loss
and reclamation, the assumption of a “proper," attached to our identity; the culture
which is either lost or regained is a culture “proper" to “us.” But what could this
“proper" mean? Against what backdrop does this “proper" make sense? The casual
positing of a proper culture thus necessarily entails the existence of some other category
against which the authenticity of “our culture" is to be measured. This category,
Michaels argues, is race.
Michaels' argument thus rests on a normativity inherent to our conception of
culture. Since the presumption that there is a culture proper to us requires some
principle lying behind it which guarantees its truth, and since talk of the culture of “a
people" requires some method for differentiating “our people" from ‘"their people," talk
5
Walter Benn Michaels, “Race into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of Cultural Identity.'’
Critical Inquiry 18(1992): 682-683.
5
about cultures and cultural difference is ultimately talk about race, coded, as in the recent
talk about "genetic intelligence” in the work of Charles Murray and Seymour Itzkoff. in
other terms which function to conceal its true racial nature. Furthermore, from Omi and
Winanfs depiction of the emergence of the ethnicity paradigm, we know that culture and
“descent” are coupled together in the determination of ethnicity, such that talk of
ethnicity is to some extent, talk about race. Michaels' argument seems primefacie
compelling.
But although I agree that matters of race and culture are inseparably linked,
Michaels suggestion that matters of race are fundamental and that “the modem concept
of culture is... a form of racism” is problematic. People from the Middle East are
routinely designated as “white” while undisputedly living in “another culture.” “Asian”
arguably reduces dozens of “cultures” to the monolithic status of a homogenized “Asian”
and the same could be said to be true of “Hispanic.” Within “white,” anti- and pro-
abortionists are often defined as being separate “cultures.”0 These examples suggest that
it is not simply a matter of determining which category, race or culture, is fundamental
and thus primary for analysis. Indeed, the deep interconnectedness of race and culture
points toward multiple levels of conceptual and practical dependency which necessitates
a theory and praxis which is capable of capturing the nuances of this mutual dependence.
My work here thus ought not to be taken as though I am arguing, contra Michaels and
° See, for example Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism, or. Why Liberals Are Incapable
ofThinking about Hate Speech,” Critical Inquiry 23(1997): 379. The essays ofAmy
Gutmann, Charles Taylor, and Jurgen Habermas also differentiate between “cultures” which
could arguably, though not necessarily, coexist within the racial designation of ‘Vhite.”
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics ofRecognition, Amy Gutmann,
ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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others, that culture, and not race, is the primary target of social critique. Rather, by
attempting to examine the function of culture apart from race, I am attempting to
provide a supplement to analyses organized along the lines of race, in order to flesh out
the complexities and subtleties of both culture and race. I strongly suspect that it is at
the limits of culture as a concept and category of understanding that we will find strong
links to the concept of race. For if “culture” as a concept does “no work without a racial
component,” so too “race” does no work in contemporary society without a “cultural”
component, some idea that the racialized other has practices, beliefs, and ways of life
vastly different from “people like us.”
The current impasse of liberal democratic projects, as evidenced, for example, in
its inability to deal coherently with the problem of “hate speech,” thus simultaneously has
its roots in several areas of concern and theoretical focus: race, sex/gender, class, and
culture— all of these sites of “difference” must be acknowledged and dealt with in any
work which purports to descended from the critical moment of philosophical praxis. The
problem is not, in my opinion, so much the lack of a proper theoretical foundation which
could reduce all of these aspects of social existence to their true (read: abstracted)
foundations. The point is not to deduce the universal, transcendent principle which
governs the functioning of difference, but rather to come to terms with and devise
feasible strategies for a world in which these divisions are becoming increasingly more
complex and disunified, a world which is, in short, increasingly interfused on all levels of
experience.
7
1.3 Against Liberalism, or Agonistic Multiculturalism
The situation of the “problem” of multiculturalism, understood here as the
problems faced by social and political structures with respect to the “fact” of coexisting
cultures which may or may not conflict in their assumptions, practices, and beliefs is
currently one of many issues at the core of liberal debates on the nature and future of
democratic society. Indeed, one ignores the multicultural question with great risk; even
multinational corporations routinely organize “diversity seminars” and workshops in
sensitivity training.’ Consequently, the problem of mitigating disputes between
different segments of a given population (racial, cultural or otherwise) and guaranteeing
the upholding of “equal rights’ among them is what drives much of contemporary social
and political theory, generally taking the form of some version of multiculturalism.
Unfortunately, these (liberal) multiculturalist theories often assume too much of a
problematic liberal framework to accomplish their express goals. The problem with this
liberal framework is precisely the primary focus of the essays which comprise Chantal
Mouffe's The Return of the Political ,
7
which attempt to argue that current liberal
formulations of the problems of pluralist democracy are insuperable so long as they
remain blind to the problem of the (potentially) antagonistic heterogeneity inherent to the
field of the political. For since democracy is dependent upon the recognition of a
homogeneous political “will of the people,” and pluralism is dedicated to the sanctity of
the individual, these two political principles are always at odds with one another,
generating an endless seesaw between the defense of the plurality of heterogeneous
individual liberties and the assertion of homogeneous popular will wherein individual
8
differences are subsumed within the univocity of the whole. The answer to this problem.
Mouffe suggests, although she does not articulate the practical measures for carrying it
out, lies m the recognition of the fundamentally agonistic nature of social spaces which
not only cannot, but ought not be eliminated. 8
In the case of culture, the assumption of the liberal framework for debate
presents few (if any) configurations of cultural difference which are able to mediate the
conflict between hetero- and homogeneity which lies at the root of the multiculturalist
debate. For if Mouffe’s point is to problematize both the homogeneity demanded by
current instantiations of democracy and the heterogeneity which is essential to liberal
pluralism, the analogue on the terrain of culture presents similar problems. Culture, as a
concept, demands a certain level of homogeneity within a given population to which a
certain culture is ascribed. At the same time, however, in order for culture to be
anything other than a frozen, static attribute and analytic concept, it must contain the
possibility for change and growth, as well as support the plurality of individual
expressions of that culture. In other words, the problem is that culture homogenizes a
population which is fundamentally heterogeneous— the division of the world into
separate, self-contained and coherent cultures is always already an abstraction from the
facts of the world.
In this respect, the question faced by multiculturalist theory is thus not so much
one of tolerance
,
for the divisions which mark the unbridgeable gaps between our
7
Chantal Mouffe. The Return ofthe Political (London: Verso, 1993).
8
Chantal Mouffe makes this claim at several points throughout her text but it is found most
succinctly in the Introduction.
9
culture and theirs is one wherein the differences are not just those of “lifestyle.” it is not
so much a question of dress and food as it is a difference in the primary assumptions
made about the nature of the world and human existence within that world. If the
problem of multiculturalism is understood in terms of tolerance, then all that it is possible
to say about, for example, thefatwa placed on Salmon Rushdie is that it is “irrational”
and lies outside the boundaries of a universalized "human morality.” But if the
fundamental difference in worldview is acknowledged, the limits of cultural plurahsm are
seemingly reached how do we tolerate someone’s worldview when it is completely
antithetical to our own? Can tolerance tolerate intolerance?
We have seen that Chantal Mouffe's resolution to this problem lies in some sort
of unspecified recognition and preservation of the agonistic nature of social spaces.
Stanley Fish, following Charles Taylor, suggests that the answer to the difficulties
generated by the multicultural nature of the world lies in a sort of “inspired adhoccery.”
wherein the solutions produced in response to social and political conflicts are always
understood as ad hoc and subject to revision, substitution, and change. 9 Although this
strategy seems to be the most pragmatic avenue of action, I want to supplement it by
suggesting that part of the problematics of multiculturalism lie also in the very ways in
which we understand culture itself. In other words, in addition to the formulation of
social and political strategies which are contingent to the exigencies of any given (cross-
cultural) conflict, we need to begin to question our very understanding of culture itself. I
do not mean to suggest that our ideas of culture are simply “false” and require the light
9
Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism, or. Why Liberals Are Incapable ofThinking about
Hate Speech,” Critical Inquiry 23(1997): 385-389.
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of reason for their unmasking. What I am pointing to is the work which follows, which
attempts to argue that there is something deeper to our insistence that cultures remain
separate and distinct, something on the level of subjective desire.
At the risk of repetitiveness, this desire for culture and its consequences for the
organization of sociopolitical structures is not simply a false desire; it is not just another
instance of the emperor’s new clothes. What the analysis of this work points to are the
ways in which this desire is a manifestation of self- (and not other) understanding. The
end result is (hopefully) to point to the directions which the deep interfusion of human
populations can be taken into account in a comparative philosophy and praxis which
circumvents and yet acknowledges the problem of the cultural. In the next chapter then,
part of the implicit argument is that perhaps a pathway out of the liberal impasse is to
begin to de-abstract the individual by taking into account subjective desire, seeing “the
individual” not as merely the receptacle for various “rights,” but also as constituted by
contradictory and meaningful desires. Regardless of whether this solution ultimately
succeeds or fails, it represents an attempt to address the fact of multiculturalism without
falling into the impasses which challenge contemporary liberal schemes. Given the
emergence of increasingly violent “ethnic” conflicts which seemingly defy the logic of
reasoned debate and rationality, we place our hopes in liberal theory (as it is currently
formulated) at our own peril.
CHAPTER 2
CULTURE, DISCOURSE, DESIRE
2.1 The Status of Culture
Philosophy proper commences in the West.
—G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy
Philosophy proper
?
In the West? This offhand Hegelian comment, a mere
prelude in his delineation of the dialectic of philosophical history and overtly an
expression of ethnocentrism par excellence
,
will not be simply index-tagged as such and
stored away in the warehouse of archaic, offensive forms of thought and thus escape
unquestioned. Instead, this expression will be compelled to reveal its structuring logic
—
what follows will be a sustained attempt to reread certain traces in the history of
philosophy and elsewhere as something less banal and of more theoretical import than
the mere expressions of a lack of sensitivity to “difference.” For there is more contained
here than just Western arrogance and the arrogation to the West of the (properly)
philosophical Ursprung
,
something on the order of language and the human world
constituted through that language. Indeed, given that Hegel is arguing that philosophy-
as-such has always been Western, and that the object of properly philosophical inquiry is
Truth
.
either this “truth” transcends the specificity and contingencies of the Western
cultures which enabled its uncovering and thus becomes universal— or it snaps back into
these cultures, unable to escape them, unable to exceed the elastic limit of the link
between philosophy and its founding “cultures.” Furthermore, there remains too the
question of the “proper” which distinguishes a certain type of philosophy from others,
establishing a hierarchical gradation of more and less “proper forms of philosophical
12
reasoning. How might this proclivity for a philosophical chain of being be related to the
question of cultural difference? Might not the designation of specifically cultural forms
of philosophy serve as a convenient means of differentiation in the Hegelian
philosophical typology hinted at here? What might the interweaving of philosophy into
the fabric of culture reveal about the logic of ethnocentrism and the status of
multiculturalism? By examining the peculiar conceptual status of culture and its infusion
throughout the philosophical project, I hope to uncover part of the machinery which
operates behind the “arrogant ethnocentrism" present in this remark of Hegel’s; the
better to derail it.
This project thus begins with the observation that there is something unusual in
the notion of culture and the discursive practices which articulate its various
manifestations, something which permits the erasure of the mark of certain cultures while
the stain of other cultures remains forever indelible. 1 What this means is that the
practices of certain cultures (primarily those identified as “Western") do not retain a
necessary link with their cultures of origin, permitting the elevation of the status of these
practices to that of universality, while the practices of other, more unfortunate cultures
are often relegated to incomprehensibility unless one possesses some minimally necessary
level of knowledge about that culture which can suitably serve as “cross-cultural”
hermeneutic keys. In the case of philosophy, this amounts to a certain ease with which
1
This is not to say that it is “simply" the case that the logic ofethnocentrism consists of
erasing the “mark" of the “home” culture while permanently tagging the culture of the
“other." To demonstrate the limitations of this reading, it is sufficient to point to the
examples of the “cultures” of Plato's Greece and Confucius' China, wherein that which
differentiates the home culture from the “barbarian" is precisely the possession ofan authentic
culture, Greek, Chinese, or otherwise.
13
philosophy designated “Western” can elude concrete links to the cultures within which it
is practiced, an ease which contrasts sharply with the case of Chinese philosophy, which
can hardly be discussed without standard discussions relating its concepts, structures,
and styles to the “material facts”' of Chinese culture. By way of an example: although
the translation of Derrida's essays might be heavily weighted with the linguistic
apparatus of lengthy footnotes, detailing the nuances of particular French verbs, nouns,
etc., this French (perhaps because it has been already properly designated as part of a
Western language family) is not understood to conceal singularly French ontologies,
epistemologies, metaphysics, etc., which are only accessible to those who speak the
language. Further, there is not, to my knowledge, anyone who claims that Derrida thinks
the way he does precisely because French, with its array of differences and linguistic
peculiarities, conditions the possibility of his thought. But if one turns to the sphere
designated as non-Westem, one immediately finds that language, far from being the
vehicle for the conveyance of ideas comprehensible to any human and not just those who
2 • .
' The term “material facts” has been highlighted here to emphasize that I am not arguing
that there are indeed objective facts which must be discussed in order to assess Chinese
philosophy. What I am pointing at is rather the arbitrariness as to what is to count as a
relevant material fact for understanding Chinese culture and the fact that there are no
relevant “materialfacts ” outside the theoretical decision to count things as such. The
insistence on factoring in the “relevant material facts” of Chinese culture is made by both
Western and Chinese thinkers, though for different motives, an insistence which could be
read as either a dispute over “the truth of the matter” or, in a less positivistic fashion, a
dispute over who possesses the authority to determine what is to be understood as
properly “relevant” material facts. Furthermore, these material facts are problematic in
that, although it is standard practice for Marxist approaches and ideological critiques to
emphasize the material bases for thought, the insistence upon the proper delineation of
the Chinese material situation is performed by thinkers who could hardly claim to be
Marxist. Indeed, one wonders why the insistence on the material emerges precisely
when a non-Marxist turns his/her attention to the non-Westem, and disappears as a
relevant concern in the examination of the Western.
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speak the language,” constitutes the fundamental limit for the possibility of thought by
those who occupy non-Western cultural spaces.
This is not to say that the problem here is merely a case of some particularly
virulent strand of ethnocentrism, nor is it to say that there are simply “no differences”
between Chinese philosophy and its Western counterpart. It is, rather, to point to a
crack in the seemingly flawless cultural integrity of both philosophies and to register a
suspicion as to the composition of the link between what we call “culture” and
“philosophy.” For if one is tempted to simply say that those Western philosophers who
write tedious articles and books detailing the infinite list of differences between the
Chinese and the West are “just being Orientalist,” then what can one make of essays,
written by Chinese thinkers
,
which nonetheless claim in cavalier fashion, as though it
could not be doubted, that the trajectories of Western and Chinese philosophies have
always already been determined by the languages in which they were founded?3 What
are we to conclude when we read in the very first paragraph of Chung-Ying Cheng's
“Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics: Confucian and Taoist Insights into the
Nature of Reality” that because the Chinese writing system is “image-oriented,” speakers
of Chinese were thus never led to a consideration of nonsensible objects and
metaphysical principles?
4
Given the dubious “validity” of such an argument, how do we
3 One could, of course, simply say that these Chinese thinkers are simply “poor natives"
who have internalized the orientalism they have experienced, and that what “they" need
is subsequently a mental unshackling accomplished by the intervention of more
enlightened theoretical perspectives.
4
This is to make the mistake of confounding language and the writing system used to
record the sounds of that language. One of the founding claims of linguistics is the
theoretical separation, made by Saussure in his Course in General Linguistics, between
speech and the writing system used to record the sounds of that speech. Since the
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understand this claim that, always distracted by the “pictures” of Chinese writing.
Chinese philosophers were never forced to engage in the abstract metaphysical
contemplations which the ancient Greeks, burdened with a phonetic alphabet, could not
avoid?5 For even if the specificity of Cheng’s argument is flawed in form and content,
does it not contain the assumption of a fundamental difference in culture, one which
marks an unquestionable boundary between the West and China?
I do not wish to advocate here a frivolous sort of universalism, whereby
underneath it all, we are all the same. To do so would be to ignore the very real
historical processes and events which undoubtedly marked the trajectories of those
philosophies and philosophers which we call “Western" or “Chinese.” I am suggesting,
however, that the historically contingent differences between the thought of the West
and of the Chinese do not amount to and ought not to be understood as the terms of an
ineluctable, essential difference in cultures, and that further, such claims about cultures
are meaningful, not because they shed some light on who “we” or ‘"they” essentially are,
but because they point to certain processes which function as a constitutive moment of
social spaces. To argue that one cannot appeal to a difference in “culture” to explain the
differences one discovers between Western and Chinese thought is different from arguing
that we live in a world where ultimately “all cows are black.” It is, first of all and at best.
writing system is always arbitrary— any sign could be chosen to record a particular
phoneme— the analysis of language is improperly focused if it remains fixated on the
arbitrary signs of the writing system. It is interesting to note here that Derrida s claim of
Western logocentrism fails to consider the obvious fact that claims as to the origins of
philosophy, when made in a comparative context, invariably resort to a comparison of
the writing systems of the founding cultures.
Understanding the Chinese Mind, Robert E. Allinson, ed., (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp. 167-208.
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* partial explanation, which is all too often taken to be the entire explanation for the
differences in Chinese and Western thought. Secondly, this explanation fails to come to
terms with the fact that no knowledge, even that which we hold to be most self-evident,
is ever innocent, or free from, complex sociohistorical practices which both constrain and
(at best partially) determine both the form and the content of that knowledge. Finally, it
is to work to undermine an uncritical conceptualization of “culture” which permeates
certain theories of discourse— such as Said’s theory of Orientalism— which would
ultimately reduce the relation between culture and philosophy to a form of discursive
determinism in which everything it is possible to do or say is always already constrained
by the discursive practices which dominate at the historical moment in which we live.
For as I will demonstrate later, the fact these unreflective assumptions made with respect
to cultures and cultural difference lead toward a theoretical black hole (to which
everything even the practice of critical inquiry— is irresistibly and unavoidably drawn)
limits the possibility of the “human freedom” which constitutes the very motivation for
the counterhegemonic theories in which these assumptions are originally embedded
.
6
It is at this point that it would perhaps be appropriate to address the question of
the speaker: who is speaking here? For I am, after all, engaging in and shaped by
6
The point here is not that freedom is the condition for the development of affirmative
philosophies, but rather that what purports to the be the unfettered development of
affirmative philosophies (of the Kantian and Hegelian types, for example) is always already
constrained by a certain self-understanding made possible by the recognition ofthe existence
of cultural others. This argument will be developed in more detail in the chapters to follow,
but here, with regard to the work of theorists like Said who are cognizant of the role of
discursive presuppositions, the failure to take the notion of cultural difference into account
prevents the accomplishment of their own philosophical goal— the advancement ofhuman
freedom.
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discursive and psychological processes which condition my epistemological possibilities;
the Enlightenment dream of a universal reason has been unseated by the critiques of
postmodernist theories. The dutiful postmodernist would here ask the required question;
If I accept the social constructedness of subjectivity, how is it that I could claim to be
free, even if only for a moment, from the pull of a discursivity which demands that I
identify myself, in addition to other modes, culturally? To this point I can only suggest
that what I am attempting, an examination of certain figures in the history of philosophy
with an eye to the manner in which culturality contaminates their projects as an
unquestioned presence even as they attempt to disavow or ignore this presence, is an
attempt at a philosophical critique which aims to reopen the field of “democratic” and
ethical possibility beyond the terms within which it seems to be presently locked.
Thus, my belief that it is, in fact, possible to escape the limitations of discursive
formations (not completely perhaps, but just enough to catch a glimpse of other
possibilities) is perhaps best understood as an act of faith— I refuse to submit without
struggle to the power of a hegemonic theory which renders everything I say and think as
completely the products of discourse. Besides, the point here is to attempt to think in a
space which falls between cultures and between discourses, dependent upon but never
completely falling back into one culture/discourse or another. For unless one wishes to
argue that there is ultimately only one culture, one discourse, then this “space between”
must be acknowledged to possess at least a temporary, tenuous existence. And if this
space is possible, then it would follow that the distance which could be maintained from
the pull of either culture/discourse affords a theoretical perspective different from that
which would be possible within either culture/discourse. Thus the one who is speaking
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here does so from a ground which would appear not to exist within the dominant
discourse on culture which maintains that one must be located within one or the other
but not both and certainly not neither.
The specific location for my examination of culture and philosophy, situated in
the middle of the abyss which establishes the difference between Western and Chinese,
cultures and philosophies, is chosen both because it is contextually convenient (my skills
in Chinese enable me to read source materials from “that other culture”) and because it is
a cultural space largely unexamined in the theoretical work to which I owe a great deal
of inspiration. This text is, of course, Edward Said's Orientalism
,
which has contributed
a great deal to understanding the subjective consequences of the political practices of
empire-building as well as the ways in which these political practices are not isolatable
acts, but rather part of networks of relations which weave together such disparate areas
of inquiry as philology, economics, anthropology, and literary studies in order to
maintain and legitimize political power. But in the text of Orientalism, Said chooses to
limit his analysis to an examination of the “Anglo-French-American experience of the
Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient.”
7
He
does this because, in his opinion, the “Near East” and the processes of orientalism can be
discussed separatefrom the orientalism which had as its object the “Far East.” My
work here, then, is an attempt both to supplement Said’s work by examining the
7
Edward Said. Orientalism
,
(New York: Vintage, 1978), pp. 16-17.
8 One might ask here whether this excuse really holds, for is not one of Said’s claims
precisely that the separation of the cultures of the Orient into distinct spheres is part of
the practice oforientalism as it emerged as a science of the cultural other in the
seventeenth through twentieth centuries?
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orientalist construction of Chinese philosophy as an object of knowledge, as well as an
attempt to move beyond the uncritical conception of culture which I believe to be
inherent in Said’s analysis.
Since the appearance of Said's Orientalism in 1978, the machine of scholarly
production has produced a seemingly endless stream of variants on its themes, which all
serve to reinforce and develop the theses of Said’s text. With each new work which
discovers yet another sphere infested with the machinations of orientalist thinking,
however, it appears increasingly difficult to avoid finding it. Everywhere one looks, one
finds the traces of Orientalism— in art, literature, history, philosophy, travel guides, and
so on. The practice of discovering orientalism has become standard to such an extent
that Disraeli s remark that “The East is a career” is ironically, with a twist in meaning,
still true. But is this all that we ought to do— hunt down the innumerable traces of
orientalism in all the disparate arenas ofhuman activity, a cataloging of mistaken
perceptions of those designated as cultural others? Or ought theoretical practice be
aimed at, not discovering more and more evidence of orientalism, but rather at
dismantling this particularly repressive discursive machine? If so, should not the task of
theory be to uncover the processes and mechanisms which are needed for the orientalist
machine’s successful functioning, so as to better be able to disengage it? Furthermore,
there is still the question of whether or not the theoretical conceptualization of
orientalism generates the danger of a discursive trap which threatens to install a
hegemonic theory of orientalism as an inescapable discourse in the place of the object of
its critique. For since Said’s work is based heavily on Foucauldian theories of discourse
20
and power/lcnowledges, 9 and Foucault’s work seems to leave us in a space where all we
can do is hope for the unpredictable occurrence of a disruption in episteme, it could be
argued that even the act of resisting power/knowledge and thus orientalist discourse, is
always already conditioned by it. 10 But if I may be permitted to provisionally wager that
theories of discourse based too heavily on Foucault leave something out, we may
discover a way out of this theoretical impasse. Let us therefore bracket this question of
discourse for the moment and turn to Said’s texts, to see what we can find there that
could be of use in charting the circuitry of the orientalist machine. Let us make a map of
the terrain before we attempt to escape this labyrinth and reconcile ourselves with
Foucault.
2.2 Orientalist “Culture” and the Discursive Trap
In both Orientalism and its theoretical sequel, Culture and Imperialism, we find
an interesting equivocation with regard to the concept of culture For although Said
often claims that there is no singular identity or essence lurking within those whom we
9
Although Said later suggests, most notably in “Foucault and the Imagination ofPower,”
Foucault: A Critical Reader, David Couzens Floy, ed., (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986),
pp. 149-155, that his work is an attempt to supplement Foucault’s conception of power in
order to theoretically envision and encompass resistances to power, the point here is that
Said, in allowing “culture” to remain unexamined, produces a theory which threatens to
reduce everything to the discursive, while at the same time seemingly maintaining that there
are “real” cultures out there in the world. Thus, while Said attempts to supplement
Foucault’s work by incorporating the discursive production of the cultural other, his adoption
of Foucauldian theory places “culture” as the foundation of analysis. Although this is not in
itself problematic, his failure to critically examine it is.
10
1 will discuss this point in more detail later, but suffice it to say for now that what I
mean to suggest is that Foucauldian theory leaves us in a position whereby it is
seemingly impossible to devise a course of action which would alter the configurations of
the contemporary episteme, since within the parameters established by that theory,
everything, from the most mundane of practices to the highest registers of theory, is
ceaselessly penetrated by the circuit of power enabled by the dominant discourse.
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designate as cultural others, no pure essence which could serve as a proper marker for
the territorial boundaries between cultures, he nonetheless lapses into language evocative
ofjust such a divide, which is often understood as coterminous with the borders of
nations. Thus, we read that “Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one
another, none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily
differentiated, and unmono lithie,” while at the same time we are presented with evidence
of British, French
,
and American varieties of European Orientalism, all of which possess
cultural specificities made manifest in the artistic works of British, French, and American
cultures.
1
1
Furthermore, these cultural specificities are the result of unique cultural
experiences of colonial and imperial power, which function as the “unconscious
positivity” of Orientalist discourse:
This cultural will-to-power and its identification as somehow the source of
imperial power is perhaps the reason for Said’s curious analytical distinction between
“latent” and “manifest” orientalism. He writes:
The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and
certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism,
and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures,
history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call manifest Orientalism. 12
There are a few possibilities for the explanation as to why the unconscious positivity of
“latent Orientalism” would be claimed to be “certainly... untouchable.” Said could be
making some sort of psychological claim, whereby there is something embedded within
the human psyche which necessarily compels it to mark out cultural others and inferiors.
He could also be claiming that this positivity is untouchable simply because it belongs to
11 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. xxv.
12 Edward Said, Orientalism , (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 206.
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the historical (and thus unalterable) past. But it is certainly also possible that this
unconscious positivity is understood by Said as simply culture itself: we cannot question
the origins of orientalism because these origins are deeply rooted in the structures and
totalities of the cultures of imperialist nations. But if this is the case, then Said’s claim
elsewhere that cultures are fundamentally heterogeneous begins to approach the status of
a utopian wish: it would be nice if we could recognize the diversity and heterogeneity
within what we call our “own” culture and there might be reasons for thinking that this is
the case, but ultimately there is nothing to be done, since there exists some untouchable
kernel of culture, some ‘unconscious positivity which anchors the shifty heterogeneity
of our society, something which compels it to cohere as homogeneous (even if
artificially) rather than fragment under the divergent pulls of heterogeneous moments.
Said might claim in his defense that these untouchable kernels of imperial cultures
are precisely the result of the orientalist discourse which sets off the home culture from
that of the other, and that these “cultures” therefore exist only insofar as they are the real
effects of orientalist discourse. However, the fact remains that in Orientalism
,
these
cultures are already assumed to exist— even if European self-understanding is
modulated by its experience of empire, European cultures nonetheless exist as cultures
which, while working to come to terms with the significance of empire are engaged in
recasting their old trajectories in previously unconceived directions. Consequently, our
understanding of the “biggest divide,” that between the West and the East, although
reinforced by the newly developed tools of orientalist systematicity in the age of empire,
has a genealogy and an origin in the distant past:
23
Consider how the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient became
known in the West as its great complementary opposite since antiquity.
There were the Bible and the rise of Christianity; there were travelers like
Marco Polo who charted the trade routes and patterned a regulated
system of commercial exchange, and after him Lodovico di Varthem and
Pietro della Valle; there were fabulists like Mandeville; there were the
redoubtable conquering Eastern movements, principally Islam, of course;
there were the militant pilgrims, chiefly the Crusaders. Altogether an
internally structured archive is built up from the literature that belongs to
these experiences. Out of this comes a restricted number of typical
encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the
polemical confrontation. These are the lenses through which the Orient is
experienced, and they shape the language, perception, and form of the
encounter between East and West. 13
If the entangling threads of orientalist thought have their originary points in the distant
past, then it would seem to be the case that our contemporary realization of their
existence is too little, too late; like a novice in a game of Go, we have realized the
ineluctable nature of our position only when it is impossible to prevent it. Consequently,
Said s chronicling of the recent configurations of orientalism simply track out the
continuations of a historical mode of thought into its present constellations; coupled with
the recent emergence of the “human sciences,” the Western practice of inscribing cultural
others has acquired the irrevocable status of an historical a priori and the legitimacy of a
type of science. Orientalism might have had a specifically eighteenth century
configuration, but this configuration is genealogically linked to an age-old historical
division between West and East which we have always made. The culture of the other is
seemingly simultaneously both a discursive fiction emergent from the processes of
orientalism and a historical fact— there have always been Western cultures and these
have always apprehended and represented the Orient as other. As a discourse.
13 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 58.
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Orientalism thus reaches into the historical past even as it conditions the future
possibilities ofhuman history.
But beyond this equivocation as to the “constructed” and “natural” status of
culture, we must also take in account Said's wavering between asserting the non-
existence of cultures as homogeneous social entities and his claims that cultures act upon
one another and produce representations of other cultures so as to submit them to some
relative status of inferiority. How might we understand this seeming inconsistency of the
notion of culture, that while cultures are “non-monolithic,” “modem Western cultures”
are able to master and control “other cultures?” Said writes, for example, that:
All cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures the better to
master or in some way control them. Yet not all cultures make
representations of foreign cultures and in fact master or control them.
This is the distinction, I believe, ofmodem Western cultures. It requires
the study of Western knowledge or representations of the non-European
world to be a study both of those representations and the political power
they express.
14
If it is the case that culture is not monolithic, and that every culture is always already
heterogeneous, then how is one to understand the coherence of the political power
expressed in its name? Is this power merely a manifestation of the erasure of the voices
of dissent ever present within what is proclaimed a unified culture such that those who
happen to wield power do so in the name of a fictitious, discursive entity? Or is there,
however slight, some reality attributed to the culture which represents its others so as to
better master them? Indeed, Homi Bhabha critiques Orientalism for precisely this
reason, arguing that Said utilizes the unifying function of “political-ideological intention”
in order to contain the binarism which is introduced in the form of the theorized split
14 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 100.
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between latent and manifest orientalism. In this way, Bhabha claims. Said attempts to
suture up the gap between the unconscious of colonial desire and its positive
manifestations. 15
The problems articulated in Bhabha’ s critique, which focus on the failure to
recognize the role of the unconscious, point to yet another sticking point in Said’s
analysis of the discursive phenomena of orientalism in that Said can be seen as failing to
articulate the limits of orientalism as a discourse, permitting it instead to be so all-
pervasive that nothing escapes its logic. If orientalism is conceptualized as the practice
of representing the Orient, manufacturing its existence over and above anything which
we might designate the “real” Orient, the gap between what is produced as the effects of
orientalist discourse and the “human history and experience” which is elided by this
discourse acquires the status of an ontological fact. We have, on the one hand, a
powerful mode of imperialist imagination which attempts to systematize and organize
knowledge of the lives and practices of people who inhabit certain regions of the world
and, on the other hand, the lives and practices of these people which cannot be
represented
[
since their reality is never what is captured in the structures of orientalism.
Indeed, once the machinery of discursive theory has been set in motion, the
representation of cultural (specifically, Oriental) others is understood as always already a
distortion— historically contingent realities tenuously and contingently linked to the real.
Although Said is careful to note that what he is concerned with is not the truth of the
15 Homi Bhabha, “The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of
Colonialism,” Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures
,
Russell
Ferguson et. al., eds., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 77-78.
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matter, not the facts which have been obscured by the ideological mechanisms of
orientalism, his insistence on the totalizing tendencies of orientalism as a Western mode
of understanding the Orient, an object of study purely the constituted result of discursive
practice, renders impossible the possibility of escape from orientalist discourse. As a
part of the historical legacy which we did not choose but from which we cannot escape,
orientalism becomes the only possible mode of articulating culture, whether it is a culture
we perceive as “ours” or as “theirs.”
A possible resolution to the problem of this “black hole” of orientalist discourse
lies perhaps in a claim which Said seems always on the verge of making but which he
never directly asserts. Indeed, the assertion of the claim that Western culture is itself
discursively constituted would pose serious theoretical difficulties for him. given his
equivocation on the concept of culture noted earlier and his seeming need for some
cultures to be capable of expressing a coherent political will. For if Said needs someone
to occupy the discursive position of the orientalist, he cannot then claim that Western
culture is itself completely caught up in the workings of orientalism. If it were the case
that Western culture was completely overwritten by orientalist discourse, then it might
be argued that nothing can be done, since our roles are already scripted by the dominant
discourse .
16
The criticism of a text and its author as “orientalist” amounts to a
16
If one argues here that our roles are not completely scripted by the dominant
discourse, then the question becomes: how is this partial escape from discourse possible?
On what grounds does it emerge, and what conditions its possibility? For if the power
flowing through the discursive network filters through to all levels of existence, including
the most banal, there would seem to be no theoretically possible basis for an escape,
even partial, from the machinations of power. Unless, of course, one posits that power’s
infiltration is not absolute, in which case one has posited precisely the existence of the
“position outside discourse.”
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descriptive claim, which cannot make the normative prescription that one ought not to
act, think, or speak in a non-orientalist fashion since it is impossible to do so. 17
In addition. Said needs someone to speak as the orientalist (or at least from the
position of the orientalist), for part of the orientalist thesis is that the West, by virtue of
its superior “power,” proclaims itself to be that which is capable of speaking the truth of
the Oriental other, and that “The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The
West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior.” 18 The
West must possess some form of agency, for otherwise the problem here is homologous
to the paradox faced by certain radical feminist strategies. 19 This paradox consists of the
fact that, for radical feminism, men are inherently (even if it is the result of gender-
constitutive discourse) aggressive, violent, death-driven, etc., while women are
inherently nurturing, life-afifrrming, and so forth. But if this is the case, then there is no
hope for a fundamental restructuring in the social structures of gender beyond sheer
miracle (a change in male consciousness and the social structures which reinforce it
17
This thus leads into the more general and “properly philosophical” questions of
determinism, free will, and responsibility, for the status of the ethical depends upon the
belief that one could have done otherwise. One could easily imagine a postmodern
bigot, claiming in self-defense: “I can’t help it that I am racist/sexist/etc., for after all,
who I am is completely determined by the dominant discourses ofmy time. It is human
history which is to be held accountable, not me, since I am completely caught within and
determined by the logic of that history.”
18 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 109.
19
As Ann Ferguson has pointed out, there is a distinction which needs to be made with
respect to radical feminists who hold some sort of essentialist theory grounded in a sort ol
biologism (e.g. Mary Daly and Mary O’Brien) as opposed to those who hold that gender is
instead the result ofsocial construction (e.g. Andrea Dworkin. Catherine MacKinnon and
Marilyn Frye). The paradox I present is primarily posed to radical feminists of the first type,
although I suspect that it applies (though perhaps less strongly and in a different way) to
radical feminists of the second type.
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might happen as a sort of lucky epistemic accident) or women becoming more like men
(becoming more aggressive in order to assume actively wrest control of social structures
from the hands of men). Since the latter is impossible (radical feminism holds that
women are inherently different from men) the most it seems we can do is to hope for
that fortuitous epistemic shift which would enable an escape from the oppressive gender
structures of patriarchy
.
20
In the case of orientalism, if it is the case that the West is
completely constituted vis-a-vis orientalist discourse, then to critique the West for what
it could not help but do seems to be only name-calling which does nothing to alter the
power differentials inherent to orientalism. The imperialist, death-driven West cannot
help but prey on those it perceives as helpless others.
Thus, even if Said s work does provide some schematic of the functioning of
orientalism as a discourse and his analysis works to provide at least some blueprints of
the logic of orientalism, what is revealed is a machinery which requires a Western
scientist for its operation. In this theoretical configuration “Orientals” are, by contrast,
the raw matter for the tools of orientalist science. This manner of understanding the
logic of orientalism thus necessitates the conceptualization of a fundamental binary
division of the world into those who possess power and the political-ideological
intentionality necessary to wield it, and those who are powerless to prevent its use upon
20
There is, of course, the practice of separatism: the formation of exclusive communities
ofwomen by women. But when translated into a practice with respect to culture, what
this amounts to is that prescription of some form of cultural isolationism, which I would
argue is pragmatically unworkable given the global nature of the world in which we live.
See the paper by Ann Ferguson in Women, Knowledge and Reality: Explorations in
Feminist Philosophy, Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall, eds., (Boston: Unwin Hyman,
1989), for a presentation of precisely these sorts of problems as they present themselves
in certain feminist positions.
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them. The manner in which "Europeans” found themselves with respect to the Orient is
thus primarily one of "exteriority : "Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on
the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the
Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West.”21 The Oriental is established as
primarily an absence, defined against the presence of the words and discourse of the
Orientalist, who represents that which cannot represent itself. 22
But far from being a simple act of exclusion, an act whereby all that is not
Occidental is rendered comprehensible as moments of that which is Occidental, Said
suggests that the logic of orientalism simultaneously constitutes the Occident itself, as
part of ""Europe’s” sense of self: "For even as Europe moved itself outwards, its sense of
cultural strength was fortified.”" ' Indeed, one of the orientalists par excellence
,
Ernest
Renan, is described by Said as becoming an Occidental cultural figure precisely because
of his "pioneering” work in orientalist philology. It is by positioning himself as a
philological scientist out to investigate the linguistic culture of the Orient, that Renan
acquires his own Occidental cultural authority.
24
This suggestion, hinted at in the text of Orientalism , becomes more evident in
Culture and Imperialism
,
where Said suggests that: “studying the relationship between
the “West” and its dominated cultural ""others” is not just a way of understanding an
unequal relationship between unequal interlocutors, but also a point of entry into
21 Edward Said. Orientalism , (New York: Vintage, 1978), pp. 20-21.
22
See Edward Said, Orientalism , (New York: Vintage, 1978), pp. 208 and 222.
23 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 117.
24 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 148.
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studying the formation and meaning of Western cultural practices themselves.”25 Notice
here the inclusion of the scare quotes around “West,” and the tentative suggestion that
“Western cultural practices” are themselves constituted, although in what fashion it
remains unclear. By the conclusion of the book, “Westernizing the Western” has
become part of the discursive construction of cultural identity, so that “Just as human
beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities.”26
Thus, we are led to the inevitable conclusion that the West's identity, far from being an
ontological constant, is instead created out of the very practice which discursively
produces the Orient.
If this is the case, that even Western identity collapses into a social formation
constituted by discourse, then the point here is that the West is what it is now, precisely
because it became enmeshed in the orientalist discursive web. It is by means of othering
the Orient that the West ever came to possess the sense of self which it now possesses.
Western culture as the agent of orientalism is no more real than the Orient as constituted
in orientalist discourse. This is the reason why Said cannot answer the question he poses
in the opening pages of Orientalism, where he asserts that the main intellectual question
raised by Orientalism is this: “Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality
seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions,
societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanely?”
27
For if the processes of
the discursive constitution of knowledge are theorized such that “human reality is never
25 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 191.
26 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 336.
27 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 45.
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innocently represented and is. in fact, always necessarily outside the sphere of the
discursive, then on what basis can Said even ask his question, let alone claim that
human reality seems to be genuinely divided?” For all we are left with is the theoretical
closure afforded by orientalism as a totalizing discourse which, as Said himself
paradoxically notes, “is anathema to critical consciousness, which loses its profession
when it loses its active sense of an open world in which its faculties must be exercised.”28
What all this amounts to is a circular argumentative path centered upon the status
of culture. Said claims first that Oriental cultures do not exist in the sense that they are
the discursive products of Orientalist discourse. This leads to the suggestion that even
the West s conception of itself as possessing a culture is unstable, since it is grounded
upon the orientalist practice of demarcating Oriental cultures from Western ones. But he
goes on further to claim that this practice of othering the Orient has its origins precisely
in the traditions of Western cultures. As a result, Western cultures simultaneously exist
as the sedimented traces of Western history while at the same time, exist only insofar as
they are constituted vis-a-vis the practice of Orientalism. I do not mean to suggest here
that either cultures exist or they do not. My contention is rather that the curious
existential status of culture and its theoretical function in Said's works, which is intended
in part to destabilize the illusory coherence of essential cultural identities, points to
something more and suggests that culture is more than an aftereffect of discursive
practice.
28 Edward Said, “Traveling Theory,” The World, the Text, the Critic, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 242.
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To resolve the deadlock between the existence of culture as an unconscious,
untouchable positivity and as a residual effect of orientalist discourse. I will argue that
there is something which needs to be incorporated into Said's theory of orientalism as it
stands, which can perhaps be introduced from the theories of Jacques Lacan. But before
I attempt to expand the theory of orientalism as it stands, I want to examine the work of
Foucault, to further pinpoint the source of the difficulty. For Foucault’s work is
explicitly cited by Said as the theoretical progenitor of Orientalism, specifically the texts
of The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, and what these contribute
to an understanding of discourse
.
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What I will attempt to argue in the next section is
that although Foucault s concepts of discourse and later, power/knowledge can be
accorded an innovative and fruitful reading, these concepts are also problematic, in that
they lend themselves toward the production of theories which totalize “human reality,”
as we have seen in the case of orientalism, into moments of inescapable discursivity that
constrain from the very start the possibility that things could ever be otherwise to the
result of accidental epistemic shifts seemingly beyond our control and intention.
2.3 Subjects of Discourse
The Archaeology ofKnowledge represents Foucault’s attempt to sketch out the
architecture of a theory of discourse initiated in his attempts to pronounce the “death of
man” in The Order of Things and the analyses of the medical subject in Madness and
Civilization. The archaeological method established in The Archaeology ofKnowledge
was, of course, to be largely abandoned in favor of the method of the genealogy, but in
29
Said notes his theoretical debt repeatedly throughout Orientalism, but refers
specifically to The Archaeology ofKnowledge and Discipline and Punish on page three.
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The Archaeology’ ofKnowledge, Foucault is still working at the archaeological level,
attempting to establish the parameters for an alternative to the conceptual unities
previously taken for granted in historical studies. These traditional emphases, Foucault
believes, sought to establish the hidden order within the chaotic and seemingly jumbled
mass of historical data by filtering it through a unifying hermeneutic principle, whether
this principle be that of a “tradition,” or of an “author,” or “oeuvre.”30 The alternative
Foucault subsequently suggests is to shift the terrain of analysis to that of the statement,
and consequently, of discourse. By shifting the focus of historical analysis to the level of
discourse and of statements, Foucault hoped to escape the teleologies and totalizations”
of the standard historical analyses, for such a shift would show that the very categories
used to unify historical interpretation were the aftereffect of discursive practices which
could not be apprehended otherwise. This would in turn result, he hoped, in a rethinking
of the status of the subject as a principle for the unification of discourse, and to
demonstrate that, far from being a suitable point of stability to which one could anchor
the disparate and disconnected events of histories and texts, the subject itself was
constituted by a system of regularities on the order of discourse and not on the order of
some cogito. The end result would be a definitive response to the problematics of the
subject emergent from the sciences ofman which sprouted in the eighteenth century as
well a dispersion of the transcendental coherence of the subject into enunciative
modalities.
31
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Michel Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge , (New York: Pantheon, 1972), pp.
21 -22 .
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For example, Foucault suggests that: “In the proposed analysis, instead of referring
back to the synthesis or the unifying function ofa subject, the various enunciative
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This rejection of the theoretical primacy of the subject, a move echoing the
earlier rejection of the human subject as res cogitans in the work of Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud, destabilizes the subject as the site of essential qualities and identities,
rendermg it mstead as a pastiche of historical overlays— the imbrication of multiple,
fragmentary, and incomplete discursive processes. After all, following the philosophical
assaults on the notion of a transcendental truth, could there be any doubt that the subject
was soon to be dismantled as well? But the problem here is that what remains after the
subject becomes mapped onto the domain of discursive practice, is nothing. It is as if the
discovery that our ideas of ourselves are the result of complex historical processes which
function in the discursive realm announced the fact that we, who had discovered this, no
longer existed except as different constellations of these processes. Foucault attempts to
remedy this, of course, by maintaining in his later work that the subject becomes
inscribed upon the physicality of the body. 32 What we had once presumed to be naturally
given in its plenitude was instead simply a blank and mute body onto which history could
be recorded. But even if we can accept this account, there is still some vestige of
modalities manifest his dispersion.... And if these planes are linked by a system of
relations, this system is not established by the synthetic activity of a consciousness
identical with itself, dumb and anterior to all speech, but to the specificity of a discursive
practice.” The Archaeology ofKnowledge, (New York: Pantheon, 1972), pp. 54-55.
’ 2 Nancy Fraser points to a problem with this conceptual maneuver in chapter three of
Unruly Practices, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), where she argues
that if Foucault indeed is arguing that the body is not a given category, then Foucault's
very choice of the body as the site to begin the work of theory is called into question.
For if the body is instead a locus of power which is called into being as a discursive
category, the result of various “micro-practices,” then for Foucault to isolate the body as
an analytical focus is to fall prey to those very regimes of biopower he wishes to unseat.
Here, the question concerns the status of the subject as a conceptual starting point, and
the fact that the subject is seemingly completely decomposed into the operations of
discourse.
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seemingly deterministic thinking which must be taken into account. For if the body is the
site of social inscription, who or what is it that is performing these processes? Or is it
the case that they “just happen?” After all:
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and
dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of
a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy,
as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the
body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history
and the process of history’s destruction of the body. 33
The sense here, that something is responsible for the inscription of history on bodily
surfaces recalls what Foucault says earlier in The Archaeology ofKnowledge, where
what matters is the systematicity of discursive rules and not the individual who speaks,
for ultimately this individual is constituted and made possible only through discourse.
The discursive subject is caught to such an extent that not even desire can be
understood as non-discursive. In The Histoiy of Sexuality, one of Foucault’s concerns is
precisely to show how even sexuality and the most seemingly natural of desires are also
the products of a long and painful process rather than being simply raw facts of
biological existence. I have argued elsewhere34 that the Foucauldian attempt to relocate
the terrain of philosophical debate, a la Kant’s relocation of metaphysical questions into
the epistemological field, is an attempt to relocate the epistemological in turn to a field of
power. Epistemological questions are thus irresolvable so long as they remain purely
epistemological questions. Once translated into the language ofpower/biowledge,
analysis becomes possible. Foucault’s theory thus seems to point us toward some form
33
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinow, ed., (New
York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 83.
34
Joseph Yeh, “Foucault, Kant, Nietzsche: Epistemology and the Politics of the
Subject,” unpublished manuscript, University of Massachusetts Amherst (1994).
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of power as an emergent property from the totality of the discursive as the proper focus
of critical inquiry.
But it could be argued that there are disturbing political problems with this line of
argument. For if discursive formations are ultimately the “cause” of the subject and
nothing escapes the workings of discourse, then historical (and thus social and political)
change can only be understood in terms of a dehumanized “power” which cannot be
wielded by anyone and which cannot be resisted. Even the resistance to power is
constrained by the discursive possibilities which articulate the subjective modalities of
resistance to power. Like Sisyphus at the moment when the rock has rolled, as it always
does, back to the bottom of the hill, the human condition consists solely of the
recognition that this is our fate: an existence constrained by circumstances which we are
doomed to only recognize.
This is, of course, the point at which Said takes issue with Foucault, arguing that
there are always real, political interests involved in the exercise of power. But although
Said proposes a theoretical maneuver designed to extricate analysis from the closed-
circuit of discourse, Said’s overreliance on too simplistic of a Foucauldian notion of
discourse necessitates its ultimate failure. For since the Foucauldian subject exists only
on the level of discourse, subjectivity is constituted solely on the plane of the social.
Individuals exist only insofar as they are interpellated by the dominant discourses of the
time. What exists, and what persists, is the network of discursive relations which
determines the possibilities for what it might mean to exist as an individual.
We can perhaps understand now why the status of culture is so problematic for
Said. For if theories of discourse subordinate the existence of individuals to the
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existence of the discursive, culture understood as a network of social practices must be
understood as structurally equivalent to discourse. In other words, culture does not exist
unless it does so as some form of discourse. To attempt to analytically distinguish
between the two is to run the risk of beginning to talk as though there exists some sort of
cultural essence which underlies the discursive as its untouchable, unconscious ground.
The differentiation of the spheres of the cultural and the discursive renders the cultural as
something which exists outside of discourse but which is nonetheless organized by
discourse and leads to the theoretical possibility that either this something can be called
the “French,” “American,” or “Chinese” essence and that there are consequently
inherently different cultural essences, or underneath it all, this something is the same for
everyone: all humans, stripped of the multiple layers of discursive guises, possess some
universal human constant, whether it is seen to lie in a basically human experience or in
some grain of quintessentially human essence.
The latter is what seems to emerge from Lacanian theories of subjectivity, and
this is what now demands our attention in our interrogation of the status of the cultural
as a prelude to an examination of the interrelationship between the cultural and the
philosophical. For while Foucault could be argued to have reduced the status of the
individual to the secondary effect of discourse without providing an outlet which could
prevent us from lapsing into the pure and absolute determination of the subject by
discursivity, Lacan’s conceptualization of desire and its role in the constitution of the
subject might provide a way out of the discursive deadlock. For although Lacan can be
seen as understanding the human experience as consisting in a relationship to the social
38
sphere mediated by the use of language and speech, there is nonetheless more to the
constitution of the human subject than simply a discursive effect.
2.4 Lacanian Culture
The strange thing about the work of Lacan is that although he makes reference to
thinkers and texts which could be argued to lie outside of Western spheres of culture,
these references do not appear to rely upon this cultural difference in order to function as
argumentative support for the claims he makes. Whether it is Zhuangzi’s parable of the
butterfly in The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, or the commentary on
the Brihadaranyaka-upanishad in Ecrits, Lacan seems to be oblivious to cultural
difference in his gathering together of references which could serve as illustrations for his
thought, evoking the consideration that what he is after is beyond the limitations of a
given cultural space. In addition, Lacan's references presume the possibility of cross-
cultural understanding— the meaning of Zhuangzi’s parable is not assumed to be
inaccessible a priori simply because it is a text from “another” culture. Given this
preliminary and superficial observation, it is perhaps hasty but justifiable to ask whether
Lacan ultimately intends his theory of the subject to be universal in its application. In
other words, when Lacan speaks of subjective constitution in the face of the Symbolic as
part of the aftermath of the formation of the ego in the Mirror Stage, is this intended to
be a universal description ofhuman subjective formation? Or is this yet another instance
in which “Western” categories are arbitrarily superimposed (in standard imperialist
fashion) over the whole of the world?
There have recently been attempts to recast Lacanian ideas with an eye to
exploring its possibilities in the work of social and political thought, as exampled in the
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work of Slavoj Zizek, Renata Salecl, Joan Copjec, and others. Indeed, in the
introduction to The Sublime Object ofIdeology, Zizek claims that a turn to Lacanian
theory not only “opens up a new approach to ideology, allowing us to grasp
contemporary ideological phenomena (cynicism, ‘totalitarianism,' the fragile status of
democracy),” but that it does so “without falling prey to any kind of ‘postmodernist’
traps.”'
5
In light of the problems generated by the conceptualization of the subject (as
cultured or not) in the work of Said and Foucault, I want to argue that it is possible to
read Lacan as providing a way out of the cultural deadlock, even though it may not be
the most desirable of paths and may suggest that what Lacan seeks is, after all,
something universal in the formation of the human subject.
In order to attempt to discover this Lacanian solution, it will be necessary to
establish some theoretical signposts which will prevent us from losing our way. The first
of these is, of course, Lacan’s theoretical “registers” of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and
Real. The Imaginary can be understood as that space in which the individual ego is
constituted, governed by relations of narcissism and identification. Lacan’s rereading of
Freud leads him to theorize the “ego” something other than what is typically meant in
psychological theory. Instead of viewing the ego as some sort of stable agency of
compromise seeking to mitigate the conflicting demands of the superego and the id,
Lacan relies on a narcissistic conception of the ego, in which the ego is seen, not as some
presocial individual presence of self, but rather as the effect of social (non-biological)
interventions in the development of the individual.
3b The ego is thus always already
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Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object ofIdeology , (London: Verso, 1989), p. 7.
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For a thorough discussion of the distinction between the “realist ego” of ego-
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caught up in a dialectic between a certain desire and the other, a dialectic which
produces the subject as an effect structured on nothingness, a lack. In this sense then,
the ego is not to be understood as or equivalent to the pure presence of the subject, but
rather as a moment in subjective experience:
There’s not doubt that the real I is not the ego. But that isn't enough, for
one can always fall into thinking that the ego is only a mistake of the /, a
partial point of view, the mere becoming aware of which would be
sufficient to broaden the perspective, sufficient for the reality which has
to be reached in the analytic experience to reveal itself. What’s important
is the inverse... the ego isn’t the /, isn’t a mistake.... It is something
else— a particular object within the experience of the subject. Literally,
the ego is an object— an object which fills a certain function which we
here call the imaginary function. 7
We can see here certain structural similarities to the Foucauldian conception of
the subject, where what we take to be the transparent “self’ is instead the result of
something social and non-biological. But where Foucault contends that subjectivity is
constituted by the dominant discourses which call forth its being, the constitutive
moment of the Lacanian subject is rooted in the desire of the individual, a desire which
emerges from the individual’s relation to an other, imaged or otherwise. From the
moment when a human infant comprehends that the image it sees before it in the mirror
is an apparently whole and complete representation of itself, that infant is propelled into
a series of identifications with something other than itself, each motivated by the desire
to be whole, to attain to the impossible ideal unity exemplified by the mirror image:
What did I try to get across with the mirror stage? That whatever is in
man is loosened up, fragmented, anarchic, establishes its relation to his
psychology and Lacan’s preference for the “narcissistic ego,” see Elizabeth Grosz,
Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction , (London: Routledge, 1 990), especially chapter
two.
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(New York: Norton, 1988), p. 44.
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perceptions on a plane with a completely original tension.... Man’s ideal
unity, which is never attained as such and escapes him at every moment,
is evoked at every moment in this perception. The object is never for him
definitively the final object, except in exceptional experiences. But it thus
appears in the guise of an object from which man is irremediably
separated, and which shows him the very figure of his dehiscence within
the world object which by essence destroys him, anxiety, which he
cannot recapture, in which he will never truly be able to find
reconciliation, his adhesion to the world, his perfect complementarity on
the level of desire.38
From the Imaginary, the subject moves into the realm of the Symbolic, where the
act of entering a linguistic community and learning to speak furthers the development of
subjective coherence. Since the ego is understood to be “frustration in its essence”
because it cannot realize its desire to be whole, and finds that it is to be forever
constrained and defined by some “other,” it is driven to seek out recognition by and in
the other, so that its existence can be acknowledged and thus guaranteed. Since this
acknowledgment must take place somewhere outside of the individual, we have moved
out of the Imaginary realm and into the Symbolic. Lacan writes:
In the human subject, desire is realized in the other, by the other.... That
is the second moment, the specular moment, the moment when the
subject has integrated the form of the ego. But he is only capable of
integrating it after a first swing of the see-saw when he has precisely
exchanged his ego for this desire which he sees in the other. From then
on, the desire of the other, which is man's desire, enters into the
mediation of language. It is in the other, by the other, that desire is
named. It enters into the symbolic relation of / and you. in a relation of
mutual recognition and transcendence, into the order of a law which is
already quite ready to encompass the history of each individual.
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Further, although the Symbolic is essentially a linguistic realm, since the dialectics
of recognition and the other must take place in speech, the Symbolic is not concerned
with meaning in language but rather with the differences brought into existence by the
linguistic function of the signifier over that of the signified as part of the structure of
language and communication. These differences do not consist in the mere inability of
the signifier to adequately express the meaning of the signified, but lie rather in the
structural difference between signifiers:
A psychoanalyst should find it easy enough to grasp the fundamental
distinction between signifier and signified, and to begin to use the two
non-overlapping networks of relations that they organize. The first
network, that of the signifier, is the synchronic structure of the language
material in so far as in that structure each element assumes its precise
function by being different from the others; this is the principle of
distribution that alone governs the function of the elements of the
language (langue ) at its different levels....
40
Since the Symbolic has nothing to do with meaning, the network of diachronic, i.e.
historical, meaning invested to the signifier as its signified lies within the sphere of the
Imaginary. Lacan writes, “There’s no doubt that meaning is by nature imaginary.
Meaning is, like the imaginary, always in the end evanescent.”41 But since meanings are
inherently unstable, linked as they are to the capriciousness of subjective desire, what
possesses theoretical primacy is the linguistic chain of signifiers.
In a Lacanian conception, the Symbolic can thus be understood as the domain of
culture, wherein the networks of signification enacted in language are utilized in the
work of separating the “human” (and thus cultural) from the “natural.” The Symbolic
40
Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection , Alan Sheridan, trans., (New York: Norton, 1977),
p. 126.
41
Jacques Lacan, The Seminar ofJacques Lacan: Book Three , Russell Grigg, trans.,
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can thus be seen as the “ordering function” of culture, whereby culture is given its
systematicity and form:
A psychoanalyst must secure his position in the obvious fact that, even
before his birth and beyond his death, man is caught in the symbolic chain
that has established linkage before history elaborates it... caught as a
whole, but like a pawn, in the play of the signifier, and this even before
the rules are transmitted to him— Such an order of priorities has to be
understood as a logical order, that is, as an always actualized order.42
This order is the result of the institution of the regulations of social ties of kinship and
the laws of marriage, which emerge out of the social necessity of regulating
reproduction. 43 This order is further linked to the individual by the formulation of the
Oedipus complex and its resolution, as well as to the prohibition of incest and the
paternal “Name of the Father” which functions as the support of law for the Symbolic
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register.
Given the failure of the signifier to ever adequately capture reality— reality is
always expressed in the medium of signs and thus always at least once removed from
what might be said to constitute reality— Lacan permanently forecloses the possibility of
ever saying something which might be true in the sense that it completely expressed
“reality.” Like Kant's world of noumena. inaccessible to the movements of reason,
Lacanian “reality” is removed to the third register, that of the Real. The Real is that
which precedes the Imaginary realm of the ego and its organization, as well as that which
42
Jacques Lacan, from the French edition of Ecrits, as cited in Marcelle Marini, Jacques
Lacan: The French Context , Anne Tomiche, trans., (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1992), p. 45.
43 One might, of course, question Lacan's dependence on the anthropological theories of
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cannot be fully represented in the Symbolic. It is not reality in the sense that reality is
only comprehensible in the significatory terms of the Symbolic, but it is reality in the
sense that it is like the Kantian “X." the transcendental Thing which is responsible for
representation but which cannot itself be represented. The real is thus that which “resists
symbolization absolutely.”45 It represents the limit of the subject46 and is as such, tkthe
impossible.”47
Since the Real resists expression in the Symbolic and cannot be incorporated into
the Imaginary (to give it a meaning on the level of the ego would again be to symbolize
what cannot be symbolized), it marks a certain gap in the field of signification, where
meaning as understood in either the Imaginary or Symbolic registers, cannot appear.
Culture then, has no visible or definable links to the real; it is an entirely Symbolic
function which is taken up in various forms on the level of the subject in the Imaginary. 48
Established as an ordering function of the Symbolic, culture necessarily contains the
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Lacan, does not, to my knowledge, explicitly state this, but I believe it to be a
theoretical consequence of the way in which the three registers of the Imaginary,
Symbolic, and Real are posited. For if the Imaginary is posited to be the space wherein
the ego is formed, on the basis of an image, this image must, beyond corporeality, take
on racial, sexual, and cultural characteristics. Witness the way in which culture, for
example, is coded by the way bodies appear as cultured in any of the new “multicultural”
commercials for airlines, sodas, cars, and so on. Since commercials rely upon the ability
of the viewer to uncode certain information about the product on display, advertisers
have had to rely upon certain symbolizations of “different” cultures such that, in the end,
the individual subject attains to a some sense and degree of belonging or possessing
some culture or another.
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significatory gap inherent to the Symbolic, so that however coherent a culture might
seem to be, its symbols and codes ultimately attempt to conceal the fact that culture is
not real and does not express some reality outside these symbols and codes. For Lacan,
culture is an ordering function governed by a certain Master Signifier49 (a signifier which
possesses no meaning but functions rather to guarantee the meaning of all other
signifies) established as a reaction-formation which attempts to close the gap between
the natural and the human, a gap paralleling the gap between signifier and signified. This
gap consists in the fact that on the one hand, humans are caught up within the
mechanism of the “death drive,” whereby we are driven to a “blind automatism of
repetition beyond pleasure-seeking, self-preservation, accordance between man and his
milieu,”
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while on the other hand, we are animals singularly tormented by the presence
of the “insatiable parasite” of reason, animals who speak. Thus the “cultural fiction”
consists in the fact that although we know very well that we are biological organisms
subject to the biological laws which, as delineated by science, govern life, we nonetheless
attempt to establish ourselves over and beyond that biological existence by establishing
culture as that which marks us as somehow “different from” the rest of life.
49
Curiously, Lacan proposes along these lines the notion of the “c factor” but fails to
develop it further. This “c factor” is the “constant characteristic of any given cultural
milieu” and the American “c factor” is identified by Lacan as “ahistoricity.” Thus, the c
factor seems to be more of a descriptive characteristic of cultures, and not a signifier as
such. Rather than pursue the possibilities of the c factor, which I believe ultimately relies
more upon the process of signification embodied in the language of the unconscious than
upon some sort of cultural essence, I have chosen instead to focus primarily on the
signification of culture, and not on the task of delineating the c factors of various
cultures. See Lacan’s brief mention of the c factor and the c factor of the United States
as “ahistoricity” in Ecrits: A Selection, Alan Sheridan, trans., (New York: Norton,
1977), pp. 37-38, and 115.
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It could be argued at this point that we have arrived again, via Lacan instead of
Foucault and Said, at an understanding of culture as some form of discourse. But where
naive Foucauldian theories are led astray by the failure to comprehend the Real— that
which cannot be expressed within discourse but which is the necessary moment of its
emergence— and where Said is misled to think that the “unconscious positivity” lurking
behind latent Orientalism cannot be analyzed, the development of Lacanian theory here
with respect to culture suggests preliminarily that culture is an object which can be
captured by analysis, with a certain caveat. This caveat consists of the recognition that
the codes and symbols of each culture, its practices, discourses and documents, can be
analyzed only with respect to its own internal “logical order” as a chain of signification,
wherein each element receives its meaning from every other signifier in the chain, held in
place by the one signifier which cannot be analyzed in and of itself (because its meaning
is dependent upon the configuration of the other links in the significatory chain), the
quilting point which functions as the master signifier. Furthermore, the examination
of the logical order of cultural codes ought not to be mistaken for the uncovering of
structural mechanisms in their gloriously complete positivity, since this order exists to
paper over the fact that there is no order outside of that which is imposed arbitrarily, in a
fashion apropos of the arbitrariness of the choice of linguistic signs. Thus the attempt to
subject the totality ofhuman culture to analysis is doomed to failure unless one takes
5
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This “quilting point” refers to the empty, meaningless Master signifier which, by virtue
of its semantic emptiness, is able to “fix” the meaning of other signifiers, freezing them
into a particular constellations of meaning in the social and political sphere. For a more
sophisticated explication, see Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object ofIdeology, (London:
Verso, 1989), especially the beginning of chapter three.
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into account at the outset that one always operates, whether one likes it or not. within a
discourse governed by an ultimately meaningless master signifier which one cannot
choose . 52
2.5 Desire, Cultural Identity, and the Cultural Fantasy
If this were all there were to a Lacanian reading of culture, we might find
ourselves in serious theoretical difficulty, since we have yet to discuss the desire of the
individuals who compose the cultures in question. How do we account for the fact that,
even though the master signifier which holds a culture together is meaningless and in
some sense arbitrary, human subjects nonetheless submit (willingly or not) to the
function of a particular master signifier and in essence, identify themselves culturally?
Without a discussion of the interpellation of the subject by culture, we would certainly
not be far from the formulation of culture as discourse which I, rightly or wrongly,
attribute to Said and Foucault. To initiate this discussion, it might be helpful to consider
an example of a conceptualization of culture which fails to take this desire into account
and which thus runs into problems it cannot resolve.
In Ideology and Cultural Identity, representative of texts which seemingly
present a purely discursive reading of culture, Jorge Lorrain attempts to account for the
processes of the acquisition of cultural identity by painting the following picture:
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This master signifier is ‘"'meaningless” in that there is no truth ofthe matter, no adjudication
possible between, for example, the meaning of“America” as characterized by “ruthless
individualism” or “insistent ahistoricism.” The master signifier which governs a “culture” is
such that it is always under contestation, its meaning never “given” but produced
retroactively by the desires ofthe individuals who accede to that culture. Thus, the Lacanian
formulation here provides an avenue for critical intervention which a more discursive theory
does not; it provides a target.
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At the basis [of the circuit of the production of cultural identity] there is a
complex society with an increasingly diversified culture and a huge
variety of ways of life. From this complex reservoir, cultural institutions
such as the media, churches, educational and political apparatuses
produce some public versions of identity which select only some features
that are considered to be representative, and exclude others. These public
versions in their turn influence the way in which people see themselves
and the way they act through a process of reading or reception which is
not necessarily passive and uncritical. Public versions are constructed
from ways of life but also constitute sites of struggle which shape the
plurality of ways of life.... The criteria for defining cultural identity are
always narrower and more selective than the increasingly complex and
diversified cultural habits and practices of a people. In the public versions
of a cultural identity diversity is carefully concealed behind a supposed
uniformity.
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The structure for the acquisition of cultural identity can thus be presented as the
following closed circuit: ways of life—cultural production
—
public versions—readings
—
ways of life. Further, the emergence of the unity of a cultural identity is understood as
the result of some process of institutional selection— some traits are selected while
others are rejected. Once transformed into the official, “public” concept of what the
culture is, this culture is “read” and internalized to some degree or another by individuals
who attempt to integrate and reconcile that public version with what they themselves do
or think.
What this establishes for Lorrain is a conceptual split between “ideological” and
“non-ideological” representations of the home culture. “Ideological” conceptions
attempt to conceal the fact that the representation of what the culture is fails to
acknowledge the “real diversities and antagonisms in society,” while “non-ideological”
conceptions of culture, particularly the cultures assumed by those properly designated as
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Jorge Lorrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World
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(Cambridge: Polity, 1994), pp. 163-164.
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“the minority" by the dominant culture, are such because “unlike the dominant versions
[of culture], they do not conceal but highlight the contradictions.”54 In this picture, the
cultures of resistance are assumed to be somehow more accurate in their representation
of the ways of life of certain segments of the population than the dominant cultural
representation.
But what this simplistic analysis misses completely is the fact that even if one
accepts the distinction between the ideological and non-ideological conceptions of
cultural constitution, the only conclusion can be that there exists no conception of
culture which is not ideological. For surely those who identify with the “culture of
resistance" themselves also possess “increasingly diversified ways of life.” Consequently
the adoption of the culture of resistance as an identity can only be at the expense of
papering over the real antagonisms and differences between the individuals who are
presumed to identify with that very culture of resistance.
In addition, what is it that determines how an individual “reads” the prescription
of what it means to belong to the dominant culture? Given that the “public version” of
the culture arguably matches the real lives and practices of very few individuals within a
given society, what could compel these individuals to see themselves as belonging to that
culture? Why identify with something which fails to accurately depict the concrete ways
of life in which you carry out your existence as a member of that “culture?” In short,
what is missing from this discursive theory of culture is precisely an account of the desire
of the individual to identify as a member of a particular culture rather than another, an
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analysis of the desire for culture. Lorrain, given his differentiation of ideological and
non-ideological forms of culture, must acknowledge that there exists the concomitant
distinction between desires to identify with a culture which are pure and impure: impure
desires are the result of an ‘‘uncritical reading” of the public version of the culture as
properly representative of the way of life of all individuals living within its space, while
“pure” desires somehow preserve the antagonistic character of a heterogeneous society.
This pure desire thus depends upon an empirical fit between the way of life depicted by a
culture and the ways of life of the individuals who claim to be of that culture. But the
paradox of this pure desire for cultural identification lies in the fact that culture, as a
generalized abstraction from the ways of life of a set of heterogeneous individuals can
never “fit” the lives of the real individuals who identify with it. Furthermore, the fact of
cultural change, the contingent character of the ways of life of a cultural group ensure
that the “fit” between the individual of that culture and its generalized form never holds,
even for communities of resistance. What it means, for example, to be a member of
black culture now does not correspond with what this meant in 1950
,
even though the
culture can be said to exist in both time periods. Assuming for the moment that those
who assume the identity entailed by the culture of resistance do so willingly, a Lacanian
response might be that this desire precisely affirms their presence as the “other” within
the social space of the dominant culture and thus, instead of constituting a “real threat”
to the dominant discourse's conceptualization of culture, functions as its very support.
In order to support this reading, however, we need to briefly sketch out Lacan's
formulation of desire. For Lacan, desire-as-such is always constituted vis-a-vis the
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other: “Man’s desire is the desire of the Other.”55 This desire emerges as the result of
the psychic development of the subject, whereby the initial impulses of need and demand
are supplanted. The immediate physical needs of the human infant, which cannot be self-
satisfied, are satisfied by the other (typically but not necessarily the mother). The
satisfaction of these needs requires their articulation in speech, even if these consist of
the inarticulate screams of infants. But, as Lacan notes, the function of demand, the
calling into presence of the Other for the satisfaction of needs, is soon transmuted into
the demand for the unconditional love of the Other:
Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls
for. It is demand of a presence or of an absence.... Demand constitutes
the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that is
to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are
satisfied. This privilege of the Other thus outlines the radical form of the
gift of that which the Other does not have, namely, its love. In this way,
demand annuls... the particularity of everything that can be granted by
transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it
obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the
crushing of the demand for love.... 56
But since this demand, the demand for the unconditional love of the Other, cannot be
satisfied, what remains as a leftover after the satisfaction of material needs is desire:
"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference
that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”
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Since desire is always the desire of the Other, what the desire for identification as
a member of a resistant cultural community can be understood as amounting to is the
Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis , Alan Sheridan,
trans., (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 235.
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assumption of the position of being the object of the other's love, an object, that is.
whose existence is acknowledged by being the object of the other's desire. Thus, if
cultures are formed by a certain superposition of a unified identity onto a heterogeneous
social space at the expense ot the exclusion of individuals whose ways of life do not
comcide with the dictates of this identity, then we are placed, as desiring subjects, in the
structural position of desiring to be identified as a member of that culture, the true bearer
of its name and thus worthy of respect. Since the position of the Other must structurally
exist there must always be those who fail to be identified as members of the dominant
culture in order for the distinction to be of any use (otherwise, everyone is a member of
the culture and that “culture" fails to mark any significant difference)— the act of self-
identification as a member of a culture of resistance, the other culture, is tantamount to
the complete identification with one's role as other, an example of ideological
interpellation par excellence. This explanation of the desire for culture perhaps explains
why, in the era in which “we are all multiculturalists,
"
8
there is nonetheless no
significant decline in the amount of ethnic and racial violence. The simple assumption
and identification of the position of the cultural other by adopting the identity of the
resistant or minority culture does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of the desire
for cultural identity. It amounts to, on the contrary, the structure of that desire carried
to its logical conclusion: I am what the other demands of me.
8
This is, of course, the title ofNathan Glazer's recent book, where the claim that “we
are all multiculturalists” simply refers to the fact in the pragmatic sense, we simply live in
an era in which we must pay attention to the presence and ‘traditions" of cultural others.
See Michael Berube’s review in The Nation , 12 May 1997, pp. 38-42.
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What does the theoretical factoring-in of the desire of the subject contribute to an
analysis of cultural difference and identity? First, the consideration of the desire for
culture adds the recognition that the problem of multiculturalism is more serious than the
suppression of and intolerance for difference. For since it is the very desire to be
identified as the bearer of some culture or another which is the root of the problem— the
successful satisfaction of this desire necessitates the presence of individuals marked as
other— the problem of other cultures is not merely the problem of the specification of
rights and respect for these. In fact, what is called into question is a fundamental process
in the contemporary construction of the subject. Consider the multicultural practice in
schools of examining the traditions of one's “native” culture by researching its history,
customs, and practices. What does this amount to if not the attempt to sustain the
fantasy that, at the core of our subjectivity, there lies some eternal, positive cultural
moment? That underneath it all, we are the representatives of some culture or another?
It is enough to imagine the response of the teacher to the child who, bewildered, cannot
identify his/her home culture. The cultural fantasy on the level of the subject thus
consists, not so much of the fact that we might somehow think “our culture” possesses
superiority over another, but in the fact that we believe that we are ever the
representatives of a culture.
The analysis of culture thus consists, not of the objective, non-normative analysis
of the rules which govern symbolic space, but rather in the analysis of the extent to
which individuals fail to “fit” within the social space demarcated by the mandates of
culture. In other words, the point at which critical inquiry must begin are those points in
which cultural “slips” can be detected, where culture erupts, like a blister, where it
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seemingly ought not to appear. That is to say, points at which culture is offered up as
the reason for why some state of affairs is the case. Thus when an “American" makes a
claim about a non-American and justifies this claim with the assertion that the other
belongs, after all, to another culture
,
what is being offered up is not the culture of the
other but rather the expression of the cultural desire of the American. To give another,
"philosophical" example, one might ask why "China" appears in the writings of Leibniz
far more often than those other, more properly philosophical terms, "monad.”
“entelechy,” and so forth/
9
Further, one could wonder as to why this fact has been
subsequently erased by generations of “philosophers" who have chosen to ignore it.
Why should a "culture" in which Leibniz showed such interest be entirely eradicated as
significant to understanding his philosophy while at the same time, those who are
understood as representative of that culture cannot produce a philosophy which can be
discussed apart from that culture?
2.6 The Permeability of Cultural Space
At this point, then, we are led to the question of cross-cultural communication,
for given that the structure of cultural desire works by the exclusion of the other and the
demarcation of the desire of the other from what is presented as the subject’s proper
desire, what emerges is the idea that the other is utterly incomprehensible, formulated on
cultural grounds entirely incommensurate with the subject’s own cultural grounds.
Furthermore, unless there is some means to account for cultural interfusion, whereby
cultures are accorded the possibility of fusion with cultures perceived as other, instead of
remaining purely intact and separate, like a mixture of oil and water, the only possible
9
See the section on Leibniz in chapter four.
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theoretical basis for cultural politics remains some version of liberalism and its language
of nghts. For if culture do not interfuse, then the recognition of cultural difference and
intercultural “justice” can only consist of the ascription of inviolable and equal “rights” to
each individual “culture,” apropos of the attribution of rights to the individual/citizen in
liberal politics. This, in turn, generates complex and perhaps irresolvable political
dilemmas. How, for example, in this conceptualization of the cultural interactions and
rights, do we account for the rights of the native cultures inhabiting the United States,
which exist within its borders, although marked off into “reservations?” Is there
something isolatable and clearly distinct as “black culture,” and how are the “rights” of
this culture to be formulated7 In fact, the various violent eruptions of “ethnic violence”
in recent times suggests that the refusal to understand culture as always already
interfused with what is supposed to be other is an unworkable and deadly way of
understanding what we mean when we say we belong to a culture.
In Lacanian terms, the basis for these ethnic conflicts (as well as the function of
Orientalism) can be understood, not as the erasure of cultural difference, but as the
attempt, by those who identify with one culture, to instantiate that culture as the
universal culture possessing “more reality,” whether this is the dismissal of “non-
Chinese” as “barbarians” or the dismissal of the “Chinese” as “heathens who never
produced science.” In each case, the attempt is made to superimpose the ordering
function of one culture onto the whole of the Symbolic. What casts this
60
See Charles Taylor’s sustained attempt to resolve the problematic of “cultural rights”
in Multiculturalism and “The Politics ofRecognition”: An Essay, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992).
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conceptualization of the function of Orientalism differently from its formulation in Said is
the fact that this attempt at the superposition of particular cultures over others cannot be
avoided. Just as the proper functioning of language depends upon the assumption that
the other to whom we are speaking will know what we mean when we speak, the proper
functioning of cultural desire depends upon the presumption that there is no other
alternative to the organization of social space other than the form which we are given.
Or, perhaps better phrased, this is to say that the successful functioning of culture as the
constitutive, totalizing moment of a social space requires the objectification of the belief
that it is unique in the way it regulates and formalizes the practices of everyday life.
Part of the belief that I am a member of a particular society as well as a bearer of its
culture is the presumption that there exist others who “do not do what I do” or do what
I do “but in a completely different way, characteristic of them." Suffice it to recall a joke
from the currently popular American sitcom Seinfeld, where the observation is made that
the Chinese are incomprehensible (and thus fools) for insisting on continuing to use
chopsticks when forks and knives are “obviously” easier to use. It would be like, he
claims, continuing to use sticks to plow fields after the development of more efficient
farm implements. This “obviously,” addressed to the audience and bearing the burden of
cashing in on whatever is comedic in the observation, depends upon a certain
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The “objectification of belief’ is a concept developed by Slavoj Zizek in chapter one of
The Sublime Object ofIdeology, and is developed from his rereading of Marx’ concept
of commodity fetishism. Zizek’s point is that what occurs in commodity fetishism is not
the making real of a belief held by the capitalist subject, but that rather it is the enactment
of certain social practices which make the belief real. Thus belief (in the commodity
form), instead of falling primarily on the side of the subjective, falls instead outside the
subject, in the subject’s objective practices.
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commonality of practical experience and thus functions as a moment in which we all
recognize, we users of forks and knives, that “obviously” forks and knives are much
easier to use but they, the Chinese, are stubbornly insistent on doing things their own
way and cannot recognize this fact. The ideological operation of this joke lies, not in the
way it misrepresents others,’ but in the way it compels the audience to commit to their
existence within only one culture at the same time as it also depends upon a minimum
level ofcultural interfusion. The joke fails, after all, ifwe do not know what chopsticks
are, have never tried eating with them and failed, etc. In addition, the jokes unifies, in a
certain laughter of mutual recognition, the cultural desire of the audience so that the
object of desire, American identity, can be acknowledged by all to be indeed the proper
focus of desire.
Consequently the belief in the univocity of “our” culture can be seen as
functioning as both the necessary belief for the successful enactment of the cohesion of
the heterogeneity of the human individuals who comprise it, as well as an ideological
screen for the fundamental impossibility of this homogenized heterogeneity. But beyond
this ideological functioning, the belief in the unity of “our” culture also masks the fact
that cultures are always already interfused, and that the other has always been both a
physical and structural presence necessary for the enactment of cultural desire. Thus, it
is always already “too late”: once we realize the presence of elements of the “cultural
other” within our borders and attempt to reinstantiate some version of cultural purity,
this cultural purity is already irrecuperable. We might here consider the case of the
“immigrant problem,” particularly with regard to the US-Mexico border at San Diego,
where each night, illegal immigrants begin to line up on the Mexican border, waiting for
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nightfall to make the trip into the United States. If, as certain American politicians claim,
this problem is one which is truly destroying the American economy and eliminating
American jobs and so forth, then the solution might simply be to fill the land surrounding
the border with landmines (leaving the major thoroughfares unmined, of course) or
simply to divert adequate resources to the policing of the border. But the fact of the
matter is that the economy of the region is too heavily reliant upon the availability of
cheap (illegal) immigrant labor, so that a more stringent policing of the border would
actually cast the local economy into severe chaos. What might we make of the
scapegoating of these immigrants, then, since their continued presence is necessary to the
economic well-being of the region?
It would be simplistic to say that this immigrant-bashing is “just” scapegoating,
for it works too well. If it were just scapegoating, would it not be sufficient to reveal the
truth of the matter and to demonstrate the area's dependence on immigrants, and the fact
that the picture of the immigrant as the “lazy stealer ofjobs” is a gross contradiction?
The reason why the persecution of immigrants works as an function of ideology is
precisely because they are understood as coming from another culture, marked by an
other language, other beliefs and other practices. This cultural difference, furthermore,
cannot be mitigated, for the other must remain other, so that we may maintain the belief
that, “were it not for their presence, we would all be happy and united, we of this
culture.”
Consequently, the belief in the fundamental presence of different cultures is a
belief enacted, not because it accurately describes reality-as-such. but because this fiction
is necessary for the maintenance of the imagined unity of “our desire, our culture. To
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give this a more concrete form, we could consider the case of paper money. At one
point the ‘‘value" of money was coterminous with the material out of which it was
formed. Thus the “value" of a gold coin was the “value" of the gold contained in the
coin. But with the advent of paper money, all that remains is the form of money itself;
the paper itself is “worthless." So wherein lies the “value" of paper currency? The
answer is that its value depends completely on the beliefthat it is “worth something,"
that despite the fact that I and others know full well that it is “merely" a worthless piece
of paper, we nonetheless believe that it possesses value. It is sufficient to simply tear up
a piece of paper money to experience the depth and strength of this belief.62 Thus,
culture “possesses value" only if I and others believe that it constitutes a coherence
which cannot be broken up; once I admit the radical contingency of the practices, beliefs,
etc., which comprise “my culture,” I have come to acknowledge the radical contingency
of sociality itself.
The various manifestations of “different" cultures can thus be understood as
being unstable partitions of the Symbolic which each possess their own internal logic of
coherence. The myth of cultural integrity, the idea that “we" are a people organized and
grouped by certain practices, rituals, codes, etc., is thus a fundamental misrecognition of
62
Zizek suggests that the function of paper money is to signal the transition from the
Subject to the barred-Subject, for the historical development of paper currency includes
as a moment an intermediary stage whereby paper currency was issued by banks, payable
to the bearer. It is not simply the case that the money thus acquires its value from the
fact that the bearer has been “universalized," and could be “anyone," but rather that
money acquires its value when we, as subjects, come to the recognition that this “bearer
stands in for us, in that we ourselves are contingent beings, “bearers" of accidental,
empirical characteristics. See Tarrying with the Negative, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1993), pp. 27-29.
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the Symbolic, the Big Other, whereby each of us “Americans" believes that the master
signifier which organizes our culture is closer to what “reality" is than other signifiers.
Take the American belief in “democracy,” for example. One cannot question the status
of democracy without being subject to strong recriminations: to question democracy is
to be communist, anti-human, totalitarian, etc. But given the fact that the American
political system, which so loudly professes to be democratic, is arguably not very
democratic at all
,
6
’
what sense could we make of this fetishization of the notion of
democracy? And to keep things fair here, consider the notion of Chinese '"tradition.”
Chinese politicians and philosophers make frequent reference to the notion of some
inherent Chineseness as embodied and demonstrated in Chinese tradition by citing
various historical sources, texts, parables, and so on. But what happens when we take
into account the fact that the majority of the “classics” of the Chinese intellectual
tradition are works compiled over hundreds of years, forgeries, edited compilations, and
misattributions?
64 What is one to make of one’s tradition if that tradition has been
forged?
6 ^
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See, for example, Lani Guinier’s critique of the American "winner take all system of
electoral politics in The Tyranny of the Majority, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1994 ).
64
See the forthcoming (Columbia University Press) translation of the Confucian
Analects, in which the translators (E. Bruce Brooks and Taeko Brooks) have practiced a
sort of hermeneutical “science" in order to differentiate between different historical
strands of thought in the Analects to show that the work, far from being the work of a
single man, the “greatest teacher” in Chinese history, is instead the work of multiple
authors, each appending and developing the ideas of those before him. so that the final
text as it appears today represents nothing like a “text’ as we understand it a line
ot
thought developed as written down (in some form or another) by an author.
65 Ann Ferguson has pointed out to me, quite correctly I believe, that perhaps the notion
ol
Confucius as an author serves as a unifying fiction whereby discourses which are
evolving
attempt to stabilize themselves by arrogating to themselves the legitimacy ol
an origin
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The point of all this, of course, is not to simply say that culture does not exist and
that those who think that they belong to some culture or another are thus deluded. This
would simply reduce culture to the status of a “false belief,” a purely imaginary fantasy
which could be dispelled through demonstration and sound argument. Far from it:
cultures are very real in their effects— they govern and regulate social and individual
behavior and limit certain historical possibilities for the group which identifies it as the
mutually acknowledged object of desire. Further, what gives culture its “reality,” what
informs it with meaning, is the link between the individuation which occurs in the
Imaginary register as it intersects with the level of the Symbolic. Culture then, has a real
tie to the level of the individual on the level of desire. The individual is not merely an
effect of interpellation into the Symbolic because what cannot be factored out as solely
the effect of the Symbolic is the presence of desire. The individual desires to identify
with/as some culture or another, since it is this culture which functions as the basis of
individual identity. Recently, I was purchasing roast duck in a shop in Chinatown (an
extravagance I am perhaps overly fond of) when two white, middle-aged couples^
happened to wander by the shop, picking their teeth with toothpicks. They observed
with disgust (by frowning, recoiling, and so forth) the roast ducks hanging in the
grounded in an “author.” As such, she argues, the concept of‘forgery” really does not apply.
However, my point here is that many Chinese texts simply accept this authorial legitimacy
without question. Witness the scores of Chinese dictionaries which provide pinpoint dates for
the origins and births of figures in Chinese antiquity for which there is no archaeological
evidence. This insistence on their facticity is precisely an attempt to ignore the constructed
nature of“Chinese tradition” by claiming that they are instead historical fact, despite the lack
ofevidence for being such. “Forgery” then, ought perhaps to be taken in the sense of
“constructed,” and not in the sense of the substitution of the inauthentic for the authentic.
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This identification is made solely on the basis of observation.
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window, and all agreed that there was something strange with this way of doing things.
On one level, this is simply cultural intolerance'’— the expression of disgust at practices
in which one does not engage. But at a more significant level, this recoiling at the
disgusting, traumatic presence of dead, roast ducks, heads and all, signals the assertion
of cultural identity at the level of desire— “Who would want to eat that?” Or perhaps
more accurately but unspeakable, “What American would want to eat that?” Thus,
although we might understand culture as a sort of discourse, it is nonetheless a discourse
enacted by the presumption of the unidirectional desire of the subjects who identify
themselves with that culture. The expression of disgust at the hanging ducks reflects not
so much an “unwillingness to experience the culture of the other,” as much as it does the
insistence on the alterity of the other’s desire. “We,” all desire the same things.
If culture functions as a way of suturing up the heterogeneity of the aggregate of
individuals who comprise a society, and if its ideological functioning depends upon a
certain misrecognition, a conflation of the limits of the home culture with the sphere of
all that is “human,” the universalization of the particularity of the home culture, then it is
perhaps time to turn to the case of philosophy, that once self-proclaimed, universal
“queen of the sciences,” in order to demonstrate and trace the circuitry of the cultural
machine delineated here. For ifwe examine the case of the emergence of “Western
philosophy” and its assumption of the role of “Philosophy proper,” apropos of that
offhand comment of Hegel’s which began this chapter, we will find that what happens in
the world of philosophy sheds light on the status, not only of philosophy, but of culture
as well. As I will show in the following chapters. Western philosophy has had a history
of attempting to distance itself from the reality and materiality of culture, trying
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desperately to present itself as something universal and beyond the constraints of culture.
This is not to say that this is not true of other philosophies and that they have not
performed the same distancing function. But what is different in the case of Western
philosophy is the fact of the erasure of its own cultural distinctiveness in the pure
structures of its philosophy, while non-Western philosophies tend to cast this difference
in terms of an ethnicity which is not erased but rather affirmed. Thus, what are we to
make of the Western “resistance to culture” and how might that recast the cultural
difference which underlies the perceived “gap” between Western and non-Western
philosophies? It is with this in mind, as well as the reconceived concept of cultural desire
developed here, that I turn to the analysis of a certain philosophical “cultural” difference.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LOCATION OF DIFFERENCE
3.1 The Cultural Problem
History of China. I only believe histories whose witnesses are ready to
be put to death.
Which is the more credible of the two, Moses or China?
There is no question of the broad view. I tell you that there is enough
here to blind and to enlighten.
With this one word I destroy all your arguments. ‘But China obscures the
issue,’ you say. And I reply: ‘China obscures the issue but there is light
to be found. Look for it.’
Thus all you say serves one of these purposes without telling against the
other. So it helps and does not harm.
We must look at this in detail, then. We must put the evidence on the
table.
—Pascal, Pensees
If there is something to be gained by an analysis of the history of “Western”
philosophy with an eye to those desires which are articulated in the language of culture,
the question may then be asked: what is it, exactly, that is desired here, and what is the
status of that subject which desires? For if the desire to be recognized as the
representative of some culture is part of the constitutive fantasy regulating the operation
of social space, then what are we to make of the fact that one can discern within the
texts of what is designated as “Western” philosophy the clear traces of an evolving form
of self-understanding grounded upon an unquestioned culturally? Thus, this chapter
begins the task of tracking the signification of Chinese philosophy as it appears within
and is delineated by what ultimately understands itself as being Western philosophy. In
other words, this chapter begins an analysis along the trajectories traced in the previous
chapter by examining the functionality of a certain “cultural difference as it operates
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within (Western) philosophical texts. For if the previous chapter was successful in
problematizing the uncritical usage of “culture,” then what are we to make of the idea of
cultural difference? If culture is an unstable conceptual category, linked to both the
discursivity of knowledge production as well as the workings of desire and subjectivity,
then the espousal of differences between cultures must be suspect as well. What we
discover, as we begin to examine philosophical texts which treat of the difference
between “Western” and “Chinese” philosophies, is precisely that differences in
philosophical outlook are understood to be grounded upon differences in culture.
Consequently, our analysis begins by attempting to determine the operational utility of
cultural difference within those texts which purport to tell us something about the
differences between us and them, between their thought and ours.
The reason for this focus stems, not so much out of the urge to “correct”
misreadings of the true meanings of Chinese philosophical texts ,
1
but out of the belief
that part of the basis for the theoretical and conceptual difficulties generated within the
contemporary debates over the status of culture and the practice of multiculturalism can
be more fruitfully resolved by recourse to an analysis of the very desire for culture itself.
Also, if there is ever to be the development of something we could call “comparative
philosophy,” the cultural differences which are said to underpin differences in
philosophies must be rigorously examined. What will be discovered here, then, are not
the truths of Chinese philosophy, but perhaps the silent presence of a generally
1
Indeed, this very urge owes its existence to the unquestioned assumption of the
“difference” between cultures, a difference assumed to grounded within the ineluctably
different “essences” which constitute the cultures in question.
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unacknowledged ethnicity of “Western' philosophy/ Consequently, the aim here is to
move beyond the simplistic claim that Western philosophy is Orientalist in its
apprehension of those deemed to be cultural others and to attempt to effect a disruption
of the conceptual coherence of “Western” philosophy itself. I wish to show that what
the continual presence of “Chinese philosophy” within the texts of “Western philosophy”
points to is thus not simply the fossilized lines of deeply embedded Orientalist ways of
thinking, but rather the positive traces of the centrality of the desire for culture within
what comes to understand itself as “Western philosophy.” For without the ability to
point to some philosophical other. Western philosophy might perhaps never have risen to
a certain level of cultural self-consciousness and thus come to identify itself as “Western
Philosophy.” To refer to these positive traces as “just” Orientalist thought in need of
reform is to ignore the constitutive moment of cultural desire and to thus construe it as
simply a sort of misguided mindset in need of a corrective visit by the PC-police.
The philosophical endeavor begun here is not meant to be exhaustive, however,
and can best be understood as a preliminary figuring of the presence of Chinese
philosophy in the philosophy of the West. For this reason, it was unnecessary to survey
the entirety of Western philosophy (a daunting task), and the analysis which follows this
chapter primarily focuses on a seemingly eclectic series of figures in the annals of
2
This ought not to be taken to mean the positing of some sort of “Western essence" at
the core of Western philosophy, but rather to suggest part of the argument which
follows, namely that part of the consequence of the representation of non-Westem
philosophies as always already marked by their home cultures is the inescapable
conclusion that Western philosophies cannot themselves escape the pull of culture.
Western philosophy thus becomes tightly culture-bound, foreclosed from the very
possibility of the universality it seems to arrogate to itself.
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philosophical history: Leibniz. Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx. Dewey, Russell, and Beauvoir.
It would have been interesting to have included as well a reading of Malebranche’s
“Discourse Between and a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher,” an inquiry
into Heidegger s fascination with the Dao De Jing, or even a critical survey of the
scattered, offhand comments and references to the Chinese and Chinese thought in the
works of Hume, Kant, Mill, Sartre, etc. But the text is instead focused on the chosen
figures because in each case, the quantity of text, as well as his/her individual notoriety
accords that case greater significance. Malebranche is hardly on an intellectual par with
Marx. Furthermore, despite the great disparity in the philosophical frameworks and
methodologies encompassed here, all of the personages surveyed approach the Chinese
and Chinese thought by assigning to it the status of a problem. For all the thinkers to be
considered (with perhaps the exception ofNietzsche), the Chinese and Chinese thought
appear as foreign objects which need to be integrated within the conceptual schemas
each develops and thus rendered comprehensible to the philosophical apparatus each
employs. Pascal's remarks above might therefore be seen as the quintessential statement
of the challenge posed by the “discovery” of Chinese civilization and the increasing
degree of cultural contact and interfusion: how are “we” in the West to understand
ourselves if the narratives of self-identity to which we have long been accustomed are
shown to be in need of revision?
3.2 The View from the Outside
The status of the Chinese problem is understandably different for each of the
thinkers to be considered in this work; I am not attempting to develop a monolithic
theory which completely captures all of the nuances of their approaches to the “Chinese
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problem. Rather, I am attempting to get at a certain commonality which runs
throughout their work, diverse as it is. What is therefore striking is the fact that
“Chinese” always locates a certain space, whether culturally or philosophically, outside
of what is implicitly understood to be the closed spheres of the “Western.” The relation
between West and East is always already rooted in the ineluctable difference between the
two, a difference which positions one culture outside of and detached from the culture of
the other. The point here is not that there is, in reality, “no difference at all,” but rather
to question the desire to maintain that this difference is real and grounded upon some
difference of cultural essence. What, exactly, is at stake in this desire? For the sake of
clarity, three general moments of philosophical desire have been isolated. First, there is
simply the assumption of the integrity of the social spaces governed by the laws and
regularities of different cultures. This is what will be examined in this chapter. In this
case, the desire for culture is understood as the desire for a position completely exterior
to the stifling, hermetically-sealed cultural space within which the “Western” thinker
finds him/herself. The desire for a sort of culturally free, theoretical space is not itself
the problem; the problem lies in the assumptions made with respect to cultural difference
which enable this theoretical jailbreak. Second, there is a sort of Western “self-
confirmation” which is to be found most prominently in the work of Leibniz. Hegel, and
Marx, and which will be examined in the next chapter. Finally, this “Western “self-
confirmation” is contrasted against the projection of a fantasy of Western “self-
fulfillment” as seen in the work of Dewey, Russell, Beauvoir, to be explored in Chapter
four .
3
These broad categorizations of approaches to that “other,” Chinese
3 The problem here is, of course, that a “fantasy of self-fulfillment” can be understood as
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philosophy/culture, are not meant to be essential definitions, however, permanently fixing
the status of the works of these thinkers within a particular configuration characterizable
too easily as Orientalist. We are after the logic of the desire for culture as embedded
within the enterprise of Western philosophy, and not merely the identification of certain
statements or modes of thought as Orientalist.
Apart from the designation of an exterior location, the assignation of the status of
a problem to the Chinese and Chinese thought also has the consequence of relegating to
them the theoretical position of being the object of investigation, a position analytically
external to that of the philosophical examiner. This exteriority, perhaps assumed for the
purposes of objectivity in the quest for knowledge, in turn reinforces the necessity of the
cultural alterity of the Chinese. For if they were too similar to us, it would be difficult to
suggest that the philosophical analyses which are produced are somehow free from the
bias of self-blindness and a certain lack of self-reflection. But this is not to suggest that
consequently there holds here a strict causal relationship, whereby the necessity of the
external position of the theorist is causally responsible for the cultural difference which
will be ultimately posited. Rather, what is being suggested here is the fact that the
cultural positioning of the philosophical theorist poses methodological problems which
itself a form of “self-confirmation.” The distinction between the two which 1 am
attempting here is thus a subtle one, relying for its efficacy on the distinction to be made
between the affirmation of the West's superiority as such (found in Hegel, for example)
as opposed to the affirmation of the West’s possibility. In other words, the division here
might be seen as centering upon a certain loss of innocence: the moment of self-
confirmation locates the giddy moment when the West seemed to present all human
possibility in its industrialization and conquest of the globe, whereas the fantasy of self-
fulfillment occurs after the realization (prompted by the eruption of earth-shattering
global war(s)) that the possibilities embodied by “Western” culture were hardly being
brought to actuality by the practices of those cultures.
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obfuscate the supposed facticity of the cultural difference presumed to exist between
Western and non-Western philosophies. The very identification, therefore, of the
Chinese as a theoretical problem already presents the Chinese as an externalized object
of investigation, a system whose limits are already drawn.
This chapter is thus primarily concerned with the location of cultural difference:
How is this difference understood? How is it utilized, and for what ends? What might
therefore constitute an appropriate segue into this investigation is a preliminary analysis
of this view from the outside, as evidenced in the opening remarks in Michael
Brannigan's The Pulse of Wisdom
4
,
purportedly an introductory text to the philosophies
of India, China, and Japan. Although the text itself is trivial, being only one of the
ubiquitous, generalized introductory readers mass-produced for university-level “cultural
diversity" courses, the stance which the text adopts with respect to the object of its
concern is not. In fact, a brief examination of this stance serves to provide a good
example of the argument that has just been made concerning the problematic, exterior
status of the “cultural difference” of the Chinese.
In Brannigan' s preface to his text, he describes how his mother (who is Japanese)
once brought to his sixth grade classroom a hand-carved replica of a Japanese home. He
recalls, among other things, the excitement at unraveling the mysteries of its interior,
claiming at the end of the anecdote that ‘the more precious lesson had to do with the
idea that we never really begin to know a house until we live in it for a time. What we
4
Michael Brannigan. The Pulse of Wisdom, (Belmont: Wadsworth. 1995).
5
Michael Brannigan, The Pulse of Wisdom, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), p. xiii.
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therefore need with respect to Asian philosophy (it is never clear, of course, to whom
^e refers) is Ihis view-from-within,' in order to properly begin to understand it.
What could this banal anecdote add to the (introductory) reader’s understanding
of Asian6 philosophy? If we accept what it claims to offer us, namely the provincial
wisdom of a sort of ethnic relativism, then we are left only with the perhaps correct, but
analytically useless adage that one cannot understand what one has not experienced, and
that one must “live as they do” in order to “understand what they think.” To have
“lived” in another world is to better “understand” that world. Thus, what is proposed
here is a sort of “First Principle" in the hermeneutics of multicultural caution: do not be
so quick to judge the thoughts and ideas of others until you have considered the
conceptual contexts in which they live and think.
But if that is all that is to be gleaned here, all we know is that I cannot
understand you
,
the reader of this text, until I have lived in your world for a period of
time. This is probably no surprise, as it is a commonplace and intuitive notion which we
all have of the lives and experiences of other human beings. Where, then, does “the
Asian” appear in this? For it appears that while we might understand the limitations of
our own individual experience and intuitively know that we cannot have unlimited access
to the thoughts and experience of other human beings, we nonetheless want to say that
the experiences ofsome subset ofhuman beings are “closer,’ more knowable, than that
6Of course, Brannigan simply ignores the fact that “Asia" refers to a far larger cultural
are than simply “China, India, and Japan,” his definition of what constitutes the “Asian"
cultural system. His naive usage of the term simply reflects contemporary usage, which
somehow “sees” the Middle East, Islam, the Soviet Union, and so on, as simply
subsumed within the category “Asian,” which for Brannigan designates only China.
India, and Japan.
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of other groups of human beings. Living here in America, it seems perfectly fine and
indeed, reasonable, to say that not only is my experience different from the experience
of the people living in China, but to go even farther and say that my experience is more
similar to those who also live within the United States. How. then, to account for this
difference?
Let us return to the anecdote recounted above. Is it really the case that
Brannigan and his sixth grade peers have actually “lived" inside that Japanese home?
Clearly not. What has happened, although Brannigan would be loath to admit this, is
that he and his classmates have examined the interior of the Japanese home from a rather
tton-empathic perspective, one homologous to the epistemological standpoint of
“Western" science. For it is this perspective, which clings to the notion that the
investigation of an object from the exterior yields knowledge as to its essence, which
permeates his account. How else are we to understand that he claims to have
understood the house “from the inside.” as though he had lived within it? The
investigation of an object from the outside, or perhaps more accurately in this case, from
the perspective of Gulliver, does not constitute so much the acquisition of a subjective
“having-walked-in-your-shoes” perspective as much as it mirrors the perspective of an
ornithologist examining with delight the nest of some exotic species of unfamiliar bird.
This perspective from the exterior is no accident, for it returns when Brannigan
turns his attention to what appears prima facie to be the greatest obstacle in the
philosophical encounter between West and East: the task of translating between
languages. In his brief introduction “to” the Chinese section of his introductory reader.
Brannigan writes that “In Chinese, characters replace the alphabet used by most other
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languages. These characters are ideographic representations within an experiential
context. Therefore, the language lacks grammatical precision.”7 There are already
several glaring problems with this “argument” as it stands, particularly in the curious
‘therefore, but we read on to discover that “We are not claiming that intuition is
stressed in China at the expense of rationality or logic. Chinese philosophy does exhibit
various degrees of analytic sophistication.”8 Let us pause here: if it is indeed the case
that the Chinese language “lacks grammatical precision.” then what on earth could that
Chinese “analytic sophistication,” that Chinese “logic” be? If we accept that the
development of (Western?) philosophical logic is the consequence of a peculiar
allegiance to Aristotle's emphasis on the validity of “arguments” as a function of form
and also agree that Chinese as a language lacks a precise grammatical form, then does it
not follow that Chinese logic is theoretically impossible, except perhaps as some form of
multi-valued logic, something which would be, at any rate, theoretically distinct from
what is considered to be logic in the West?
Brannigan's problems again lie in his intuitions, this time his intuitions about
language. Here, he conflates “language” and “writing” when, had he been more careful,
he might have remembered Saussure’s claim that “Language and writing are two distinct
systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first.”
9
Brannigan's “therefore” completely denies the idea that “language” might be anything
other than a system of writing. We see again Brannigan's adherence to the
7
Michael Brannigan, The Pulse of Wisdom, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 4.
8
Michael Brannigan. The Pulse of Wisdom, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 4.
9
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1959), p. 23.
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epistemological superiority of the perspective of the exterior, whereby not having lived
the language, experienced it from the inside, he nonetheless makes claims as to its
essence (here precision ) from the point of view of the supposedly objective
investigator. Indeed, the obvious question arises when we recall that he emphasizes the
cognitive importance of apprehending the “experiential context” in coming to terms with
Asian thought. We would want to know, at this point in our inquiry, whether or not he
actually speaks Chinese. For how else could he claim that Chinese “lacks grammatical
precision?”
This interlude, into a text significant only because it provides a clear example of
the underlying assumptions of cultural difference which ground excursions into
“comparative” philosophy, raises the question of the perspective afforded by Chinese
philosophy, for at the foundation of Brannigan's account is the experiential difference
between the philosophies of West and East. We have been asked to accept the
difference in philosophical perspective based solely on the “fact” that these are
philosophies produced and promulgated by people who are not us. In other words, the
only conceptual basis given for the difference in philosophies is the fact that the labels
“Western” and “Asian” refer to the philosophies of other people who belong to different
cultures .
10
Given the audience of the text, there is no guarantee that its readers will have
ever talked in the shoes” or spoken the languages of those whom it claims to present.
10
The linguistic difference here is also understood along the cultural divide, for
Brannigan constructs Chinese as an experiential language. Although it is unclear what a
non-experiential language is (mathematics? chemical notation? English?) the
identification of the “ideographs” of Chinese as grounded in experience marks the
situation of the linguistic difference within the lived experiences, and thus the culture, of
the unfamiliar lives of cultural others.
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Indeed, the result of this assumption is the hermeneutic foreclosure of the text's explicit
goal: understanding the philosophies of cultural others.
With the difficulties generated by the insistence upon the cultural divide and its
attribution to certain subsets ofhuman groups, why preserve the distinction as it stands?
Might it not be preferable to attempt to recast the standard classificatory schematics of
culture along other, less problematic lines? We are thus returned to our question of the
very function of this classificatory scheme of culture— what purpose does it serve? For
our present concern, we could delimit the scope of this question to address solely the
field of philosophy and recast it thus: how does the preservation of a distinction between
cultures function in the field of philosophy? Why would it be necessary to maintain
cultural distinctiveness and is it unavoidable?
It might now prove fruitful to examine specific examples of the functionality of
the Chinese signifier in the texts and philosophical structures of “Western’' thinkers who
maintain the structural rigidity of the cultural divide. Consequently, I wish now to
explore the deployment of “Chineseness” in the thought of Foucault and Nietzsche. In
Foucault, we will discover the utility of the confrontation with a radically foreign other,
echoing something similar in the work ofNietzsche. For in both Foucault and Nietzsche,
we encounter something which could be described as the theoretical functionality of the
Chinese signifier. In other words, the role that is to be played by “China" in their
thought is one whereby China “marks” a privileged perspective from which to objectively
survey, from without, the entirety of Western thought. Indeed, we might even question
whether “China” in Foucauldian and Nietzschean parlance need necessarily refer to some
materially existent culture and people. Since what is theoretically required is simply a
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foreign perspective, they might just as well have chosen the perspective of
extraterrestrial beings. Although the reason for selecting this perspective might lie in the
fact that these aliens would be nothing at all like us, possessing not even a minimal level
of humanness, we might ask here whether the common humanity accorded the Chinese
does, in fact, bring them any closer to us humans in the West.
3.3 Foucauldian Laughter
Foucault writes in the preface to The Order of Things that his book was bom out
of “a laughter that shattered... all the familiar landmarks ofmy thought— our
thought.”
1
1
The source of this mirth of destabilization. Foucault tells us, was a passage
from Borges which recreated a table of categories from “a certain Chinese
encyclopedia,” a table which ordered the multiplicity of animal life into such seemingly
absurd and biologically useless categories as animals which “belong to the Emperor,” or
which are “included in the present classification,” or which “from a long distance off
look like flies.”
1
' Furthermore, there is an uneasiness in this laughter which has its roots
in the fact that Borges locates this foreign classificatory scheme in the “mythical” lands
of China. For indeed:
In our dreamworld, is not China precisely this privileged site of space? In
our traditional imagery, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the
most rigidly ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached
to the pure delineation of space. . .. There would appear to be, then, at the
other end of the world we inhabit, a culture entirely devoted to the
ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of
existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to
1 3
name, speak, and think.
11
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. xv.
12
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. xv.
13
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. xix.
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It is therefore this very absurdity of those nonsensical Chinese categories which leads
Foucault to question the West 's “a priori,” the grounds on which Western thought is
systematized, ordered, classified, and made possible. This species of a priori
, Foucault
contends, allows for the production of knowledge precisely because its objective status is
unquestioned. Thus, from the fact that Foucault sees that ‘Ihere would appear to be” a
culture whose categories for classification and the production of knowledge are
understood to be and recognized as arbitrary, Foucault is driven to a Nietzschean
laughter as he simultaneously recognizes the impossibility of the Western a priori s
unquestionably.
But despite the fruitfulness of Foucault's laughter and subsequent philosophical
enterprise, there nonetheless remains for him an unthought here, namely, the very gulf of
incommensurability between China and the West which first enabled him to perceive in a
burst of laughter the arbitrariness of Western knowledge: the fact that “there would
appear to be” a culture radically foreign and incomprehensible to us, situated at the other
end of the world. For how are we to understand the fact that to Foucault there would
appear to be (not “/V’) a culture “at the other extremity of the world we inhabit” which
“does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories which
make it possible for us to name, speak, and think?” Who is it that comprises this “we” to
whom the Chinese seem so incomprehensible, so epistemologically and ontologically
distant? Why would “we” be so predisposed to think in these terms, in terms of an “us”
and “our thought” as opposed to
kkthem and “their thought?” Are ‘Ihey” who occupy the
position of the inscrutable “China” fictitious beings, produced from the discursive effects
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of the ‘would appear to be,” and thus lacking the solidity of the “real” existence “we”
possess?
Given the project which Foucault sets for himself in The Order of Things, that of
an inquiry into the conditions of possibility for the emergence of Western knowledge and
theory, it would seem that the unasked question here resolves into something like the
following: what are the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a knowledge about
China and the Chinese? What is the historical a priori at work behind this seemingly
facile distinction? Why would there ever have appeared to “us” the idea of a culture so
distant, so incomprehensible, so incommensurable with “our” own?
I have already suggested that it is the very fact of a presupposed radical alienness
of a Chinese system of ordering which renders visible to Foucault the arbitrariness of
“Western” categories of knowledge, but we see too that China’s location “at the other
extremity of the world we inhabit” marks its ontological separation as well; the Chinese
are not only distant from the “us” in the “West” epistemologically. For since they inhabit
the other extremity of the world, they are perhaps consequently radically different,
Chinese beings. Whether or not there actually exists such a thing as a “Chinese being” is
not the issue. What is at stake are the fossilized mechanisms of a certain historical logic
which delimits the realm of possible meanings of China and Chineseness in order that it
might possess a peculiar utility for “us,” here at the other end of the world, an imagined
usefulness for understanding “ourselves” and “our thought.”
Curiously then, the founder of contemporary discourse theory, which has yielded
many strategic and politically useful insights, is here blind to the profoundly political
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positioning of his own philosophical endeavor. Gayatri Spivak, in “Can the Subaltern
Speak9”, poses the question of Foucault’s politics in the following manner:
Although Foucault is a brilliant thinker of power-in-spacing, the
awareness of the topographic reinscription of imperialism does not inform
his presuppositions. He is taken in by the restricted version of the West
produced by that reinscription and thus helps to consolidate its effects.
The clinic, the asylum, the prison, the university, seem screen-allegories
that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism 14
Although Foucault recognizes that there is a vested political interest in the production of
knowledge, he has not seen his own complicity in the political discourses of the West.
Thus, his usage of the cultural other is here suspect, overwritten perhaps with the
historical legacy of an imperialist past which conceals the “unthought” of a facile
differentiation made between the cultural spaces of West and East.
In fact, his assumptions about culture and its functions are even more
problematic, as when on the next page he attempts to produce the theoretical ground
which he will attempt to capture in the analyses of The Order of Things. Here, he draws
a distinction between the “fundamental codes of a culture,” those schemata which govern
languages, perceptions, exchanges, and so forth, and the “scientific theories and
philosophical interpretations” which serve as juridical mechanisms to establish the verity
of the fundamental codes. But in between these two extremes, Foucault claims, there is a
nebulous middle ground wherein “...a culture, imperceptibly deviating from the empirical
orders prescribed for it by its primary codes. . . frees itself sufficiently enough to discover
that these orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones; this culture then
finds itself faced with the stark fact that. . . order exists
” 15
14
Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” p. 84.
15
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. xx.
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My quarrel here is not with his claim that this middle ground between cultural
codings and their legitimization in the fields of science and philosophy exist as the very
space of order, but rather with the peculiar wording which seems to attribute to
“culture” a sort of consciousness on the order of individual subjectivity. In other words,
in his phrasing, culture becomes understood as something primary, something on the
order of the liberal conception of the individual within society. Each culture possesses
its own codes and might reach a point where it recognizes the limitations of these codes,
whether it is in the conflict with an other, or with itself. So far so good. This conception
of culture is similar to that developed in the previous chapter with reference to Lacan.
But what would generate, in the Foucauldian case, the dissonance necessary for a culture
to begin to free itself? Why would a culture ever begin to think it necessary to free
itself from its own regulatory codes? Is it simply the fact of contact with an other
cultural code which presents possibilities hitherto unimaginable? If so, then cultural
difference is theoretically necessary as the dialectic of cultural change, a dialectic
grounded, I would argue, in the desires of the individuals who comprise that culture.
But it is the desire of the individuals who inhabit culture which remains
unaddressed in Foucault’s neostructuralist account. The failure to acknowledge the
presence of the individual desire to be the embodiment of a particular culture produces a
conception of culture wherein individuals fulfill their roles with all the regularity of the
gears and wheels of a machine. Where, then, does the “consciousness” which Foucault
seems to attribute to a culture arise? How does a culture become aware of itself, if not
for the individuals comprising it sensing that something “isn’t quite right?”
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In this context, then, the Foucauldian position is clear: although Foucault quite
astutely describes the modes of epistemological production within the West, the strength
of his analysis is seriously compromised by the fact that he leaves unexamined the notion
of a culture as a strangely self-conscious, monolithic, homogeneous entity, as well as the
imperialist imagination which underwrites the modernist experience of cultural alterity.
Foucault s conceptualization of the human sciences as founded upon a notion of man
which had to be discursively produced and which is thus far from being a universal fact
of nature is theoretically and politically incomplete. What is lacking, then, is the work
supplied by much of contemporary postcolonialist theory— the fact that the discursive
notion of the universal human subject is enabled by its conceptual grounding on the
notion of cultural others and the critical reworking of the concept of culture. In
Foucault’s case, it is this very dreamworld of imagination wherein the cultural others
inhabit geographical spaces on the other side of the planet that provides him with the
critical distance necessary for his project. Western theory needs its others as the
precondition for its own existence.
But has this always been the case? Should we simply add this usage of the
cultural other to the long list of evils associated with the phenomena of empire-building
in the colonial era and applaud ourselves for our deft analytical skills? It might be
suggested that this functioning of the cultural other is merely an aftereffect of the ways in
which the social spaces of hitherto relatively non-interfiised social spaces violently
collided in the age of imperial conquest. But it seems that we really do not have enough
data on the matter to render a definitive judgment. Thus, let us examine the functionality
of the space of the Chinese other in the work of Nietzsche, for although Nietzsche is far
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from explicit in his political philosophy, his work in the critique of culture might provide
useful insights into our problem.
3.4 Nietzsche’s “Asiatic” Eye
From the vast amount of writings Nietzsche left behind, we find these two
curious statements with which to continue our investigation. First, he writes in 1884: “I
must learn to think more orientally about philosophy and knowledge. An oriental
overview of Europe, and he asks in 1 886 in Beyond Good and Evil', “...whoever has
really, with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye, looked into, down into the most world-
denying of all possible ways of thinking—
”
17
Within the contemporary terms with
which “Oriental thought is popularly viewed. Nietzsche's comments here might seem to
be only a rather banal variant of that Orientalist stance popular with those dreamier
practitioners of “Western” philosophy, an epistemological orientation which seeks to
juxtapose what is understood to be the destructive and mechanistic “rational” modes of
Western thought against the more “life-affirming” and ethical modes of thought
understood to be characteristic of what is generally named “Eastern Philosophy.” But
what is the difficulty with this? Do not these Eastern philosophies, these products of
Oriental minds, contrast sharply with philosophy as it is understood in the West? Is there
not some sense to this division of human thought into the poles. East and West? Is there
not, after all, a kernel of truth to this binary opposition?
16
Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe , Colli and Montinari. eds., 1 1:26, p.
317.
17
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, R. J. Hollingdale. trans., (New York: Penguin.
1972), §56.
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But apart from the facile bifurcation of the cultures of the world into West and
East, there is also the matter of the perspective which is advocated here. Nietzsche
seems to be suggesting that there is an alternative to European modes of thought,
distinctively different worldviews to be found in the perspective of the Oriental. Given
that one of Nietzsche’s philosophical projects is the advocacy of a different perspective,
indeed, that truth and value are themselves matters of perspective, what lies behind the
advocacy of the perspective of the Asiatic? Indeed, if Nietzsche believed that the best
manner in which to carry out a ruthless critique of the values of one's society was to
adopt the highest possible perspective, that which afforded the clearest view of that
which exists in a given society, then is there not here the suggestion that the Asiatic
perspective is (until the development of the ‘"supra-Asiatic eye,” of course) at least
higher than the perspective of the European?
18
Setting these questions aside for the moment, however, we might further argue
that what these Nietzschean statements reveal is also a certainfunctionality , whereby
Asia qua signifier derives its significatory power from its ability to serve either as an
antidote, a philosophical corrective to the various theoretical diseases of the West, or as
its stark opposite, throwing the contours of Western thought into sharp relief. In either
case, the Asian signifier designates something which is always already conceptualized as
the manifestation of a pure difference located along cultural trajectories. Thus, it makes
no difference what the actual content of the term “Asia or China is, so long as that
18
Assuming, of course, that Nietzsche intends the development of the perspective of the
Asiatic eye as the basis for the launching of a critique ofEuropean (French, German,
and so
on) cultures.
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term can be usefully counterposed against the philosophical, social, or cultural Western
systems one wishes to critique. Or to put it yet another way. 1 am suggesting that it is
only by being conceptualized a priori as non-West that “Asia” or “China” can
supplement the West, fill its “lack.” Thus, it is not so much the fact that “Asia” or
“China is “simply' a discursive fiction, emergent from the Western Orientalist discursive
machine, but rather what is at stake in the assertion of a cultural difference between the
two is thefunction of a peculiar, “Oriental” signifier which exists in the discourses of
both East and West.
19
This “Orientalist” function (if it still makes sense to call it that) is
subtly intertwined with the notion of cultural difference, theoretically grounded upon a
faith in the a priori separation between two incommensurable cultural spaces. A closer
examination of the function of “China” in Nietzsche’s texts will serve to further clarify
this line of argument.
Nietzsche utilizes “Chinese” as an aesthetic adjective twice in the last section of
Beyond Good and Evil. Both times, it serves to mark the expression of an artistic
impulse that succeeds only in capturing that which is “on the verge of withering and
losing its fragrance!”
20
In the first instance, Nietzsche locates Mozart with his “childlike
delight in curlicues and Chinese touches” at the death of a particular mode of musical
expression, one which resounded
tk
the last chord of a centuries-old great European
19
This “Oriental” signifier functions within “Eastern” thought by utilizing an assumed
homogeneous philosophy of the “West' as a means of coming to terms with, and in fact,
(re) inventing, itself. Witness, for example, the scathing critiques launched upon
Confiician tradition in the early twentieth century where, for some revolutionary or
progressive groups, complete Westernization was the solution to what became viewed as
an outmoded and stale Chinese Confucianism.
20
Friedrich Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, R. J. Hollingdale, trans., (New York.
Penguin, 1972), §296.
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tasted 1 In the second instance, Nietzsche speaks, as he often does, to a “We” (which
could either be himself or the community of philosophers who, along with Nietzsche,
recognize in their times the degeneration of the once-noble human spirit), but this is a
peculiar ‘We.” That is, the group with which Nietzsche seems to identify himself is “we
mandarins with Chinese brushes.” Nietzsche’s “Chinese” gesture thus consists of, in a
fashion similar to Mozart, the writing and capturing of ideas which will soon be
incomprehensible. As a philosophical “mandarin,” he represents philosophy's swan song
at the close of a decadent age.
If this were all that there were to Nietzsche's appropriation and utilization of
“Chinese”-ness, then there might be no problem, for we might understand it as simply
metaphorical. But taken in the context of the remainder of Nietzsche’s references to
China and the Chinese, we are faced here with what seems to be a paradoxical attitude.
That is. if Nietzsche believes himself to be a “mandarin with Chinese brushes,” then what
are we to make of the fact that he diagnoses European culture of his time as
“...becom[ing] thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more
mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian...?"" In fact, if
“Chineseness” is synonymous for Nietzsche with “ossification.” “physiological
regression,” “smallness” of heart, “castration,” “desiccated... stagnation,” and so on."'
21
Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, R. J. Hollingdale. trans., (New \ ork:
Penguin, 1972), §245.
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Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals, Walter Kaufinann, trans., (Vintage:
New York, 1967), I, §12.
23
See Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power Walter Kauffnann, trans., (New York:
Vintage, 1967). §127, §129, §395, §866; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil R.
J. Hollingdale, trans., (New York: Penguin, 1972), §267; Friedrich Nietzsche, “Why I
am a Destiny,” Ecce Homo, Walter Kauffnann, trans., (New York: Vintage 1967), §4.
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and we couple to this view of the Chinese as the archetypal “herd animal" Nietzsche's
understanding of culture as “above all. unity of style in all the expressions of the life of a
people, then what sense does it make at all to imagine that Nietzsche considered
himselfto be “a mandarin with Chinese brushes?” Why would Nietzsche resort to this
particular self-descriptive metaphor, one based in a culture he seemingly disparages,
especially when he calls Kant, one of his many philosophical targets, “the great
Chinaman of Konigsberg?”25
The simple response to this might be that since Nietzsche differentiates between
“culture” and “genuine culture,”26 this double sense of culture is at play in his use of
“Chinese.” In other words, apropos of the fashion in which he advocates the
development of a truly German culture in the face of what passes for German culture, his
appropriation of the Chinese brush signals a similar assault on the decadent “leveling”
culture of the Chinese. Actually, one might be able to extend this reading further, by
developing a Nietzschean critique of the Confucian “slave revolt in morality.” That is,
one could produce a reading of the Confucian termsjun zi and xiao ren 1 which attacks
24
Friedrich Nietzsche. “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” Untimely
Meditations
,
R. J. Hollingdale. trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),
§ 1 -
26
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , R. J. Hollingdale, trans., (New York:
Penguin, 1972), §210.
26
See Robert John Ackermann, Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look, (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1990). Chapter two provides a close reading of Nietzsche on
culture, based on the essay on David Strauss in Untimely Meditations.
27
Part of the revolutionary impact of Confucian thought can be argued to lie in the fact
that Confucius revalues the terms, jun zi and xiao ren. terms which originally refer to
station (i.e. “prince” and “small man,” by insisting that one can be ajun zi even if one is
not a member of the nobility. To qualify as ajun zi, one must possess the moral qualities
which characterize thejun zi; it is not sufficient (or even necessary) to be of noble birth.
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Confucius for imbuing the original valuations of these terms with moral content. In
other words, by infusingjun zi or “prince” and xiao ren or “small/petty man." terms
which refer to a social rank and position, with a moral and ethical sense, Confucius has
performed precisely a slave revolt in morality homologous to Christianity’s revaluation
of “good." Furthermore, since Nietzsche seems to believe that a critique of the
foundations of a society is best developed from the outside, from the perspective ofa
foreigner
,
he is ideally suited to perform this evaluation of Chinese culture, is he not?
It is difficult, if not impossible, however, to see how Nietzsche could seriously
have intended this critique of a culture about which he knew very little, if anything at all.
Indeed, his knowledge of “the Orient" was primarily limited to Indian philosophy and
Mahayana Buddhism? 8 and even these were sketchy subjects for him. What we are
perhaps left with then, is the functionality of “Chineseness.” something very much like
the manner in which the terms “Asia" and “Orient" function in the pair of remarks at the
beginning of this section, in which “Chinese" functions as the space of an artificial
perspective from which Nietzsche can, as a stranger in a strange land, gain distance from
his own, European culture in order to diagnose its ills. In the specific case of the
diagnosis of German culture, Nietzsche writes that although the learned German classes
could not imagine that their own culture, “the ripest and fairest fruit of its age," is in fact,
quite decadent, there is nonetheless an external position from which one can gain insight
into its nature. He writes. “The more cautious observer, especially ifhe is aforeigner.
28
See Johann Figl, “Nietzsche’s Early Encounters with Asian Thought," Nietzsche and
Asian Thought
,
Graham Parkes, ed., (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), pp. 51-
63.
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cannot help noticing that what the German scholar now calls his culture and that jubilant
culture of the new German classics differ from one another only in the extent of their
knowledge... [emphasis added] Thus, if one is to successfully work to transform the
value tables which govern a given “culture,” the only position which the theorist can
adopt is that of the externally positioned foreigner. It is in this mode, then, that he can
write in The Gay Science
,
for example, that:
China, for example, is a country in which large-scale dissatisfaction and
the capacity for change have become extinct centuries ago; and the
socialists and state idolaters of Europe with their measures for making life
easier and safer might easily establish in Europe, too, Chinese conditions
and a Chinese “happiness,” if only they could first extirpate the sicklier,
tenderer, more feminine dissatisfaction and romanticism that at present
are still superabundant here.
30
Here, Nietzsche's cultural critique requires a “leap to China” made both spatially and
temporally, in the comparison between the Chinese of “centuries ago” and the present of
Europe. The comparison of Europe to China and the power of this criticism of
European culture is rooted in the difference between the two. The suggestion that
China, which at this time was at the military mercy of Europe, was in fact stronger than
Europe might have compelled a reader at the time to think more carefully about the
supposed superiority of European culture.
But if it is the case that China and the Chinese are necessary to Nietzsche
primarily for the function they play, for the fact that the extreme foreign-ness of Chinese
29
Friedrich Nietzsche, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” Untimely
Meditations
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R. J. Hollingdale, trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),
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culture serves as perspectival distance from European culture, then what is important
here is not content
,
but form. It is unnecessary for Nietzsche to “get China right”: what
is necessary is that Chma lie on the “other side of the world.” that China and the Chinese
be maintained and understood as a distinct and independent cultural system outside of
Europe.
31
Chinese thought, or Chinese “Philosophy,” which Nietzsche almost never
addresses (with the exception of passing references to “Lao Tse” and Confucius in The
Antichrist
,
Twilight of the Idols
,
and The Will to Power32) is thus necessarily located
outside of the sphere of Western thought. Western and Chinese thought can only be
understood as distinct systems which might be compared or contrasted, since each
possesses independent and non-related constitutive principles which capture in a distilled
form the essence of that cultural system. Thus, while the West is seemingly forever
trying on different political forms, China represents the insistent and unchanging
adherence to a single, unalterable political structure. If the West is seen as
homogeneously dedicated to the principles of scientific observation and discovery, then
31
Perhaps this explains why so many texts attempting to relate Nietzsche to Chinese
thought possess the same tedious structure, i.e. “Here is some aspect of Nietzsche's
thought. Here is some aspect of X's thought (where X represents the Chinese thinker
under consideration). These are the similarities. These are the differences.”
30
‘ In these instances. Nietzsche treats Chinese thought as simply another item in a list, as
when in The Twilight ofthe Idols he writes: “Neither Manu nor Plato nor Confucius nor
the Jewish and Christian teachers have ever doubted their right to lie.” In The Antichrist
the usage is similar, when he proclaims that the “anti-realist”, searching for the
experience of a life unsullied by expression in language and signs would, “among
Indians... availed himself of Sankhya concepts; among the Chinese, of those of Lao-
tse— without having felt any difference.” In the first case here, more interestingly than
in the second, one gets the feeling that Nietzsche is after something universal, perhaps
the expression of a fundamental will to power w hich transcends the specificity of culture.
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China is similarly devoted to modes of thought which stress the immanence of things and
not the development of transcendent ordering principles. Thus, in addition to being
radically foreign to the West, the unchanging style of Chinese culture and thought
provides a stable point of reference, from which Nietzsche may survey the changes
which European culture is undergoing. Given that China “never changes,” one can glean
an understanding of European “civilization” by contrasting the vicissitudes of its
historical forms with the “durability” of the Chinese. 33
It is interesting, then, to note that those Chinese thinkers who accepted or
utilized Nietzsche, particularly those of the early 1920s, were focused on prescribing the
antidote to the stagnation of Confiician culture, an antidote developed by adopting the
perspective ofthe West. In other words, this intuitive reading of the relative differences
between cultures is simply accepted tout court as an accurate analysis of social facts, and
not as the predispositions of a certain perspective. For example, this
West :=change/China=stagnation dichotomy is adopted as part of the culture critique
mounted by Li Shicen and Lu Xun. 34 who attempted to throw off the dead weight of
centuries of Confiician culture as an impediment to the development of China as a
“modem” nation. Li, for one, writes:
I am not an advocate of Nietzsche, but after close consideration of his
thought, I cannot but admit its real value. We Chinese, due to our
33
Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power, Walter Kaufrnann, trans., (New York:
Vintage, 1967), §90.
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Both men were leading figures in the “May Fourth" incident in 1919. which is
generally considered to mark the beginning of the drive to transform and recreate
Chinese culture by actively pursuing and promulgating the development and practice ot
Western ideas. Lu Xun is primarily known for his highly satirical stories, written in (the
then revolutionary) baihua (ordinary language, as opposed to the complex, stilted styles
of classical Chinese).
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phlegmatic disposition, have been despised by the peoples of other
countries. Lacking the courage to advance and deficient in creativity, we
are docile slaves of custom, merely out of cringing timidity. Bringing up
such docile slaves is a waste of the country's money, giving birth to them
is a waste of the race's energy. I suggest that we might perhaps find the
salvation of these phlegmatic vassals in the thought of Nietzsche, who is
so reviled, abused and refuted by our countrymen.
Both Li Shicen and Lu Xun used a Nietzschean perspective as the vantage point from
which they hoped to forcefully vault China into modernity, from which it had until then
both excluded itself and been excluded. Nietzsche, who had used Chinese culture as a
point from which to critique Western culture, is thus reconfigured by them to serve as
the appropriate point from which to critique Chinese culture. In both the Chinese and
Western cases what imparts momentum to the moment of self-critique is the assumption
of the position of the radically foreign. By means of seeing one's self as though one
were aforeigner, a certain distance necessary for the successful execution of the self-
diagnostic is thereby attained.
But what is preserved in this type of theoretical maneuver, despite the
reorientation of “cultural" perspectives, is a fundamental ontological split between
cultures. Even though Nietzsche is seen as a means of transforming Chinese culture, the
manner in which he is utilized is strictly homologous with the contemporary Western
fascination with the “non-mechanistic" philosophies of the East. That is to say, the
invisible and unbridgeable difference between the cultures of the West and of China is
strictly maintained as a fundamental fact, as unquestionable as the claim that a pigeon is
35
Li Shicen, Li Shicen lunwen ji [Collected Essays of Li Shicen], as cited in David A.
Kelly, “Nietzsche and the Chinese Mind,” Nietzsche and Asian Thought . Graham Parkes,
ed., (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), pp. 156-157.
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not a hawk. Since the West is assumed to have always already been modem. Chinese
culture is always situated in a position of backward powerlessness, from which it can
only escape by being more Western than the West. 36 For the propagators of the May
Fourth movement, what served as a restorative force in Chinese culture, then, was the
complete repudiation and dismantling of traditional Chinese culture, the destruction of
the ancient idols of Chinese society. Nietzsche's reading of China as an ossified,
stagnant culture is accepted as accurate— in order for China to escape the unbearable
weight of its own centuries-old stagnation" the only solution is Westernization, the
conscious adoption and absorption of the Western cultural principle of change.
Is this the solution, though? Is Nietzsche’s assessment of Chinese culture
correct? Could it be possible that any society has gone unchanged for centuries? China
of Nietzsche’s time was surely different from China of the thirteenth century. What
serves as the index for evaluating the amount of change a “culture" has undergone?
Nietzsche certainly prides himself on the ability to perceive across long periods of
history, as in his declamation that the Christian slave revolt in morality was the result of a
“centuries-old struggle."
' 7
But the point here is that the evaluation of societal change is
accomplished with the theoretical tool of a certain perspective which, given the
36
Li Shicen, that cautious advocate for the adoption of Nietzschean thought, writes for
example that “the ineptitude, impotence and pitiable complacency of the Chinese is
beyond remedy....” Chaoren zhexue qianshuo [Outline of the Philosophy of the
Superman], as quoted in David A. Kelly, “Nietzsche and the Chinese Mind,” Nietzsche
and Asian Thought
,
Graham Parkes, ed„ (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p.
158. Given this description of the character of the Chinese and his advocacy of
Nietzsche cited above, the only conclusion can be that this “impotence” needs the
infusion of Western ideas and energy to restore it to power.
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Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy ofMorals , Walter Kaufmann. trans., (Vintage: New
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presumed, underlying differences between cultures, need not be applicable to the culture
under examination. 38 Thus, Nietzsche can perhaps be understood as a perpetuator of a
particular conception of China, one in which the Confucian tradition is understood as
freezing Chinese culture into a particular configuration. What I want to suggest, then, is
that what he produces in his scattered remarks about the Chinese is not so much an
accurate picture of the Chinese, but rather a cultural critique firmly grounded in the idea
of cultural separation, marked here by change or the lack thereof. What marks China
and the Chinese is an absolute lack of change, which is instead the guiding societal
principle within Western cultures. Although Nietzsche utilizes the notion of cultural
difference in a fashion dissimilar to other theorists we will examine, the fact remains that
his philosophical perspectivalism necessitates an ontological difference. The fact that he
chooses ‘"the East” as this utterly foreign perspective is perhaps simply a mirroring of
notions of culture already prevalent in his time. The end result is still, of course, the
absoluteness of cultural difference, a mirroring of the classic claim that, of course, they
are different from us.
But just how are “they” different? In the case ofNietzsche, we might be able to
argue that the difference of the Chinese is only the result of the theoretical necessity of
an external viewpoint located outside of Europe. But as suggested earlier, this necessity
is not simply one of theoretical necessity, for it could easily be argued that there does
exist certain unavoidable differences between the Chinese and the West. It Nietzsche has
38
Granted, there is here the question ofthe “higher” perspective, in that one could claim that
what Nietzsche sees, he sees from a higher perspective. As a preliminary response, I can
only
ask but what means the “higher” perspective is justified. From what perspective is
this the
“higher” point ofview?
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utilized the vantage point of a culture completely different from his own, positioned at
the far edges of the European cartographical imagination, there is nonetheless what
presents itself as a fact of cultural difference. For Nietzsche, we could understand this
fact as grounded in the expression of a distinctly Chinese style of life— the difference
between us and them thus consists of the differences which exist between their lives and
ours. But this would be quite the paradox, for the “grandfather of postmodernism'’ to be
claiming that there existed something resembling some form of cultural essence. So what
is it, apart from the pure contingency of geography, that constitutes this Chineseness?
3.5 Interlude: Chinese Essences
What could this be, this Chinese essence? For ifwe could clearly establish its
contours, then we would have resolved the question of other cultures once and for all:
they are different from us because they are like this There have been many attempts
to identify this essence, and any perusal of the “Chinese” philosophy section of a library
will suffice to produce some of the salient features of this essence. One finds that
Chinese culture is more “ethical”; it is more concerned with the immanental role of
human beings within the world, and not with the discovery and delineation of
transcendent first principles; it understands the cosmos as a working harmony and not as
a machine to be taken apart, etc. But what these descriptions of the Chinese essence fail
to take into account in their anxiousness to accurately detail the differences between
West and East is the fact that philosophy is not a politically neutral endeavor, nor is it
free from the historicity of meaning. The decision to interpret is not predicated upon
some clear access to truth but is rather the result of a historical trajectory which is too
easily forgotten. In the case of the difference between China and the West, what
95
historical possibilities exist for understanding this difference, and why are they possible?
Which rejected historical practices of understanding the "Chinese” lie in the dusty past of
the philosophical imagination? China and Chinese philosophy are not purely discursive
fictions, but neither do they possess any sort of objective meaning or essence which can
be unearthed vis-a-vis appeals to a “Chinese mind” or their “fundamentally Confiician
nature. The very attempt to ground an understanding of China and Chinese philosophy,
for example, upon the bedrock of Confucianism is part of the larger process of the
sedimentation of historical meaning. Philosophical objectivity in the attempt to
understand Chinese philosophy is impossible, not because the producers of these
attempts are not “Chinese” in some sense or another, but because there is no
philosophical escape from the historical. Philosophy itself is embedded within the
historical, in such a way as to its make claims to a pure understanding of its “objects” of
investigation theoretically and politically suspect. What is it that philosophy wants to
avoid? What secret letters lie at the bottom of its ancient box of papers? This is not to
say that Chinese philosophy does not exist, but rather that although Chinese philosophy
does, in fact, exist, the manner in which we understand it, come to apprehend its
meaning, and indeed, even label it as “philosophy,” is arbitrary, subject to the constraint
of a history too often denied in the process of adhering to one possibility of historical
interpretation.
Let us examine one of the primary essential differences between the West and
China, that of the peculiar Chinese ethicality. One of the grounds on which Chinese
thought and Chineseness are differentiated from Western philosophy is the fact that it
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tends to be focused on ethics?
9
due to its stronger concern with the immanental role of
human beings within the world than in the investigation of the transcendental realm
.
40
We read, for example, in Wang Gung-Hsing’s The Chinese Mind, an odd little text
which attempts to present an account of Chinese thought from the perspective of one
who claims, above all else, to be Chinese, that what is predominant in Chinese thought is
our humanistic thinking, and if we “name anything Chinese, chances are that it is more
or less linked with our moral perceptions .” 41 In fact, Wang understands the transition
39
See, for example, texts ranging from Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China,
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), especially chapter twelve, in which Russell “sums up
the Chinese character,” hoping that it may be possible to preserve “something of the
ethical qualities in which China is supreme,” p. 224, to James T. Bretzke, “The Tao of
Confucian Virtue Ethics,” The International Philosophical Quarterly, 35.1: pp. 25-41,
in which we find the thesis that the “inscrutability” of the “Orient” comes from a
misunderstanding of its fundamentally ethical character. Bretzke writes, for example,
that “An ethics of virtue has been indisputably the predominant tradition in Confucian
society [understood to be Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and societies “elsewhere”] and
though the Occident may regard the Orient as inscrutable at times, clearly no one has
ever credibly suggested that the latter is in a state of moral decay or chaos,” p. 27. I
have arbitrarily chosen these two examples, one from the distinguished Bertrand Russell,
and the other from a contemporary philosopher, because these represent the general
trend of attributing a fundamentally ethical character to the Orient and specifically China
and the Chinese. Other examples of this phenomenon are quite easily found.
40
This “distinction” between the theoretical foci of “Western” versus “Eastern”
philosophy appears throughout the literature on Chinese philosophy and I will merely
point out that it can be found prominently in the work of H. G. Creel, A. C. Graham, as
well as numerous others. Curiously though, proponents of this distinction often fail to
note that there existed a school of logicians in the Warring States period, who were
hardly concerned, as is typical with logicians, with questions of ethics. Furthermore, the
powerful political philosophy of legalism, which advocated the formulation of strict
codes of law to regulate the populace is highly amoral, reading more like a scientific
treatise on statecraft. But yet it is precisely this amoral political philosophy which
became the ruling philosophy of the first Dynasty, with a continual presence up until the
present.
41 Wang Gung-Hsing, The Chinese Mind, (New York: Asia Press, 1946), p. 4.
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from the “Confbcian past” of Chinese history to the modem present as marked by a
revaluation of Chinese ethics, for he suggests that:
many Chinese patriots, argue that during the last one hundred years
China has been suffering much at the hands of the imperialist powers. All
this is due to the fact that we know less about science and technology
than the West does. Hence, the Occident is ‘advanced’ while we are
backward.’ This might not have happened if Confucius had been less
insistent in stressing that aside from the subject of virtuous living nothing
is worth knowing. As it is, our scholars have been dominated so much by
ethical motives in their search for knowledge that they are unable to see
anything worth while beyond the moral horizon. Consequently the
inventive genius of the Chinese race has been sidetracked, and of science
and technology we know no more than our ancestors did in the days of
yore.
42
The claim that there exists something fundamentally more ethical about the
Chinese is often supported with reference to the fact that in the wake of China’s defeat
by British cannons during the Opium War, many proponents of Westernization argued
that what was needed were the superior armaments of the West, and not Western culture
and its products. The ethicality of the Confiician tradition was thereby preserved. But is
42 Wang Gung-Hsing, The Chinese Mind, (New York: Asia Press, 1946), p. 25.
Curiously, Wang Gung-Hsing’s work raises another critical issue, for he both claims to
be Chinese, and yet, as quoted, offers generalizations about the Chinese that might be
seen primafacie as an example of an internalized orientalism. But does this explanation
work? First, it suggests wrongly that there exists a truth about the situation which
Wang’s ideology-laden mind cannot penetrate, thus ignoring the fact that it is just as
feasible to read Wang as working within the logic of orientalism to preserve the
meaningfulness of what he perceives as “his” culture. In other words, we could read his
comments about the essential characteristics of Chineseness as an attempt to resist its
subordination within the matrix of West-China. Second, and most importantly, the
internalized orientalism thesis misses the point that it itself supposes that Western theory
is needed to rectify Wang’s misunderstanding. “If only Wang were more postmodern!”
The point to be made here is that the existence of the logic of a distinction between
China and the West, between two different and opposed characters, is itself the problem.
My work addresses this logic from the viewpoint of “Western theory,” which is taken to
be separate from something called a Chinese viewpoint. In order to complete the
analysis, an understanding from the supposed “other side,” from the point of view of the
ontologically distinct “Chinese,” is necessary.
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it really necessary to argue that this desire, to preserve what one perceives as one's
culture by a selective importation ot ideas from the West, be grounded in an essential
ethicality of the Chinese? If one loses a fistfight and remarks that one lost because of
inferior physical strength and training, is this any justification for claiming that one is
consequently more moral? The suggestion is that since what is desired are tools,
instruments, and not the “mindset" or culture, one is therefore preserving one's culture
intact; the Chinese essence will not be sullied and transformed by the simple addition of a
nuclear arsenal. In the case of the Chinese, this “addition" of Western science might
even produce what Bertrand Russell hopes will be “a genuinely new civilization, better
than any that we in the West have been able to create.”43
What happens, then, when this ethical essence becomes transformed? What
happens when the Chinese “essence" changes to adapt to its times? It is in this context
that a particular letter by Li Hung-Chang.44 written to a friend, pleads the case of
Westernization, as well as vents frustration at the seeming near-impossibility of this task
43
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina , (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 220.
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Li Hung-Chang, a curious figure in the politics of nineteenth century China, was bom on
the eve of the collapse ofthe Qin dynasty and the beginning ofa period of intense “national"
turmoil, and thus witnessed the collapse of the internal (to China) belief in the absolute
superiority ofthe middle kingdom. He thus watched as the West utilized its superior
weaponry and forces to compel China to enter the emerging global economy on the West’s
terms. As a result of the numerous Chinese defeats at the hands of the armies and navies of
the West, he urged the “modernization” of China, not because he felt that the culture of the
West was superior, but because he recognized the fact that the armaments of the West were
unmatched by the Chinese. He was consequently a driving force behind the “self-
strengthening movement" which began in 1871. This movement incorporated the formation
of foreign language schools, the construction ofgun factories, naval schools, and the
development of extensive coal and iron mines. Ultimately, however, there was great
opposition to modernization at all levels of the Chinese society of the period, and the
movement failed in most of its goals. See especially chapter eleven ot Immanuel C. Y. Hsu,
The Rise ofModern China , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
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within the context of a generalized popular denial of the China-West imbalance of power
in the late nineteenth century. It describes, among other things, his attempts to convince
the existing government of the necessity of a rail system in staving off the “barbarian”
invasion, and includes the following peculiar observation about his “fellow Chinese.” He
writes:
The gentry class forbids the local people to use Western methods and
machines, so that eventually the people will not be able to do anything....
Scholars and men of letters always criticize me for honoring strange
knowledge and for being queer and unusual. It is really difficult to
understand the minds ofsome Chinese [my emphasis].
This last line, that “[i]t is really difficult to understand the minds of some
Chinese,’'' from a letter written almost one hundred years ago, contains within it echoes
of the epistemological incommensurability between China and the West which I have
already suggested derives from a philosophical orientalism— the naive, unquestioned
assumption that China and Chinese thought are both distinct and radically foreign from
the “familiar” experience of the West. Although there are numerous ways of reading this
seemingly casual remark, one of these, which is difficult at best to defend as an
interpretation of Li’s statement, is precisely that which is often affirmed by Western
philosophy as it examines Chinese philosophy. This reading understands the meaning of
the statement as having to do with a sudden shift and discontinuity in Li’s thought (and
essence), so much so that Li is understood to be somehow no longer Chinese. Given
that the old order of Confucian China has been forever lost, due to the gunboats and
missionaries of the West, Li’s mind has been transmogrified by a (corrupting)
45 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise ofModern China , (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1983), p. 290.
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Westernizing influence so that in short, Li has become Western to such an extent that he
cannot understand his fellow citizens. The West here represents a bizarre sort of cultural
contagion, which replaces the natural, more ethical qualities of a “native” culture with a
self-interested, scientific, rational, in short. Western mode of thought. In the context of
the letter, it would seem that this reading, wherein Li’s mind has been corrupted by the
influence of the West and is thus no longer Chinese would be the least plausible, for how
would it be possible to understand this sudden shift in being, this abrupt historical change
of character? If it is indeed the case that the two poles of culture, China and the West,
are as distinct as seems to be implied by the ease with which the distinction is made, then
one is at least forced to argue that what has made the Western mode of thought so
predominant is not the fact that it was ever “closer” to truth, but that it simply possessed
adequate firepower to imprint its cultural superiority over those who had been historical
unfortunate enough as to not have devised cannons and naval warships.
We are now perhaps at a point where we possess an understanding of the
problematic status of a distinction which had seemed so easy to make, so intuitive and
unassailable. The differentiation between the Chinese and the West is based upon neither
objective history or simple “fact,” but is instead predicated upon a certain, already
existing mode of comprehending the Orient and imagining China. Thus, although
Jonathan Spence
46
claims that Said overgeneralizes, leaving out in Orientalism “too
much of the story,” because:
46
The eminent historian who likes above all else to write works of history which
incorporate original documents, narratives, and other information into peculiar literary
narratives that renders him. according to The Wall Street Journal , an expert explorer of
the frontiers where European and Chinese minds me[e]t.” See particularly his account of
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There have been so many twists and turns along the way to depicting
China during the last four hundred years that no such broad generalization
can hold. And that is at it should be. No one is easy to understand. And
the more blurred and multifaceted our perceptions of China become, the
closer we may be to that most elusive thing: the truth. 47
Spence himself still maintains this faith in the possibility of a truth about China and the
Chinese mind. In his hurry to defend himself from what he understands Said to be
saying, namely, that historians such as himself are guilty of displaying a “patronizing and
exploitative attitude toward Eastern civilizations,” Spence completely misses the point of
Said. Said is not concerned with rectifying a “patronizing and exploitative attitude,”
espousing instead a sort of universalizing “equal consideration of cultures.” On the
contrary, what I take to be the point of Said's work is the elaboration of the hitherto
unseen process of historical production which “creates” the object we investigate and
identify as an “Eastern civilization.” Much as “native” populations are understood by
clumsy anthropologists and sociologists as representing a crystalline relic of a primordial
human culture, so too, China and “the Orient” represent and are restricted to “the other
end of the world,” far removed from the comfortable familiarity of our “own” world. It
is not simply that there exists, on the one hand, “China and Chinese thought” and on the
other, “the West and Western thought” which need to be treated as equals from a
standard liberal point of view. Rather, what is contested is the very possibility of a
relation of equals, given the historical fact of a certain mode of comprehending “China”
and the “Orient.”
John Hu, a converted Jesuit who traveled to France only to become incarcerated in an
asylum for being seen as “mad” in The Question ofHu , (New York: Vintage, 1988).
47
Jonathan Spence, “Western Perceptions of China From the Late Sixteenth Century to
the Present,” Heritage ofChina: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization ,
Paul S. Ropp, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 13-14.
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Consequently, what is of crucial import in the investigation of the Chinese and
Chinese philosophy is not the relatively simple matter of being less biased in our mindset,
of attempting to treat them on an equal footing with the West. This view suggests that
one can simply overcome historical inertia by clearing away the distorting cobwebs of
“false beliefs” from one’s mind, that it is possible to isolate what one thinks from the
history within which one lives. It is precisely not a simple matter of equal rights, for in
such a view, all that we need to alter in our “approach” to China and Chinese philosophy
is some sort of unreflective predisposition, without any examination of what remains
after one has theoretically “become more open-minded.” What is missed in this
conceptualization is precisely the point of Said's critique and ofmuch of contemporary
postcolonial theory, namely, the historical and philosophical grounds upon which we
predicate our belief that there must exist fundamentally foreign, alien, different cultures
from “our own” which can be neutrally investigated with whatever apparatus of
knowledge we possess, anthropology, archaeology, sociology, philosophy, history,
psychology, and so forth. It is a matter of equal rights only ifone takes there to be
radically incomprehensible and different cultures from our own, cultures which are
inhabited by beings who think, act, and exist in a completely foreign way. Although this
assumption might be seen as harmless, as somehow necessary to expanding our own self-
conceptualizations, I want to argue next that even if it is such, this very assumption
renders impossible, in terms of its own logic , any sort of "understanding ot the “other
cultures.” This discussion will thus return us to the second aspect of the assumption of
cultural difference: the transformation of the other into an object of study. To
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accomplish this, I want to focus on one specific text: Robert Allinson's “An Overview of
the Chinese Mind," his introductory essay to Understanding the Chinese Mind.
3.6 Hybridity and the Problem of Other (Chinese) Minds
The very title of Allinson's text should suffice in itself, for given what has already
been said, we can suspect what we are about to discover within its pages. The book
itself is a rather typical collection of essays, all focused on Chinese philosophy, edited by
Robert Allinson, a member of the philosophy department of the Chinese University of
Hong Kong. If one subscribes to the logic of a necessary epistemological and
ontological split between China and the West, then one would see that as a Westerner,
and as a philosopher, Allinson is seemingly in a perfect position to write his introductory
essay “An Overview of the Chinese Mind.” Allinson speaks from a theoretical
perspective from which it is possible for him, not only to attempt to provide an overview
of the “Chinese mind,” (which, given the existence of over a billion “Chinese minds” is
rather remarkable) but without any significant examination of the historicity of this
particular way of dividing the world.
Allinson's essay begins in rather straightforward fashion. He writes: “In our
attempt to understand the Chinese mind, we must agree upon what we mean by
‘understanding,’ by The Chinese mind,' and by ‘philosophy.’”
48 We make clear, with
this properly philosophical beginning, that we do not assume we “know” what is meant
by the major terms in our sentence and thus wish to set about clarifying these terms,
producing arguments for some definitions and rejecting others, hopefully producing
48
Robert E. Allinson, “An Overview of the Chinese Mind,” Understanding the Chinese
Mind
.
Robert E. Allinson, ed., (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1.
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some philosophy at the end of the process. The “Chinese mind” here is simply some
“object” like “knowledge” or “belief,” which must be taken apart with philosophical
implements and reconstructed and clarified so as to be meaningful. But there is more
going on than just the application of a philosophical methodology, and there are more
assumptions at work behind this statement than Allinson suspects. We read in the first
few pages that the general assumptions and methodology of the book consist of the
following:
This volume is the outcome of a belief that the Chinese mind can be
understood through its philosophy... [It] is one of the first of its kind to
set out to reveal how Chinese philosophy can be understood in light of
the techniques and concepts taken from Western philosophy. In this
respect, we may expand the mirror image to that of a mirror being looked
at through another mirror. Classical Chinese philosophy is investigated
with the intention of articulating philosophical terms and key concepts by
comparing these terms and concepts with parallel terms and concepts
developed in classical and contemporary Western philosophy. It is hoped
that by presenting the philosophical roots of the Chinese mind in terms
which are familiar to the Western reader that the Western reader can
come to a better understanding of the Chinese philosophical tradition
which has formed the Chinese mind, and hence to a better understanding
of the Chinese mind.”49
There is first of all the assumption, beneath these seemingly innocuous
comments, that the Chinese mind is an object to be studied
,
that it can be understood as
an object of inquiry by means of the Western philosophical method, read here as
“analytic” philosophy.
50
Secondly, the philosophical methodology employed here is
49
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Robert E. Allinson, ed., (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1.
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Allinson’ s piece and all of the pieces in this book, with the exception of a piece by a
professor of religion, could be called “analytic” philosophy because the philosophical
methodology employed is generally employed by the Anglo-American school of
philosophy. The question of the approach of other philosophical traditions to “Chinese”
philosophy remains to be examined and I will not do so here. Instead I want only to
point out that these other traditions are also guilty (to some extent) of philosophical
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assumed to be neutral with regard to its object
,
and as such is capable only of producing
value-free “truths about Chinese philosophy. This imagined purity of the philosophical
method not only takes the form of both an assumption that it is “free” from history, but
also that of a conscious disavowal of the possibility of implication in the historical stain
of imperialism. We later find, for example, statements such as: “In the end we are not
cultural imperialists, we are dancing partners.”' 1 Allinson' s argument here is roughly the
following: though we may begin with our “crude” assumptions about the Chinese mind
and about Chinese philosophy, by using (analytic) philosophy to understand the Chinese
mind we end up fundamentally shifting our outlook so that we as “Western” become
more “Chinese” in our thought while the “Chinese” becomes more “Western.” Thus, it
is a dance where no one is leading and the two halves/partners exist in perfect
complementarity, each having become more of the other. In fact, Allinson writes later
that “We are no longer purely Western or purely Eastern. We are all of us hybrids.”"'
But if this were true, ifwe took this metaphor seriously, then we might expect
that the essays in this volume would reflect this, that they would ultimately be a strange
new synthesis of ancient Chinese philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. But
regrettably, the text does not live up to the demands of its metaphor, for what we end up
with is a series of articles which deploy the method of analytic philosophy to understand
imperialism. The appropriation of“Maoism ’ as the true “socialism by the disillusioned
French left of the late 1960s is perhaps a striking example, but the problem in general
requires more investigation than I have done here and it is not my design to specifically
malign “analytic” philosophy.
51
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the object. Chinese philosophy. From the lengthy quotation above, it is evident that
Allinson holds that Western philosophy is capable of producing through careful
deployment, an understanding of the Chinese mind, of producing some truths” about
what it is. There is no serious reflection at all on the fact that if one assumes, as Allinson
does, that the “Chinese mind” and the “Western mind” are distinct entities
, then there is
no epistemological guarantee for the production of knowledge about either. That is to
say, if one assumes that Chineseness and Westemness lie at the opposite ends of an
ontological divide, it does not follow that the existence of a means ofcommunication
between the two is guaranteed. One might as well argue first that Martians are different
from humans, but that nonetheless humans are capable of understanding and knowing the
contents and contours of the “Martian mind.”53
This maintained purity of the philosophical method is not a subtle and cunning
imperialist “plot” hidden under many onionskin layers of ideology. Instead, its arrogance
is fairly straightforward:
It is entirely possible that ancient Chinese philosophy becomes more
intelligible (rather than less) by the attempt to understand it through the
viewpoints of contemporary Western philosophy. In fact, it may well be
that such a model of understanding would make Chinese philosophy more
theoretically understandable to the contemporary Chinese mind than it
was to its ancient counterpart [emphasis in the original].'
4
53The obvious retort to this counterexample is that, of course, Martians and humans are
different entities, while Westerners and Chinese are both simply types of human beings.
It is my contention, however, that the differentiation between Chinese and Western as
typically found and historically mediated produces precisely this: two different entities.
54
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Characteristic of an imperialist attitude, one which sees only the natives and not one's
presence in “their culture,” there is a fundamental blindness to the assumed position of
power taken by the philosophical gumshoe hot on the trail of the Chinese mind. The
question of whether or not the microscope affects the organism being studied is unasked
and unanswered. "Contemporary Western philosophy,” already a reduction since it
obviously specifies a particular methodology as the whole of philosophy, is understood
to be such a powerful tool that it can reveal, not only the Chinese mind to the Western
gaze, but the Chinese mind to itself. Unlike Chinese philosophy, which is necessarily tied
to a particular, non-universal viewpoint, everyone can understand the results produced
by the neutral methods of Western philosophy.
Thus we return to the fact that “Chinese philosophy” as an object ofstudy is
created and given its theoretical contours by Western philosophy. We read for example
that:
...the Chinese mind is not monolithic and... Chinese philosophy, rather
than being simply a body of doctrines, is a dialogue between philosophers.
It is not a matter of choosing ‘Vho is right” as it is a realization that the
task of understanding is largely a work of interpretation, and that every
act of interpretation that we perform alters and expands the object that
we are attempting to understand. The proper result is that the Chinese
mind grows under our fingertips as we attempt to understand it."
And a little later we read that “What constitutes the Chinese mind is to some extent
formed by our modes of investigation and our modes of investigation are in turn altered
and expanded by our contacts with the Chinese mind.”"
6 What we find here is a
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simultaneous disavowal of “cultural imperialism” precisely while performing it. There is
both the assertion that the Chinese mind is neither “monolithic” nor “essential” but what
is posited by the investigation as its proper object is precisely the “Chinese mind” in its
essence. Allinson writes, for example, that a debate between Hansen and Harbsmeier
over the status of Gongsun Long's infamous White Horse dialogue is a debate as to
“what constitutes the Chinese mind in its essence.”" 7 Moreover, this statement is
coupled with the claim that the debate between Hansen and Harbsmeier is “an East-East
debate,” for “both sides can find the roots of their claims in Chinese culture.”58
Remarkably, by simply talking about Chinese philosophy, Hansen and Harbsmeier have
undergone a transmogrification of essence; they are now located within that Chinese
culture at the other end of the world.
Consequently, other than the fact that the philosophical gaze is now keenly
focused on the “the Chinese mind,” we see that it nonetheless remains the pure and
unadulterated gaze of Western philosophy. The “Chinese mind” and the “Chinese
philosophy” under scrutiny are not. however, quite so fortunate. They emerge reborn,
glistening within the pure crystalline structures of “contemporary Western philosophy.”
They are now hybrids, strange creatures which are somehow both “Western” and
“Chinese.” Confucius is now taken to have had a semantic concept of truth, at least
operatively; we have unearthed the Chinese axiology behind their ethical tradition. What
is now different about the Western philosophical method, other than the fact that it has
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examined something it typically does not investigate? A cannon, even when it is aimed
at different objects, still remains a cannon ; a biologist, irrespective of the particular
species she examines, remains a biologist. In order for Western philosophy to have
altered as much as Allinson claims it does, far more is required than simply a different
object of investigation. The patent absurdity of Allinson’s claims about -‘becoming more
Chinese might be illustrated with the following politically-charged comparison: Allinson
might as well have argued that since the Nazis spoke of Jews and claimed that their
understanding of the Jews came from an understanding of the essence of the “Jewish
mind,” that the Nazis were consequently more Jewish.
Thus, this peculiar object of our Western philosophical investigation. “Chinese”
philosophy, appears to begin to recede from its cognitive reach. This does not mean that
a Truth about Chinese philosophy has been revealed here. Rather, what we have seen is
that there is something of a flaw in the methodology of Western philosophy when it
purports to examine something it has already removed, ontologically and
epistemologically, from the world it is purported to inhabit. The problems Allinson
encounters are not emergent from the inherent resistance of the object to study, from the
difficult, inscrutable nature of Chinese thought, but rather because he cannot see that he
is caught within an imperialist mode of understanding that makes certain assumptions
about the thought of the cultures it considers to be vastly different from itself. The more
philosophy of the sort Allinson practices attempts to grasp Chinese philosophy “in its
essence,” the more impossible the task becomes. Let me cite from Allinson again to
make this point clearer. He writes:
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As some of the chapters depict the Chinese mind as it has existed within a
long, historical tradition, we must bear in mind that today, in many ways,
the Chinese mind has become Westernized and is rapidly in the process of
becoming more and more Westernized. This does not simply mean that
Chinese people are now enjoying Western soft drinks and are wearing
Western suits. From a philosophical point of view, what this means is
that through contact with the West, many Chinese have come to value
Western, proof-orientated thinking and. as a result, have lost the roots of
their own tradition. What this means is that a Chinese person may need
to re-learn the ways ofthinking ofher or his own tradition in the same
way as a Westerner must discover the roots of Chinese thought [emphasis
added]. 59
The fact that Allinson boldly asserts that Chinese philosophy is accessible for the
“corrupted,’' Westernized Chinese only through Western philosophy amounts to little
more than an arrogance about the prowess of “Western, proof-orientated thinking” and
the assumption of the corruptibility of the Chinese (not the Western) mind. Who is
leading in this dance? Is it not implausible to suggest that “a Chinese person may need
to re-leam the ways of thinking of her or his own tradition in the same way as a
Westerner must discover the roots of Chinese thought?” Is Western thought always
transparent to its own, such that this form of cultural re-education is unnecessary?
Could we imagine the sentiment above, but with the cultural positions reversed?
What this points to is precisely an insurmountable logic of difference between
Western and Chinese thought, for one is either (purely) Chinese in thinking or one is a
corrupted (Westernized) Chinese examining the Chinese mind. This difference renders
impossible Allinson’s hope that the Chinese might become Western while the Westerner
became simultaneously Chinese. In this logic, we are one or the other, but not both. If it
appears that we are, in fact, hybrids , it is only by virtue of a theoretical blindness to the
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relationship of China to the West. Only if we pretend that the fact of Western
imperialism did not occur or that it is now irrelevant to our cultural interactions,
philosophical or otherwise, do we arrive at the possibility that something like Allinson's
hybrids might exist. Without this naivete, we are left with an ineluctable difference
which cannot be mitigated by either “Chinese” or “Western” ways of thinking.
Where are we now? If the first part of the attempt here at a sketch of the history
of an odd relationship has been even remotely successful, then it seems that we, as
Western philosophers, are faced with a particularly unpleasant methodological issue.
How might it be possible to read Indian philosophy, Japanese philosophy, Indian
Philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and so on, if the very determination of these different
categories of philosophy is overwritten with an unrecognized form of historical conceit?
This is not just a “moral failing,” to be sure, since the problem is with the very logic of
naively using these sorts of distinctions. But, let me end this, not with a “new set of
categories” or a “new methodology,” but with a final question concerning the utility of
the distinction between Western and Chinese philosophies.
This utility of Chinese philosophy marks yet another site of cultural
differentiation, for if one simply visits what is generally termed the “New Age" section of
a bookstore, there will be no shortage of titles which purport to illumine some “Oriental”
or “Chinese” way of living which is more benevolent, more at one with the universe than
our own. If one surveys the popularity of Taoism and Confucianism within the “New
Age” movement, then one sees immediately that at the very least there is a market for
“Chinese thought.” There is also, consequently, the existence of a certain Western
“mining” operation, one which can unearth and import “Chinese philosophy” as artifact,
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following the imperialist vision of L. Adams Beck as stated in the preface to his 1928
text. The Story of Oriental Philosophy™ He writes: “The value of the thought of Asia
is daily more realized by Western thinkers. The demand for knowledge of its riches
grows more and more insistent. The caravans still journey from the heart of Asia,
carrying merchandise more to be desired than gold or jewels.”61 Disraeli’s infamous
remark, “The East is a career,” might now be rewritten as this: “Eastern thought is a
career.”
The marketability of Chinese (more generally, “Oriental”) thought requires that
this thought be
,
in some sense or another, Chinese. One would hardly think of buying
The Tao ofBusiness Management (a real text), if one did not think that there existed
within its pages some kernel of Oriental wisdom to be applied to the world of business
management. In fact, what we desire, what we are actually attempting to buy, is the
essence of a different culture. But can this make any sense? Does the consumption of
Chinese food confer Chineseness? Does reading the Bhagavad Gita make one more
attuned to the nuances of Indian culture? If so, then what has been demonstrated by this
cultural “migration” is the fact that the borders between cultures are arguably only as
sharp and impenetrable as we want them to be; the “borders” of culture are no more real
than the borders of states. The suggestion for the practice of comparative philosophy is
thus something like a willful forgetting of borders, not the watchful preservation of them.
In other words, “hybrid,” comparative philosophies ought not to aim at preserving the
60
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distinctions between Western and Chinese philosophy, but rather at escaping them
all together, giving up the need to identify some particular thesis as inherently more
“Western’' or “Chinese.”
Ifwe accept the fact that we live in a “multicultural” world, and that the
“differences” between cultures and peoples ought not to be the basis for oppression but
rather the point of departure for the production of new forms of human knowledge, we
must accept that there is more to this “multiculturalism” than the simple staging of ethnic
dances for educational entertainment or the parading out of the inherently culture-bound
ideas of “Chinese” philosophy before the “Western” gaze. A “respect for difference”
entails more than simply making the claim that now “we are unbiased,” it entails the
willingness to relinquish the tenacity with which we hold the claim that there is
something within ourselves which unifies and grounds “our culture.” For if difference is
to be anything other than a repetition of the old logics of domination, we must come to
terms with not only “our” historical a priori , our unthought in relation to “other”
cultures, but with the fact that perhaps, echoing Nietzsche, “We are unknown to
ourselves... we have never sought ourselves, how could it ever be that we should ever
find ourselves?”
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CHAPTER 4
THAT GODLESS, OTHER TIME
4.1 Intercultural Time
Once Time is recognized as a dimension, not just a measure, of human
activity, any attempt to eliminate it from interpretive discourse can only
result in distorted and largely meaningless representations.
... To be sure,
chronology is only a means to an ulterior end. The temporal distancing it
involves is needed to show that natural laws or law-like regularities
operate in the development of human society and culture.
—Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other
In the previous chapter, I attempted to show that, embedded within philosophical
praxis was an inherent attitude toward what is marked as “Chinese” philosophy, an
attitude which functioned to remove Chinese philosophy from the sphere of the Western
in order to either demarcate it as a proper object of philosophical analysis or to preserve
a certain theoretical perspective whereby the incisiveness of philosophical insight is
determined by the distance one can attain from the systems one wishes to scrutinize.
This removal of Chinese philosophy from within the conceptual spaces of Western
thought took the form, I argued, of a geographical displacement, a relocation to the
“other side of the world” which is simply maintained as a material fact. The very
facticity of the Chinese location, however, masks the political motivations for such a
displacement, attempting to shroud them in the honorable robes of pure fact. Far from
being a disinterested observation, the identification of the Chinese as occupying the
farthest extremity of “our world” is instead an observation made within a mode of
perception which relocates cultural others to other spaces. Thus, the previous chapter
can be understood as locating a primarily spatial mode of understanding the (Chinese)
cultural other. But as such, the analysis of the previous chapter was incomplete, for
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what accompanies the spatial is the temporal. What further serves to mark the difference
of the Chinese and their thought is thus their relegation to a past
, such that even though
there might exist a Chinese society in a time contemporaneous with that of the West, the
Chinese are always positioned at a temporal distance, frozen within an ancient mode of
thought perpetuated by Confucian stagnation. To be sure, the figures examined in this
chapter, Leibniz, Hegel, and Marx, undoubtedly considered Chinese society as occupying
lands far removed from their own home sites and the spatial separation between the two
cultures is deeply embedded in their understandings of themselves and the other. But
what also characterizes their perception of China and Chinese thought is its allochronic
location— the Chinese represent a society which, although contemporaneous with their
own, is nonetheless governed by ordering principles which the West had long ago
superseded.
In this regard, the work of Johannes Fabian is of significant theoretical import,
since Fabian’s insightful text. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Make Its Object
,
is concerned precisely with the ways in which Western discourse about the rest of the
world serves only to redefine the space occupied by the non-Westem as somehow
temporally distant, existing as fossilized structures of bygone times. This discursive
imprisonment of the non-Westem within the past is concomitant, Fabian argues, with the
birth of Western science of anthropology and its attempt to provide a classificatory
schemata of human societies. Thus, appellations of “primitive” and “savage function by
denying to societies designated as such the possibility of coevalness, occupation of the
same world-historical moment, transforming them, furthermore, into formal objects of
study. These “primitive societies” can be studied as relics of the past and legitimate
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objects of scientific inquiry, but as for communication with them, that very possibility is
foreclosed by their temporal distance— communication requires, at the very least, a
shared, intersubjective moment in time
.
1
Intercultural communication is, in this context, always ordered hierarchically.
Whether the higher position is occupied by the possession of the revealed truths of
Christianity, or the epistemological perspective of Western science, the privileged
position is always that of the West, with its superior philosophical and scientific tools. In
what follows, the analysis will remain focused upon how the differentiation between
Western and Chinese thought is organized, but with additional emphasis placed upon the
lines of a temporal difference which is deployed along with the deployment of the spatial
to preserve and maintain the difference between cultures. This temporality is, of course,
deployed differently by each of the three figures surveyed here. Leibniz’s location of the
Chinese within the past will be different from the position accorded them by Hegel and
Marx who are, arguably, already operating within a vastly different episteme. In
addition, it is unclear whether there can be any salvation for Hegel’s Chinese, as opposed
to the salvation that awaits the Chinese who inhabit the texts of Leibniz and Marx. But
let us begin by addressing precisely this question of “salvation” by examining Leibniz’s
attempt to come to terms with the godless Chinese who cannot understand their own
past and who have thus remained trapped within it for centuries.
1
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4.2 A Certain Blindness
If it is true that “China” appears within the voluminous corpus of Leibniz's
writings' more often than those other strikingly Leibnizian terms, “entelechy,” “monads,”
“pre-established harmony,” and so on, then an immediately obvious question is to ask
why it is the case that no philosophical discussion of Leibniz's thought ever mentions this
fact.
3
The simplest response to this question would be to parade the age-old distinction
between what counts as the proper object of philosophical analysis and what does not
—
Leibniz’s writings on China are philosophically uninteresting, because they do not
address properly philosophical issues. The problem with this approach is that it rejects a
priori the possibility that what Leibniz has to say about China and Chinese philosophy
has anything to do with his theories of “pre-established harmony between monads” and
the like. It is as if Leibniz’s writings on China can simply be dismissed the way one
might dismiss a comment by Russell on the virtues of chocolate ice cream. The
vicissitudes of a particular philosopher’s taste, the peculiar historical attitudes which s/he
might display toward the sociohistorical events of his/her time are to be dismissed in
favor of more rigorous analyses of the eternally true (read: philosophical) propositions of
his/her thoughts and texts.
But is this the case with our present concern? Might not this deliberate blindness
to the presence of China and Chinese thought within the Leibnizian oeuvre mark
2
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a few other exceedingly rare discussion compose all of the philosophical discussion on
the topic. A cursory examination of the texts on Leibniz should suffice to prove this
claim.
something more than the philosophical irrelevance of a pre-Enlightenment philosopher's
musings about a society other than his own? Is it possible or legitimate for us to treat
Leibniz’s thought as somehow compartmentalized, imagining that when Leibniz was
writing about monads, he was somehow disengaged from what he thought about the
Chinese and that, like a primitive computer, the data contained within the files of one
program in Leibniz’s head did not affect or influence the files within another? It is
understandable that we might want to argue that what one thinks about a particular
flavor of ice cream does not have any direct influence upon what one thinks about, say,
the status of truth and the structures of belief. But given the unquestionably heavy
presence of China within Leibniz’s text, I believe that in this case what Leibniz thinks
about China, while it might not teleologically predetermine the trajectories of his
philosophy, is nonetheless significant and cannot be simply excised from an examination
of his work. What it thus under examination here is this significance— the hitherto
unexamined ways in which the Leibniz’s knowledge of China and Chinese thought might
inform his work and provide for us a glimpse at what might be the first sustained
discussion of Chinese thought by a Western philosopher .
4
This is not to say, of course,
that Leibniz's thought is consequently derivative from what he knew of Chinese
philosophy. Rather, my aim here is to situate Leibniz within a history of attempts in the
4
The question of what “Chinese” and “Western” denotes is, of course, precisely part of
the problem here. At this point, I will use “Chinese” and “Western” to designate,
arbitrarily and perhaps problematically, simply those persons and things which exist
within geographical spaces demarcated as Chinese or Western. Leibniz is a “Western
philosopher, not because he holds a certain set of beliefs, but simply because he lives
within Europe. Thus, at this point, “Western” might be seen as referring simply to
“American and European,” with “Chinese” referring in a similar fashion, to what lives
and exists within the geographical and historical borders of what we call “China.
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genealogy of Western philosophy to come to terms with the “philosophy” of what is
marked as culturally or socially other. 5
The contemporary blindness to what Leibniz had to say about 1 8th century
Europe s contact with Chinese thought and culture perhaps reflects not only an
unwillingness to acknowledge the socio-historical specificity of Leibniz’s thought, but
also the (nonconscious?) attempt to render the history of the Western intellectual
tradition hermetic, closing off the possibility that cultures and societies have never
existed as stable, self-contained unities untouched by interfusion with heterogeneous
elements from the outside. This seemingly perennial failure to examine the multitude of
ways in which Western philosophy has always already been in contact with and informed
by non-Westem thought should not be seen as simply ethnocentric, however. As I have
already argued, this “failure” should perhaps be seen more fruitfully as a moment in the
constitution of philosophical “culture” itself. Thus, what is interesting in the case of
Leibniz and the silence of philosophy is not the condemnatory claim that “Western
philosophy is intolerant and ethnocentric,” but rather what we can glean from this (and
other) cases to produce a philosophical critique of the ideology of “culture” which
manages to escape the doomed logic of PC-multiculturalism.
In the case of Leibniz the task is difficult, since the texts involved in the
philosophical excavation involve at least four different languages and a philosophical
5
1 am fully aware, of course, that this contact between Western and non-Westem
philosophies is by no means the first. Indeed, the presence of Arabian commentators of
Aristotle and the Islamic philosophers of the Medieval ages is testimony to the fact that
the contours of Western philosophy have always included moments of deep interfusion
with cultures perceived as being situated outside of the West. Here, my concern is with
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history which is inextricably linked to the beginnings ofhuman thought, regardless of
cultural location. But, given that Leibniz’s primary aim in his discussions of Chinese
thought was the promulgation of an accord between the worlds of 1 8th century Europe
and China, we could perhaps see the project here as the attempt to bring Leibniz's dream
to fruition, though he himself failed both historically and, I will argue, philosophically.
Part ofmy argument here will naturally consist of a critique of the ways in which Leibniz
attempted to enact this dream, but despite my problems with Leibniz and his
conceptualization of Chinese thought, I strongly believe that Leibniz’s dream of a global
accord is not entirely misguided. For one thing, coming to terms with the imagined
ethnicity of Western philosophy might be a means of escaping the deadlocks of
contemporary philosophical and cultural criticism and expanding, if only for a moment,
the horizons of philosophical thought.
4.3 The Terms of Assimilation
Apart from trade, the most significant “first” contacts between the West and
China occurred as Christian missionaries, spurred by their desire to unify the globe under
the auspices of Christian theology, attempted to spread the revealed truths of Christianity
to the populace of China. Leibniz himself saw the paramount importance of the
Christian task, closing the text of his “Preface to the NOV1SSIMA SINICA”'’ with the
following description: “Certainly the size of the Chinese Empire is so great, the
reputation of this wisest nation in the Orient so impressive, and its authority so influential
philosophies identified as “Chinese,” and the claim that Leibniz serves as a good starting
point for the delineation of marking Chinese philosophy as Chinese.
6
Daniel J. Cook and Elenry Rosemont, “Preface,” Leibniz: Writings on China , Daniel J.
Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), pp. 45-59.
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example to the rest, that scarcely since apostolic times has any greater work appeared for
the Christian faith to accomplish. Indeed, it was through the writings of the Jesuit
missionaries in China, particularly the writings of Matteo Ricci, who had been granted a
stipend by the Chinese emperor and given a residence in Beijing, that Leibniz received
almost all of his knowledge of China.
But the missionaries were plagued by the difficulties of translating the Christian
doctrines into a language which provides no easy linguistic equivalents for such “simple”
notions as “God.'’ “soul,” “resurrection,” and so on. Anxious not to repeat the failures
in Japan (where the choice of the Japanese word “Dainichi” (Vairocana-Buddha) as the
Japanese equivalent for God doomed missionary efforts there8 ), missionaries in China
hotly disputed the proper translations into Chinese of Christian terminology. In addition,
the matter of various Chinese practices had to be accounted for. Was the reverence held
for Confucius and the shrines built to him evidence of a secular practice, or were they
inherently blasphemous? Were Chinese offerings to the “spirits of departed ancestors”
pagan or reconcilable to the practice of Christianity? In short, could the practices and
thought of the Chinese be understood as compatible with Christian doctrines, or ought
the missionaries urge the rejection ofthem altogether?
7
G. W. Leibniz. “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA,” Leibniz: Writings on China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §22.
The NOVISSIMA SINICA was a text which brought to its readers the latest news from
the exotic lands of the Orient. Leibniz’s contribution here consisted solely of the preface
to the book.
8
Arthur F. Wright, “The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas,” Studies in Chinese
Thought
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 289.
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As the 1 7th century ended, Leibniz became quickly embroiled in this debate,
which became eventually known as fthe Rites Controversy.” The first Jesuit
missionaries in China, led by Matteo Ricci, had been of the former position, holding that
the displacement of the traditional Chinese beliefs with Christianity would be impossible;
the Confucian ideals and traditions built into the structures of social power would render
this displacement practically unfeasible.
4
Thus, the position of Matteo Ricci and his
supporters (which included Leibniz), the Accomodationist position, attempted to
facilitate the conversion of the Chinese to the Christian faith by treating the ritual
offerings of food and other items to dead ancestors as merely secular rites which
converts to Christianity could continue to practice without fear of blaspheming God.
For the Accomodationists, the reverence held by the literati for the figure of Confucius
did not put Confucius in the position of a “false God,” but was simply the rendering of
honor to an influential figure of the past. The Anti-accomodationist position, however,
argued for by the missionaries who followed Ricci, primarily Longobardi and Sainte-
Marie, thought that Confucianism and its attendant rituals of ancestor “worship” and so
forth, posed a direct challenge to the supremacy of the Christian God and ought to be
considered fundamentally blasphemous. For the Anti-accomodationists, the acceptance
of Christianity necessarily entailed the rejection of these and other practices. After fierce
9
There are various accounts of the Rites controversy and its history. To name a few;
David Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism: the Search for Accord, (Honolulu:
University Press of Hawaii, 1977) pp. 1-17; Jacques Granet, A History ofChinese
Civilization
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 495-525; D. P.
Walker, The Ancient Theology, (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 194-230; and finally,
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China , vol. two, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1956), pp. 496-505.
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debate, the matter was referred to the pope, who sided with the Anti-accomodationists,
decreeing that Chinese who became Christians could no longer engage in these
blasphemous social practices. By way of reply, the Chinese emperor banned the teaching
of Christianity within Chinese borders in 1724.
Leibniz’s major writings on China are thematically centered within the terms of
the Rites Controversy. The focus of the argumentation is primarily upon arguing against
Longobardi and Sainte-Marie in the attempt to prove that the Chinese practices and texts
were not in and of themselves blasphemous. But ifwe set aside the functional surface of
these texts for a moment, we quickly discern that there is more at stake than the terms of
a long-dead Christian debate. To begin with: we notice the fact that Leibniz, who had
himself never traveled to China and who did not speak Chinese, approaches the Classical
philosophical texts he uses to prove the Accomodationist case from the outside. In other
words, Leibniz’s understanding of the ‘true” Chinese position is always mediated by
some other translator or missionary. Thus, an analysis of Leibniz’s work might be better
situated, not in terms of the truth of what he says about the thought of the Chinese, but
rather with an eye to distinguishing his mode of perception with regard to other
“cultures.” What assumptions does he make about the “culture of the Chinese and their
thought? And, in this case, what profound influence might Leibniz have had upon the
formation of hermeneutical possibilities in the interactions between previously “closed"
social groups? In short, how might Leibniz have set the tone for future interpretations of
the “meaning” of Chinese philosophy, pursuing specific avenues of
investigation at the
cost of forgoing others?
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4.4 The Difference of the Chinese
As we examine Leibniz's texts on China, the first point we ought to bear in mind
is that he is not operating with a notion of “culture” like the one which we, in the late
20th century are inclined to hold. That is to say, the idea of “culture” as “the way of life
of a people” is not part of the active intellectual vocabulary of Leibniz’s time. 10
Consequently, we cannot simply say of Leibniz that he had a particular attitude toward
the “culture” of the Chinese, since the extent to which he even recognizes the Chinese as
“possessing” a culture is unclear. We would at most be able to say that he drew a
distinction between the ways, thought, and customs of the Chinese and those of the
West. Although this matter might seem primafacie trivial, the general focus of our
investigation here— the perception and constitution of cultural alterity
—
prevents us
from treating this distinction lightly. For if Leibniz does not see the Chinese as culturally
distinct, then we might be able to delineate some of the salient features of the perception
of cultural difference, partially tracing their origins to the figure of Leibniz. As a result,
our investigation of the mode of differentiation Leibniz employs in discussing the
Chinese will have to presume that it is not a difference in “culture” which produces the
difference of the Chinese. In other words, the task here is to locate the possible
presence, within Leibniz’s writings, of the discursive origins of the philosophical
essentialism which believes to this day that, beyond the contingencies of borders and
language, there persists some sublime “Chinese” thing at the heart of all Chinese texts.
See Chris Jenks, Culture , (London: Routledge, 1993), especially pp. 1-15.
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There is, first of all, the matter of the physical separation between the social
spaces of Leibniz s Europe and China of that time. This physical separation, instead of
simply being a physical “fact” about the world, is part of the way in which we organize
the social map of the world, and is intimately connected to the ways in which we are able
to locate cultural others and the space of other cultures. With regard to Leibniz, we can
see that he is careful to note this fact. The very first line of Leibniz’s “Preface to the
NOVISSIMA SINICA,” a collection of the “latest news from China” which Leibniz
edited and published, establishes the geographical extremes ofEurope and China. He
writes, “I consider it a singular plan of the fates that human cultivation and refinement
should today be concentrated, as it were, in the two extremes of our continent, in Europe
and in Tschina [sic], which adorns the Orient as Europe does the opposite edge of the
earth.”
1
1
The point in examining this remark is not to question the ‘Hruth” of this fact, to
dispute the veracity of the claim that China does indeed lie at the “opposite edge” of the
Eurasian landmass. What is more significant are the social meanings of this fact for the
imagination of the reader of Leibniz’s preface and for Leibniz himself. For the implicit
suggestion which always seems to be linked to the perception of physical distance is that
the farther away from “us” “they” are, the more different “they” become.
u
Thus, we
might propose, in a preliminary manner, that there is at work in the interactions between
11
G. W. Leibniz, “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA,” Leibniz: Writings on China .
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §1.
12 One could look, for example, at the preface to Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things,
where Foucault describes the project of his work as the result of an encounter with the
epistemological order of the culture “at the other side of the world.” Interestingly,
Foucault’s encounter with Chinese thought is also mediated— by the work ol Borges.
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cultures an unwritten and unspoken social axiom: distance entails difference. Thus,
underlying the discussion of the “concrete’* differences which follow in this Leibnizian
text is the tacit acceptance of a geographical imaginary which divides the world into
poles, with the greatest distance between social worlds mapped onto the greatest
differences in social structure. What must be taken into account in considering this
geographical imaginary is the fact that it does not simply reflect pre-existing differences
between Europeans and Chinese— it also reinforces the perception of difference so that
it becomes possible to imagine that this difference is grounded, not just in miles, but in
ontology as well.
1 '
But the point here is not that physical distance was a meaningless triviality in
Leibniz’s time. Rather, since the historical bases of the imagination of social distance
and the perception of space are quite unlike what we experience at present, are we not
directed toward a fundamental contemporary limitation in the conceptualization of
cultural alterity? The shrinkage of the space of the globe vis-a-vis the development of
transportation technologies, telecommunication networks and satellite linkups avails us
of the possibility of a transformed understanding of the space of the world and the
lifeworlds of the people who inhabit it. For Leibniz, China and Europe do indeed lie at
the opposite ends of the earth, and this fact is significant, not because it is the
manifestation of a form of false geopolitical consciousness, but because this
13
1 attended a paper at the “Philosophy, Interpretation. Culture” conference at
Binghamton University which argued precisely this. The author claimed that the Chinese
practice of qigong
,
a form of physical meditation similar to taiqi , produced a different
phenomenological experience of the body. What the author shied away from, ot course,
was the impending conclusion that the bodies themselves were different as a result of
substantially different modes of “inhabiting” them.
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conceptualization still underlies our contemporary understanding of the differences in
cultural and social spaces.
So much for maps. There remains the question of the “other time” which the
Chinese occupy as a result of being so detached from the movement of civilization here
defined as the developments of Western philosophy and science. This difference can be
discerned, not as overtly as the assertions of the fact of physical distance, but it is
nonetheless present within Leibniz’s writings on the Chinese, specifically within the
assumptions which undergird his perceptions of the “social differences” between
Europeans and the Chinese. As I will show, even the seemingly harmless difference
which Leibniz identifies between the Chinese and Europeans, that the Chinese are more
“ethical” or “civil” than Europeans, has linkages with the Chinese location in an other
time.
Leibniz writes that “certainly they [the Chinese] surpass us (though it is almost
shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and
politics adapted to the present life and use of mortals.”
14
This foundation of practical
philosophy manifests itself, of course, in the amazing civility of the Chinese:
As our people have noticed in amazement, the Chinese peasants and
servants, when they bid farewell to friends, or when they first enjoy the
sight of each other after a long separation, behave to each other so
lovingly and respectfully, that they challenge all the politeness of
European magnates.... Thus it happens that scarcely anyone offends
another by the smallest word in common conversation. And they rarely
show evidences of hatred, wrath, or excitement.... Neighbors and even
14
G. W. Leibniz, “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA,” Leibniz: Writings on China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §3.
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members of a family are so held back by a hedge of custom that they are
able to maintain a kind of perpetual courtesy. 15
This fundamental (cultural) civility of the Chinese 16 is peculiar in that unlike, say.
Aristotle’s notions of ethics and the “good life,” they are not grounded by philosophical
theory. Leibniz points out repeatedly that the Chinese “lack” the principles of
argumentation and philosophy so firmly entrenched in Europe. 17 That is, this “ethicality”
is presented as the result of a sort of habituation which occurred without the benefits of
philosophical debates over the abstract notions of Good, Justice, and so forth. Without
the fundament of philosophical theory, the good-natured civility of the Chinese is
strikingly similar to ethnographic accounts of the good-naturedness of the inhabitants of
“primitive” cultures who live in the idyllic world of a society seemingly untouched by the
social ills of scarring Western societies.
1K
But despite the great advantages wrought by this habituated civility, the Chinese
lack something, a lack that guarantees their social inferiority: “...the Chinese do not
15
G. W. Leibniz, “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SIN1CA,” Leibniz: Writings on China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §4.
16
This motif appears repeatedly in any discussion or comparison between Western and
Chinese cultures. Bertrand Russell, for example, writes in The Problem ofChina that
the Chinese are a “nation possessed of exquisite manners and perfect courtesy,” p. 190.
Russell’s mode of cultural perception will be examined in the next chapter.
17
As when he writes in the “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA” that “In profundity
of knowledge and in the theoretical disciplines we are their superiors. For besides logic
and metaphysics, and the knowledge of things incorporeal, which we justly claim as
peculiarly our province, we excel by far in the understanding of concepts which are
abstracted by the mind from the material.... The Chinese are thus seen to be ignorant of
that great light of the mind, the art of demonstration, and they have remained content
with a sort of empirical geometry, which our artisans universally possess,” §2.
18
See James Boon’s account of the manner in which ethnographic accounts of the inhabitants
of Bali are all strictly maintained within a visuality which presents them as the inhabitants of a
timeless world in The Anthropological Romance ofBali, 1597-1972, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977).
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attain to full and complete virtue. This is not to be expected except by Heaven's grace
and Christian teaching.” 14 We expect the Chinese to be deficient in divine grace, of
course, for that was the entire purpose of contact with China, but the failure of the
Chinese to receive divine dispensation in the form of the revealed truths of Christianity
guarantees another deficiency: the absence of a history of philosophy dedicated to
unraveling the mysteries of Christian metaphysics and its concomitant generation of the
principles of First Philosophy. From the lack of First Philosophy, it is a short step to the
claim that the Chinese lack scientific principles and truths such as those of geometry.
For the practical purpose of conversion then, Leibniz recommends that one ought first to
teach geometry to the Chinese, inculcating the desire for more European knowledge,
moving then to teaching the Chinese the principles of First Philosophy, which would in
turn pave the way for the introduction of the Christian religion. Indeed, the '“twin arts”
of geometry and First Philosophy are, Leibniz believes, the two “eyes” which Europe
possesses and the Chinese do not.20
Consequently, the first step in locating the Chinese contemporary to Leibniz in an
allochronic position to their European counterparts is their presentation as childlike,
requiring the education which the West can provide. In the terms of the classic coupling
of the visual with knowledge, the Chinese require that their eyes be opened to the truths
19
G. W. Leibniz. “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA,” Leibniz: Writings on China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §5.
20
Leibniz writes in the “Preface to the NOVISSIMA SINICA” that “Although they may
be convinced that we are one-eyed, we have still another eye, not yet well enough
understood by them, namely. First Philosophy. Through it we are admitted to an
understanding even of things incorporeal. Verbiest was prepared to teach them this,
rightly judging that it would prepare an opening for the Christian religion, but death
intervened,” §9.
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of the world. Civility and ethicality might be something valuable, but without the truths
of science and philosophy, these are simply the character traits of good-natured
simpletons. Of course, this is all that the Chinese are, since they are blind to the
meanings and significance of their own intellectual tradition. Furthermore, the location
of the Chinese in an alterior time is not presented as an arbitrary act of self-centered
interpretation. The Chinese are where they are because of a developmental failure
they have been derailed from the proper sequence of social development by the fact that
they are bad readers.
It is the “blindness'" of the Chinese (they must be blind, since they lack the “eyes”
of the West) which makes them such bad readers of their own tradition. The problem
for the missionaries out to convert the Chinese is, in Leibniz’s opinion, that without the
hermeneutical tools of Philosophy and Science, the Chinese are doomed to misread and
mistake the true meanings of their own ancient texts. Indeed, one of the benefits
conferred upon the Chinese by their contact with the West is the introduction of proper
reading tools, just as one would teach the Jews how to interpret their tradition:
It is not absurd for discerning Europeans (such as Ricci) to see something
today which is not adequately known by the Chinese erudites, and to be
able to interpret their ancient books better than the erudites themselves.
Who does not know in our own day that Christian scholars are much
better interpreters of the most ancient books of the Hebrews than the
Jews themselves? How often strangers have better insight into the
histories and monuments of a nation than their own citizens! This is even
more likely concerning doctrines more than twenty centuries removed
from the Chinese, who are quite possibly not as equipped with the
interpretive aids as we, informed about Chinese literature, and especially
2i
aided by European methods.
21
G. W. Leibniz, “On the Civil Cult of Confucius,” Leibniz: Writings on China , Daniel
J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §11.
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And elsewhere:
It is indeed apparent that ifwe Europeans were well informed concerning
Chinese Literature, then, with the aid of logic, critical thinking,
mathematics and our manner of expressing thought— more exacting than
theirs— we could uncover in the Chinese writings of the remotest
antiquity many things unknown to modem Chinese and even to other
commentators thought to be classical .
22
And so the depiction of the state of the Chinese tradition which this preliminary reading
of Leibniz yields is one in which the founders of the society wrote profound and not-
entirely-mistaken works which have, due to the absence of divine grace and the
hermeneutical tools this provides, fallen into a state of considerable disrepair, with the
millions of people who claim that tradition as part of their heritage unable to discern,
beneath the dissimulations of their own intellectuals, the truth of their own historical
inheritance.
But the story is perhaps a bit more complex. Not only have the Chinese
contemporary with Leibniz been misled by bad readers, what they have failed to thus
receive is the various bits of the Christian faith which lurk within the classical texts.
Leibniz’s intention, in his “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese” is, to be
sure, well-meant, since the piece is primarily focused upon rebutting the arguments of
Longobardi and the Anti-accomodationists to show that the natural theology contained
within the Conftician classics at the very least do not contradict the truths of European
First Philosophy. Once again completely dependent upon the translations of Chinese
texts provided by the Jesuits and Longobardi himself, Leibniz attempts to present a
22
G. W. Leibniz, “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese”, Leibniz: Writings
on China
,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court,
1994 ), §68 .
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reinterpretation of them to show that, far from being evidence of materialist protoatheist
thought, the content of these texts is quite compatible with Christian doctrine.
But it is difficult to reconcile such intentions with the fact that Leibniz seems to
think that he is the person capable ot doing what none of his Chinese contemporaries
were able to do. If Leibniz seriously holds that “Among the Chinese... neither history
nor criticism nor philosophy are sufficiently developed,” and that “no one at all has yet
emerged who has produced a literary history of the Chinese and who has attributed the
true works, meanings and sense to each author,”23 then does not his claim that the true
meaning of the (Neo-Confiician) Chinese term li is actually something like the “sovereign
substance which we [Europeans] revere under the name of God”24 force us to the
conclusion that Leibniz has succeeded where millions of Chinese have failed? Leibniz
adds later that: “Chinese philosophy more closely approaches Christian theology than the
philosophy of the ancient Greeks who considered matter as coeval with God.”25 But
given that Leibniz also holds that since the philosophy of the Chinese lacks systematic
organization and even philosophical terminology (why call it philosophy, then?),
“nothing prevents interpreting what the ancients teach about divine and spiritual things in
a more favorable sense,”
20
the only thing which guarantees the stability of the meaning of
23
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Leibniz s interpretation is the fact that it is the truth bestowed by divine dispensation.
In other words, Leibniz's reading of Chinese texts is given authority by the fact that he is
privy to “the one Revelation which can explain to us the beginning of the universe.”27
Put simply, Leibniz succeeds and discovers the truth where the Chinese have been misled
or mistaken because he has access to the Truth given by divine (Christian) dispensation.
Thus, in the spatial and temporal distance which marks the separation between
the West and China, we find a justification for European intervention. It is a task of
educating the savage and civilizing the pagan so that they may assume their proper roles
in world-society. The question of cultural difference is not really a question of culture at
all. It is simply a matter of education and the promulgation of proper instruction. The
West’s superiority lies in the fact that it sees where the Chinese do not. Given this
distinction, it is not an act of chauvinism to suggest that the Chinese need Western
instruction. Rather, it is an act of beneficence— setting the Chinese on the path of true
enlightenment. Thus, everything “fits.” All of the parts of Leibniz's imagined globe have
their proper place and function within its hierarchical gradations.
4.5 The “Pre-Established Harmony” between Leibniz and the Chinese
Without dwelling too long upon the task of recreating the whole of Leibniz s
complicated metaphysical scheme, let us simply note that for Leibniz, the universe was
understood as composed of
kk
windowless monads, each of which contained within it, an
“entelechy,” or active principle. These monads were combined to form bodies and were
27
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ordered hierarchically, thus constituting the basic building unit for everything in the
world. What provided this order was a “pre-established harmony” between monads,
given by “prior divine artifice,” guaranteeing the functional stability of the cosmos and
the individual monad's “clarity of perception” with respect to its own active principle. 28
This conceptualization of natural order and hierarchy had. of course, political
consequences. It prevented, for example, the materialist tendency to atheism which
Leibniz found problematic in Hobbesian philosophy,29 by reinforcing God’s position at
the top of the natural order and asserting the presence of divine intent throughout it. By
arguing for a hierarchical metaphysics, Leibniz could be seen as attempting to produce
an understanding of the ideal civil society in which rank and position ought to be “strictly
correlated with goodness and with clarity of perception.”30
There are two matters which bear closer examination here. First, there is
something striking about the coincidental similarity between classical Chinese
philosophy and Leibniz’s own thought which is produced when Leibniz turns to an
examination of Chinese philosophy. Second, given Leibniz's understanding of the bases
of society and social order, facts which he admittedly does not discuss at great length.
28
For a careful and thorough (leaving out a discussion of the social world and China, of
course) treatment of Leibniz’s metaphysics see Catherine Wilson's text Leibniz's
Metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, especially chapter five.
29
For an interesting critique of Flobbes, see Leibniz’s “Caesarinus Furstenerius (De
Suprematu Principum Germaniae),” Leibniz: Political Writings , Patrick Riley, trans. and
ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Leibniz writes that “ifwe listen to
Hobbes, there will be nothing in our land but out-and-out anarchy.... Hobbes'
demonstrations have a place only in that state whose king is God, whom alone one can
trust in all things.” p. 1 18.
30
Catherine Wilson, Leibniz 's Metaphysics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), p. 202.
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compared to the amount of time he spent discussing metaphysics, what conclusions
could we draw about Leibniz's understanding of the place of the Chinese within the
social order of the globe guaranteed by God?
In light of the fact that Leibniz considers the “modem” Chinese to be atheists, 31
and that his proper reading of the Chinese texts produces an understanding of the
Chinese concepts li and qi which is perfectly compatible with Christian doctrine, it is
ironic that these concepts did not play the role in classical Chinese thought which Leibniz
supposed and were rather the results of the metaphysical impulse of the Neo-
Confucianists beginning around the time of the Song Dynasty (960-1280). 32 Leibniz’s
examination of the classical Chinese texts translated by Jesuit missionaries makes no
distinction between the thought and texts of the Classical period (roughly 500-200 BC)
and the rebirth of interest in Confucian thought in the beginnings of the Song Dynasty.
Ail of the Chinese texts are relegated to the dusty past, without concern for their proper
historical placement. Granted, Leibniz could simply have been misinformed, but the ease
with which he relegates everything he discusses to Chinese antiquity is highly
problematic. To draw a parallel with European philosophy, Leibniz could be seen as
assuming that the work of the Medieval Scholastics were indistinguishable from the
works of the ancient Greeks in the quest for ascertaining the meaning of Western
philosophy.
31
Leibniz observes in the “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion that The Chinese
literati are atheists, they believe the world is the result of chance...” §1.
32 See chapter four of David Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism: The Search for
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Why make such an obvious mistake? We could simply assume that Leibniz was
just misinformed and thus allowed himself to make assumptions he was unwarranted in
making. But this explanation fails to address something deeper— the idea that Leibniz
perhaps desperately wanted to find similarities between his metaphysics and that which
could be deduced from the Chinese texts he read. In other words. Leibniz always
already reads the texts of the “Chinese'’ philosophical tradition with an eye to
determining its proper position within his own philosophical system. Rather than
entertaining the notion that what is revealed by the Chinese texts is the necessity for a
revision of philosophical framework, Chinese thought is always understood as an ancient
component of the pre-established divine harmony and thus assimilable. Although it
might be problematic to suggest a psychological motivation for Leibniz's theoretical
mistake, I believe that ifwe examine his position on the meaning of the Yi Jing, we find
support for this hypothesis.
During Leibniz's correspondence with the Jesuit missionary Bouvet, Bouvet
discovered a correlation between Leibniz's newly developed idea of a binary logic and
the divinatory symbols of the Yi Jing,
33
Bouvet thought that these symbols were not
tools for prognostication, as they were then used by the Chinese, but rather part ot an
ancient treatise on binary logic. If this were true, then an Accomodationist argument
could be made, attempting to show that the Chinese themselves, within their ancient
texts, possessed knowledge of the world compatible with the ideas produced by
theological philosophy. Leibniz, understandably, was excited by this (coincidental)
33 See the discussion in David Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism: The Search for
Accord
,
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977), chapter three.
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correlation. The final sections of both the “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion” and
the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese” are concerned with the
possibilities generated by this concurrence. For example, Leibniz concludes the
Remarks ’ with the following observation:
And thus, as far as I understand, I think the substance of the ancient
theology of the Chinese is intact and, purged of additional errors, can be
harnessed to the great truths of the Christian religion. Fohi, the most
ancient prince and philosopher of the Chinese, had understood the origin
of things from unity and nothing, i. e.
,
his mysterious figures reveal
something of an analogy to Creation, containing the binary arithmetic
(and yet hinting at greater things) that I rediscovered after so many
thousands of years.... 34
The similarity which Bouvet and Leibniz had uncovered was this: the Yi Jing is
composed of a series of sixty-four figures, or hexagrams, which in turn are composed by
combinations of two trigrams. Each trigram is in turn composed of the combination of
single, unbroken lines, and broken lines in groups of three. By attributing to the
unbroken line a value of one and to the broken line a value of zero, Leibniz was able to
produce a numerical correspondence such that a certain order of the hexagrams
produced the sequence of numbers from zero to sixty-four.
Setting aside for a moment the evidence presented by Joseph Needham in
Science and Civilization in China that the Chinese performed mathematics without the
notion of a mathematical zero until it was conceptually imported from Indian
mathematics in the ninth century, the general opinion on this matter is that the similarity
between Leibniz’s binary system and the ordering of the Yi Jing hexagrams is simply
34
G. W. Leibniz, “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion”, Leibniz: Writings on China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §9.
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coincidence. But for Leibniz, the similarity was proof positive of the superiority of the
methods of European philosophy in investigating both the natural and social worlds For
by means of European thought:
more exacting than theirs. Reverend Father Bouvet and I have
discovered the meaning, apparently truest to the text, of the characters of
Fohi, founder of Empire, which consist simply of combinations of broken
and unbroken lines, and which pass for the most ancient writing of China
in its simplest form.
. . . Actually, the 64 figures represent a Binary
Arithmetic which apparently this great legislator possessed, and which I
have rediscovered some thousands of years later
.
36
By finding support for his own theory in the ancient texts of a language he does not read,
in a social world at the furthest extreme of the Eurasian landmass, Leibniz can only
believe that with his philosophical tools, he has without question tapped into part of the
ultimate truth of the world.
In addition, the fact that Leibniz’s Chinese contemporaries use the hexagrams of
the Yi Jing for divination reaffirms his belief that it is the modern Chinese who have
strayed from the path of true wisdom, and that by explaining the true meaning of their
own texts to them, they will then recover the wisdom already possessed by their ancient
ancestors. This correspondence, in turn, provides further evidence for the other
similarities between Leibniz’s thought and that of the Chinese, to which he hopes to
restore its “proper meaning.”
37
But given that Leibniz also believes that “nothing
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prevents interpreting what the [Chinese] ancients teach about divine and spiritual things
in a more favorable sense.
8
would we not be justified in claiming that Leibniz has
perhaps read too much into Chinese thought?
For these reasons then, that first, the Chinese philosophical texts and terminology
which Leibniz discusses are precisely not the ancient texts to which he constantly refers;
second, Leibniz gives far too much weight to the coincidental similarity between his
work on binary logic and the hexagrams of the Yi Jing ; and third, Leibniz holds that the
Chinese texts permits interpretative possibilities which would allow us almost to say
whatever we wish it to, Leibniz’s assertions that the philosophy of the Chinese is
fundamentally and philosophically compatible with the principles ofEuropean Christian
philosophy do not withstand critical scrutiny. Why, then, might he have clung so tightly
to his beliefs?
Given Leibniz's conceptualization of the human social world as patterned on the
hierarchical natural world of the monads, the suggestion that the Chinese social world
had had access to the same facts as the Europeans would have provided further
justification for his metaphysics. For if the Chinese social world could be shown to be. in
some sense, only a divergence from the originary point of divine Christian revelation,
then the unification of the human world under the auspices of the Christian faith and the
principles of First Philosophy is assured. In addition, although Europe might not possess
the same degree of civility and politeness evinced by the Chinese social order, they were
nonetheless clearly ahead in the pursuit of knowledge. By demonstrating that the
38
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Chinese had always already possessed the germ of Christianity, the philosophical tools of
the West prove their usefulness and possibilities, firmly establishing their position at the
cutting edge ofhuman development.
4.6 The Groundwork of the Conceptualization of Chinese Philosophy
I wish to conclude this discussion of Leibniz by noting two primary
characteristics of Chinese philosophy produced in his writings. These characteristics are
not simply “false.” What I hope to eventually show, vis-a-vis an analysis of prominent
“Western” thinkers, is that more often than not, the attitudes which are displayed toward
Chinese philosophy do not reflect the ‘"truth” of Chinese philosophy so much as produce
it. In other words, Leibniz’s conceptualization of Chinese philosophy as a mode of
thought can be seen as an inaugural moment in a history of demarcating the proper
meaning of the “Chinese” in Chinese philosophy.
Firstly, Leibniz distinguishes between the philosophies of Europe and China by
arrogating the possession of science and the demonstrative “art of geometry to
European thought, while tagging Chinese thought with the label of“practicality."
Chinese thought is, for Leibniz, more developed in practical terms toward the proper
ordering of the social realm. But since the Chinese have lost the truth of their ancient
texts by suffering the misfortune of not having been blessed by divine grace,
what
Chinese philosophy needs is the “more exacting terminology" and “systematic”
analysis
which European thought provides. This corrective, Leibniz thinks, will also
serve to
reveal to the Chinese the divine mysteries of the Christian faith and unify
the world in a
sort of ecumenical universalization.
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To this end Leibniz reads Chinese philosophy as being, with a few creative
interpretive solutions, essentially the same in principle as European thought. But if
Chinese thought is understood to be, in antiquity , closer to the doctrines of Christian
theology and philosophy, are not the subsequent millennia of Chinese history then a kind
of aberration? These modem Chinese who have lost the Christian meaning of their own
tradition, is not their entire social structure faulty? Leibniz’s perception of Chinese
thought therefore indexes it as something within the order of an other, ancient time. By
demonstrating the “modernity” of the thought of the West, the existence of the Chinese
other is necessarily shunted into the past. Any work of unification requires, then, the
acceleration of Chinese thought and society. They must be brought back onto the proper
track delineated by the progress embodied in Western ideas.
The second conceptualization of Chinese philosophy concerns the issue of
whether it is “philosophy” at all. The Chinese are, after all, “a people lacking in
metaphysical vocabulary”
9
and “do not possess a philosophical terminology,
40
with the
consequence that “neither [their] history nor criticism nor philosophy are sufficiently
developed.”
41
But if Leibniz has been successful in his project of deriving the true
meaning of the ancient texts, and if there are so many similarities between Chinese terms
like li and qi and “philosophical” notions of First Principle and Prime Matter, then has
Leibniz not shown that Chinese thought is precisely philosophy?
39
G. W. Leibniz, “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion”, Leibniz: Writings on China,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §8.
40
G. W. Leibniz, “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion”, Leibniz: Writings on China,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court. 1994), §7.
41
G. W. Leibniz, “Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion”, Leibniz: Writings on
China ,
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, trans and eds., (La Salle: Open Court, 1994), §5.
142
This paradoxical dual status of Chinese philosophy as being simultaneously
philosophy and not-philosophy is not simply a refusal to recognize the law of
contradiction. Instead, I believe it points to a fundamental contradiction in the
constitutive moment of philosophy’s self-consciousness. That is. Western philosophy
becomes “self-aware" only by being able to single out instances of “other” modes of
thought which are not philosophy. But this moment in the practice of philosophy
ultimately leads to the conclusion that everything, as it comes under the gaze of
philosophy becomes philosophical. In the present case, what is at first not-philosophy,
strange Chinese writings on foreign concepts like li and qi, become slowly assimilated
within the framework of philosophical analysis until they can only be comprehended as
philosophy. In the case of Leibniz, then, I want to suggest that the “Chinese” in
“Chinese philosophy" names, not so much some exotic Chinese essence as it does the
need of philosophy to identify and mark that which it deems to be outside of it. as a
preliminary to its assimilation. This naming presumes, among other things, that there
exists a certain unity and stability to the culture in which philosophy functions. Leibniz's
writings fail us here, since the lack of texts which deal explicitly with culture gives us no
basis for an analysis.
As we have seen, part of Leibniz’s difficulty in coming to terms with Chinese
philosophy was perhaps rooted in his Christian desire to discover nothing in the world
which did not reaffirm the presence of the divine will. Rather than simply claiming that
the Chinese and their philosophy were “simply” barbarian and in need of conversion, he
felt that he had discovered in the classical texts of Chinese philosophy a form of proto-
First Philosophy which resonated with Christian doctrine. It was this presence of the
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germ of Christian truth in classical Chinese texts, specifically the Yi Jing, which enabled
him to conceive of Chinese civilization as a part of the divine plan. But because the
Chinese had not received the benefits of the revelations concomitant with the receipt of
divine grace, they had subsequently spent the next two thousand years building a
misguided civilization based on the failure to recognize the truth of their own tradition.
But this Leibinizian mode of approaching the traditions and texts of a social space
perceived as radically different is ultimately one of reduction— the Chinese are simply
where “we Europeans'” might have ended up had we not been so fortunate as to receive
divine revelation. As a result, the Chinese do not possess so much a culture different in
matter as in form, albeit an imperfect one. Consequently, the reconciliation of the
difference between the worlds of the Chinese and the European lay in working toward a
convergence of form. The tension generated by the perception of the difference between
the Chinese who inhabit the other time of the extreme other side of the continent and the
Europeans of the West is not resolved, but instead absorbed into the monolithic “pre-
established harmony.” Since the tools of First Philosophy and Western science had
proved their intrinsically powerful nature by being hermeneutically useful— revealing
that the Chinese had themselves always possessed within their own texts the beginnings
of Christian truth— their divine truth was self-evident. The absorption of the Chinese
into the European context required a philosophical re-reading, to demonstrate that there
was essentially no difference between the Chinese notions of li and qi and certain
categories in European philosophy.
But this mode of perceiving across social distances contains within it a certain
contradiction, embodied in the simultaneous presence of sameness and difference,
which
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cannot be resolved in Leibniz’s terms. One has only to examine the lengths Leibniz to
which goes in order to establish that the Chinese are inherently the same, after
establishing their fundamental difference, to get a sense of this difficulty. For if the
Chinese are ultimately “just like us Europeans,” then why maintain the rigid distinctions
between the two social spheres and the radical alterity of the Chinese? But if they are
simply different, completely other to European thought, then Leibniz’s position in the
Rites Controversy is philosophically flawed— although his intent was perhaps more
proto-multicultural than his opponents in that debate, he nonetheless was wrong in
assuming that the Chinese could be anything other than barbarians. Their fundamental
difference can either be tolerated or subsumed within the more “scientific” methods and
philosophies of Europe. But if our investigation has led us to the seeming presence of a
contradiction embedded within a particular stance toward the philosophy of the Chinese,
what better than to turn now to Hegel, the philosophical theorist of contradiction par
excellence?
4.7 Between the Two Hegels
As Slavoj Zizek observes in For They Know Not What They Do . there is a
particular theme which runs through Hegel scholarship, which first reads Hegel as the
quintessential monistic idealist, and then proceeds to proclaim to have discovered the
“non-dialecticizable fourth term” of the dialectic triad, which Hegel himself somehow
failed to see.
42 We could certainly give a credible argument as to the existence of this
42
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Hegel of “Absolute Knowledge,’' given some of the appallingly bad claims he makes
about the cultures of non-European others in The Philosophy ofHistory. But the
question is not so much whether or not these readers who attempt to produce a Hegel
who fetishizes an all-encompassing “Absolute Knowledge” are correct in their readings
of his texts, but what the consequences are for reading him in such a fashion, particularly
since, as Zizek attempts to show, Hegel himself did not subscribe to such a conception of
Absolute Knowledge. For if Hegel’s dialectic is a sort of totalizing monster which, once
set free, devours all phenomena in its path, then we ought to expect that the future will
consist of a globalized monoculture, reveling in the enlightened bliss of Absolute
Knowledge.
Fortunately, there is another interpretive possibility. Slavoj Zizek rereads Hegel
as a philosopher who could count to four and who was thus fully aware that the final,
and most important moment of the dialectic was not the traditionally feted third moment
of synthesis, but the power of negativity itself— the zero space wherein the power of
contradiction is itself given positivity. There is nothing teleologically deterministic about
Zizek’s Hegel, nothing which drives the figurations of Spirit inexorably toward
Absolute Knowledge and World-Spirit. For Zizek, the power of Hegelian dialectics
resides precisely in the power of negativity, as that driving moment in the dialectic which
acts as a motor to the dialectical process. The failure, in reading Hegel, to notice this
moment of pure negativity as positivity can only produce a deterministic “straw”
position, causing us to lose
4k
the unfathomable surplus of the pure difference which
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counts for nothing/ although it makes the entire process go, this ‘void of the substance'
which is at the same time the ‘receptacle’ for all and everything.”43
Although those readers of Hegel who insist upon the deterministic Hegel as the
true Hegel might very well be right to read him in such a fashion, I fmd Zizek’s reading
to be far more compelling because, the Hegel of “pure difference” has a great deal more
to contribute to sociopolitical analysis than the standard monistic Hegel. Reading Hegel
as the idealist apologist for Western expansionism reduces his insights into the concepts
of difference and contradiction to the mere expressions of an ideologue who ultimately is
interested in difference only to subsume it within the interpretive frameworks of the
West. It is more fruitful to determine just how much of Hegel’s insights into the
dialectic of self and other can be utilized in the development of a politics which works
against, not with, the historical logics of domination with which we are seemingly
saddled. Following Zizek’s interpretation then. I want to understand Hegelian dialectics
as grounded, not in the positive moment of synthesis, but in the positivity of negativity,
the moment of pure difference. The reason for this is because I suspect that when we
examine Hegel’s coming to terms with Chinese culture and thought, we will find that it is
this moment of confrontation with the pure difference of the Chinese which forces Hegel
into the position of reaffirming the possibility of European philosophy’s self-
consciousness. In dealing with Hegel’s understanding and pronouncements on the
culture and philosophy of the Chinese then, I do not intend merely to point out the “false
facts” he produces, correcting them with the truth. Rather, I wish to examine how what
Hegel has to say about the Chinese and their culture might be seen as a certain
43
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movement in philosophical Spirit- to locate Hegel in his own history and to produce a
readmg of Hegel which will allow us to grasp what is at stake in the philosophical
encounter between West and East. What I wish to show is how Hegel himself,
particularly in his readings of the history of other, non-European cultures, becomes
trapped within a perception of the Chinese, a perception which precisely forces him, and
European philosophy, to a transformed level of self-consciousness which is not possible
without the consciousness, first, of the radically different cultural other.
4.8 The Hegelian Chinese
For Hegel, History itself begins with the Chinese who, although they possess the
distinction of marking the emergence of History, nonetheless remain “frozen’' in the
specific constellation of the generative moment of the historical process. He opens his
discussion of China with the following:
With the Empire of China History has to begin, for it is the oldest, as far
as history gives us any information; and its principle has such
substantiality, that for the empire in question it is at once the oldest and
the newest. Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it
is found at this day; for as the contrast between objective existence and
subjective freedom of movement in it, is still wanting, every change is
excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually, takes
the place of what we should call the truly historical.
44
Thus the presence of the Chinese in Hegel's world is as a frozen anachronism— a
miraculously preserved relic from the beginnings of History which, paradoxically, is not
historical because it is not self-transcending. The Chinese “principle” lacks the motor of
self-consciousness which propels Spirit forward in its manifestations. We recognize here
44
G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy ofHistory, J. Sibree, trans., (New York: Dover, 1956), p.
116.
148
as well the all-too-familiar elements which typically “characterize” Chinese culture— its
age, its lack of change, its stolid stability. This stability, however, is not maintained just
by the military might of the emperor’s army and the external threat of force for, as we
see here, the peculiar stability of the Chinese lies within the ordering principle of their
society, which prevents change because it is ultimately nothing more than a lifeless
moment in the evolution of Spirit.
The Chinese state, as a manifestation of this principle, is equally fixed in its
structure, and Hegel identifies it as a “despotism” wherein the Sovereign represents pure
Substantiality, the Law made real in the body of a human. Since, for Hegel, the proper
form of obedience to the rule of law occurs only after the subject of the law has made the
law its own, that is, internalized its reason as a moment of its own consciousness, 45 the
juridical structure of Chinese society simply reflects the state of consciousness to which
the Chinese have attained and which they will never transcend. Consequently, no
Chinese possesses a proper subjectivity beyond immediate self-consciousness:
The element of Subjectivity— that is to say, the reflection upon itself of
the individual will in antithesis to the Substantial (as the power in which it
is absorbed) or the recognition of this power as one with its own essential
being
,
in which it knows itselffree— is not found on this grade of
development. The universal Will displays its activity immediately through
that of the individual: the latter has no self-cognizance at all in antithesis
to Substantial, positive being, which it does not yet regard as a power
standing over it....
46
45
1 recognize that Hegel’s argument here is more complex, and his dialectical conception of
law more complicated, but for my purposes, I think this summary, although reductive,
doesn’t alter the general thrust of his argument in Section VI of the Phenomenology ofSpirit,
where he writes (of a stage through which Spirit passes) that “This Spirit can be called the
human law, because it is essentially in the form of a reality that is conscious of itself,” p. 267.
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The Chinese are thus mindless cogs within a social machine: they perform their tasks,
they fulfill the roles expected of them, but they do so without self-consciousness. Thus,
the relationship of the Chinese to their ruler is not the relationship of citizens to
government which characterizes the European social order. The operating principle of
the Chinese social order is properly that of the Family: “The Chinese regard themselves
as belonging to their family, and at the same time as the Children of the State.”47
In The Phenomenology ofSpirit , Hegel identifies the Family as the first,
immediate stage of social existence. In the case of Europe where self-consciousness
does exist, the Family ultimately negates itself by producing children who become self-
conscious individuals capable of being citizens.
48
But what sense can we make of this
with respect to the Chinese? In the Phenomenology
,
the transformation of Spirit from
the form of the Family to the form of the Nation is a necessary movement, generated by
the contradiction which self-conscious Spirit encounters. What the Chinese state
becomes, then, is a lifeless manifestation of Spirit writ large, wherein the motive force
embodied by European societies simply does not exist. It is stuck in a changeless time,
sealed within the fixtures of its own, unchanging principle. For Hegel, every structure
and characteristic of Chinese society reaffirms the lifelessness of the Chinese spirit,
whether it be the government, the administrative structures, religion, philosophy, or
language. In the concrete realities of Chinese existence, a circle of ossification exists, in
47
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which the stability of the Chinese principle produces cultural forms which impede
progress, thereby supporting the societal principle which in turn maintains stagnant
cultural forms.
Interestingly enough, Hegel recognizes the existence of “philosophy” in Chinese
culture, but although he recognizes in the “Y-King”49 the “purely abstract ideas of Unity
and Duality,’' he nevertheless maintains that Chinese Philosophy is nonetheless a stillborn
moment in the history of European thought: ctthe Philosophy of the Chinese appears
therefore to proceed from the same fundamental ideas as that of Pythagoras.”50 But
whereas the development of European philosophy carried it from these simplistic, basic
musings into the development of the sophisticated philosophical systems of Hegel's time,
the metaphysical ideas of the Chinese were developed so that they believe:
that he who is acquainted with Reason, possesses an instrument of
universal power, which may be regarded as all-powerful, and which
communicates a supernatural might; so that the possessor is enabled by it
to exalt himself to Heaven, and is not subject to death (much the same as
the universal Elixir of Life once talked ofamong us)/
1
What is curious about this mode of differentiating Chinese philosophy from the European
is that without the parenthetical remark which alludes to “unscientific' superstition, the
statement would do very well as a postmodernist critique of the European philosophy of
Hegel’s time. The fact that Hegel renders the Chinese word dao as “Reason" is
significant as well, in that for Hegel, Reason “is Spirit when its certainty of being all
49
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reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the
world as itself.” 3 ' In other words, the Chinese philosophical obsession with “dao” or
“Reason” reaffirms Hegel's conceptualization of the Chinese as an eternally static
moment of Spirit. For since Reason must become self-conscious in order to become
Spirit, the Chinese immutability is evidenced even in the abstract and metaphysical texts
and thought of the Taoists.
As for Confucius, his work is seen by Hegel as containing “a circumlocution, a
reflex character, and circuitousness in the thought, which prevents it from rising above
mediocrity.”
53
I would argue that aside from the form of Confucius’ thought, Hegel also
believes Confucius to be mediocre in terms of content. For if Confucius' work consists
primarily of “correct moral apophthegms,” then Confucius is simply another cultural
manifestation of the ethical structure of Chinese society, in which laws are not made
internal (this would require self-consciousness) but are instead mandated from without,
thus producing a civil society in which “All legal relations are definitely settled by rules;
free sentiment— the moral standpoint generally— is thereby thoroughly obliterated.”
34
Without a subjective aspect, wherein the law is internalized, the Chinese do not possess
the possibility of being moral; they simply follow their “determinate duties ’ and
obligations.
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Finally, like Leibniz, Hegel subscribes to the idea that the Chinese lack science,
although unlike Leibniz, he attributes this lack of science to the inherent limitations of
the Chinese language, which is unsuited for the development of scientific theories
because the Chinese do not possess any ‘true scientific interest.”55 Once again, this lack
of science (which for Hegel is something more than purely empirical studies, something
he cedes to the Chinese) is reflective of the stalled dialectic: “A free, ideal, spiritual
kingdom has here no place. What may be called scientific is of a merely empirical nature,
and is made absolutely subservient to the Useful on behalf of the State— its requirements
and those of individuals.” 56 Without self-consciousness, the Chinese have certainly
developed ways of understanding and managing the external world. But here, unlike
European science, Chinese “science” is purely functional— it is a pragmatic concern
which, failing to grasp the truth of the world, discerns only that which is socially useful.
4.9 The Stalled Ontology
Obviously, there are few “facts” in the Hegelian perception of China and Chinese
thought which are not overlaid with the arrogance of Eurocentrism. But simply stopping
here would miss the more subtle undertones of what is happening in Hegel’s China and
the possibilities embedded here. First, let us note that the Hegelian China is stuck in
time. The confident progression of Spirit in the Phenomenology is evident in The
Philosophy ofHistory , but only when Hegel gets to Europe. The rest, Chinese, Indian,
Persian, and Greek civilizations, are all superseded moments of European patf. It is, of
55
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course, only by identifying other cultures which represent the European past which
enables Europe’s situation in the present. For without some index by which to do the
work of cultural dating, there is no scale by which to assert the advanced nature of
European society. But unlike the rest of the world and the superseded moments of the
past which exist only as various forms of historical record, Chinese civilization is unique
in that it still persists
,
despite (or precisely because of) its failure to make the dialectical
development to self-consciousness. Thus, Hegel’s conceptualization of the world of the
Chinese comprehends it as non-coeval. That is, China exists in its own time, within a
state of suspended animation wherein the movement of spirit has stalled. 57 Second, we
must notice that Hegel gives no explanation as to why this dialectical impasse should
exist. Reading the Phenomenology
,
one is given no strong reasons to believe that the
evolution of Spirit he traces there would be the description of a specific culture. But
unless Hegel is going to claim that the Chinese are not, after all human (a claim he might,
in fact, be making), we have no reason for understanding this inability of the dialectic to
generate self-consciousness. After all, is not the dialectic driven by a certain necessity?
Hegel marks the difference of the Chinese, not so much in terms of distance (i .e.
the Chinese inhabit a world at the extreme far edge of the continent and so on) but in
temporal terms. And as such, the Chinese provide an extremely useful example of the
earliest stages which Spirit must overcome on its path to becoming Europe. In a manner
57 Rey Chow, in her book Primitive Passions, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),
p. 194, critiques precisely this understanding of the “time of the other” as part of the deadlock
of contemporary cultural studies, arguing instead that critiquing the “great disparity” between
European and non-European cultures entails reconfiguring both the notion of alterity and of
the origin itself.
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akin to anthropologists who believed that they are able to discover, in so-called
“primitive’' tribes, the preservation of the earliest cultural patterns of human history,
Hegel here utilizes a particular conception of the Chinese in order to bolster the
theoretical development of his philosophical system. Since it is Hegel who is doing the
theorizing here, and not a Chinese Neo-Confiicianist, then clearly the philosophical
vantage point of Europe is far superior to that of China— European philosophy is
capable, in a way which Chinese philosophy cannot, of unearthing the meaning of other
cultures.
But if the Chinese dialectic is stalled, does not the mere presence of the Chinese,
as a heavy anachronistic mass of non-self-conscious people, confront the “developed
Spirit” of Europe with its own contradiction? For if it is the case that the power of Spirit
lies in “looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the
negative is the magical power that converts it into being,” 58 then European philosophy’s
self-consciousness, its self-understanding as being something more than the sum of the
truths it has produced, emerges, not from a confrontation with itself, but with its
identification of its own, proper Other, that frozen moment which it had supposedly long
ago transcended. Indeed, the “truth” of philosophy “includes its negative also, what
would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might
abstract.”
59
Thus, in order for European philosophy to move to the next level in the
dialectical progression, it must identify and confront what appears to it to be radically
58
G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology ofSpirit, A. V. Miller, trans., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), p. 19.
59
G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology ofSpirit, A. V. Miller, trans., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), p. 27.
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other, since this confrontation is the only thing which can force the emergence of the
next moment of Spirit's unfolding.
But what of the other here, of the Chinese moment which, after its dialectical
confrontation with European philosophy as a superseded moment of its own dialectical
evolution, is seemingly included within European philosophy? Does it vanish? Is it
simply incorporated within the body of European philosophy as a moment of the
neutralized antagonism represented by the presence of the other, absorbed into the
present ofEuropean thought? Or does its silent, anachronistic presence point to the
arbitrariness of the identification of European philosophy as “philosophy proper?” The
Hegelian encounter with Chinese philosophy can thus be seen as a historical moment
where European philosophy believed it had encountered its own transcended past and
incorporated it, classifying the principle underlying Chinese thought as simply a primitive
moment in the dialectical development of European philosophy and thus readily
explained and absorbed. But as Hegel himself observed, historical truths are “concerned
with a particular existence, with the contingent and arbitrary aspects of a given content,
which have no necessity.”60 In the time that has passed since Hegel's attempt to
incorporate the Chinese other, the Chinese negative, much has transpired. In the next
chapter, I will attempt to address the unkept promises of the principle of Western
thought and civilization, but given that Hegel's account of history is often criticized for
its ahistoricity, its idealism, what should we expect to find when we examine materialist
60
G. W. F. Hegel. The Phenomenology ofSpirit, A. V. Miller, trans., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), p. 23.
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accounts of the difference between cultures, as evidenced in the thought of Marx, the
very founder of materialist dialectics?
4.10 States of Decay: the Asiatic “Mummy”
Although Marx might have believed that he had “turned Hegel on his head,” what
we discover when he examines non-European societies is that he has cheated in his
handstand— he has only gone halfway. For just as Hegel, in his reading of the non-
European, simply absorbs it into the dialectic of ideas by identifying Chinese society in its
essence as merely a transcended stage of European development, we could see Marx as
relegating the socio-economic peculiarities of non-European societies to the status of
being outmoded, “pre-historical moments” of materialist dialectics. China, India,
Mexico, North Africa, all of these are merely relics and remnants of essentially pre-
capitalist economic formations which have had the misfortune not to have reached the
advanced capitalist stage attained by the European powers. As these “primitive” states
find themselves coming increasingly into contact and conflict with the powers of Europe,
they will find it correspondingly more and more difficult to resist assimilation or
colonization. European capitalist formations are thus the materialist motor of historical
progress and as the active representation of socio-economic development are thus the
social and cultural powers to be reckoned with.
But although Marx sees himself as providing a corrective antidote to Hegelian
idealism which allows for the theoretical capture of the true essence of historical change,
he nonetheless falls into the same mode of coming to terms with the non-European other
to which Hegel succumbed. As a result, Marx provides us with another mode of
understanding Chinese difference, one located in the antiquity of the Chinese economic
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formation and not in the frozen principles of Chinese ideas. Ultimately however, despite
the reorientation of the primary theoretical assumptions, we are led to much the same
conclusion. Whereas for Hegel the stagnation and ossification of Chinese society is
inherent in its principle, for Marx the ideas of a society do not precede its material
existence and the manner in which it reproduces itself— the thought of the Chinese can
thus be read as a shadowy reflection of the ideology which was necessary for the
material reproduction of Chinese society. Given this shift in philosophical prioritization
then, we need to address what Marx understood to be the materiality of Chinese society.
But before we can anticipate what Marx might have to say on the topic of Chinese
philosophy, we need to address Marx's conceptualization of the economics of Chinese
society and the notion of the Asiatic Mode of Production (hereafter abbreviated as
AMP).
Marx's interest in China and the non-European was bom out of his stint as a
correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune. Assigned to cover the consequences of
British foreign policy, Marx began writing a series of articles for the New York Daily
Tribune on China and British foreign policy in 1853, and continued to do so until at least
1 860.
61
The portrait of Chinese civilization which emerges from these articles is one in
which China is always temporally “behind,” always at a disadvantage, and always tinged
with the metaphor of decay. Thus, China is: a “mummy” which has been brought into
violent contact with the “open air” of British imperialism and which will, as a result,
61
See Marx on China (1853-1860): Articles from the New York Daily Tribune , Dona
Torr, ed., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968).
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surely fall into “dissolution,
’6 ~
“the rotting semi-civilization of the oldest State in the
world. and a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating
m the teeth of time.’'64 In each of these descriptions of China, the metaphoric depiction
of Chinese decay is counterposed with the active vitality of the British and their
imperializing forces. Where Hegel's idealist account of Chinese thought merely rendered
it a frozen principle without conjuring up specific images (what does a frozen principle
look like?), Marx's metaphorical rendering is perhaps a bit more vivid, evoking
unpleasant images of rotting foods and the stench of decomposition.
This identification of the European with “progress” and “vitality” and the non-
European with “decay” and “stagnation” sets the tone for the understanding of those
cultures themselves. For if the non-European is stagnant and rotten, then it is surely the
result of the economic organization of these societies which produces this stagnation as
an aftereffect of the attempt to reproduce its conditions of existence. This economic
organization finds its legitimation and derives its social power from a “despotic” state
—
a government which is divorced from the rural sites of economic production and which
controls the appropriation and distribution of the surplus produced there. This “Oriental
despotism” is a stalled stage in the natural evolution of the human community in which
some person, a “despot,” occupies the empty position of the imagined unity of the
62
Karl Marx. “Revolution in China and Europe,” Marx on China (1853-1860): Articles
from the New York Daily Tribune , Dona Torr, ed., (London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1968), p. 4.
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Karl Marx, “Persia— China,” Marx on China (1853-1860): Articles from the New
York Daily Tribune , Dona Torr. ed., (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1968), p. 45.
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Karl Marx, “Trade or Opium?” Marx on China (1853-1860): Articlesfrom the New
York Daily Tribune . Dona Torr, ed., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), p. 55.
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community and serves to make real this unity. As a result of this form of social
organization, the shift in economic focus from countryside to town does not occur, and
Asiatic states are left with an imagined collectivity of farming communes, each a
mediated part of the “clan’s” unity. 65
This discussion requires some elaboration, for we shall see that this is ultimately
the economic and not ideal basis upon which Marx grounds Asiatic stagnation and
decay. First, the passage from the Grundrisse under discussion proceeds in a dialectical
fashion similar to that of “The Ethical Order” in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Only, for
Marx, the dialectical evolution of the form of communality requires, not the generation
of self-consciousness, but rather the transformation of the economic organization of the
community. Thus, the difference between Asiatic communality and the second form, that
(presumably European) “product of more active, historic life” consists of the economic
focus of the community which in turn produces the necessary conditions for a
transformation of consciousness. Within the Asiatic community, the economic focus is
upon the rural agricultural village as the site of production, whereas in the European
form, the economic focus is upon the commerce which occurs in the town, removed
from the rural areas.66 This delineation oftwo alternate forms of communal existence
before the emergence of feudalism could be read in two ways. First, one could argue
that there is a progression here, from the Asiatic to the European, from rural-based to
urban-based economies. Alternatively, and I believe, more accurately, one might
65
Karl Marx, Grundrisse , (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 472-474.
66
Karl Marx, Grundrisse , (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 474.
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contend that both the Asiatic and the European are meant to be seen as alternate
pathways out of the first mode of “clan community.”
The first reason for adopting the latter reading ofMarx's conceptualization of the
Asiatic communal form is simply a close reading of Marx's text. He writes:
The second form [of communality]— and like the first it has essential
modifications brought about locally, historically, etc.
—
product of more
active, historic life, of the fates and modifications of the original clans
—
also assumes the community as its first presupposition, but not, as in the
first case, as the substance of which the individuals are mere accidents, or
of which they form purely natural component parts— it presupposes as
base not the countryside, but the town as an already created seat (centre)
of the rural population....
67
This non-Asiatic communal form situates the town as the economic center of social
organization, whereas in the Asiatic form, the town is merely accidental, forming “only at
exceptionally good points for external trade.”68 Thus it is the exigencies of the location
of economic communities which is primarily responsible for the path of their
development.
Another reason for reading the two modes of communality as non-unilinear is
that the Asiatic mode is described as a form in which the farming communes “vegetate
independently alongside one another” while the non-Asiatic mode is characterized by the
internal drive to develop. For since it is in the non-Asiatic mode that we encounter
private property, the more this is developed, “the more, further, the clan removes itself
from its original seat and occupies alien ground, hence enters into essentially new
conditions of labour, and develops the energy of the individual more....”
6
" Given this
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Karl Marx, Grundrisse , (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 474.
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understanding of the two modes then, it would appear logically impossible that the
Asiatic form would ever evolve into the second form, since the Asiatic form is always
already limited by its internal principle from developing the forms of private property
necessary for the dialectical evolution of societal organization. The non-Asiatic form, on
the other hand, since it does possess the characteristic of private ownership of property,
can thus generate the internal contradictions necessary for progression to feudal society
(and ultimately, of course, to the even more advanced structures of capitalism and
communism).
Thus, unlike Hegel, Marx provides us with a material basis for understanding
Chinese
70
stagnation, although ultimately the meaning of Chinese society is material
stagnation. The economic forms which the Chinese developed, due to ‘Various external,
climatic, geographic, physical, etc. conditions as well as... their particular natural
predisposition— their clan character”
71
are what maintains the “will to vegetate” which
animates Chinese society. But even given the shift in focus, from “principle” to “material
conditions,” is there not something suspicious in the appeal, at the very last to some
notion of Chinese (or, more accurately, Asiatic) character? For is not this "character'
simply the Hegelian “principle” linked to a social and material specificity? Are then the
Asiatics thus inherently limited, doomed to mummification, because ofwho they are?
70
1 recognize that I have here shifted from discussions of societies characterized b\ the
Asiatic mode of production” to “Chinese society,” but since Chinese society is, for Marx,
clearly included within the class of societies which could be called "Asiatic," this shift is
not a conceptual error, but just a shift in focus.
71
Karl Marx, Grundrisse , (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 472.
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The consequences of this, are of course, politically difficult to accept. For since
it is the non-Asiatic mode which is driven to inhabit “alien ground,” then is it not
precisely the case that the economic wanderlust of European imperialism is necessary to
shake up the intrinsic static nature of non-European societies, propelling them out of
existence in the changeless, eternal limbo of the frozen and transcended past of world
history and back onto the tracks of dialectical progress? Indeed, elsewhere, with
reference to India, yet another example of a “undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative
life,” Marx writes that contact with the imperialist violence of the British is
fundamentally necessary as a condition for social change:
England, it is true, in causing a revolution in Hindostan, was actuated
only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing
them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its
destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If
not whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the
unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution.
72
The stagnating, self-absorbed “Asiatic” societies thus “require” the influence of
imperialist capitalist nations in order to rejuvenate themselves, shedding their old,
outmoded forms the way a “mummy in a hermetically sealed coffin" disintegrates into
dust upon contact with the air it has been protected from for centuries.
Marx’s notion of the AMP thus guarantees the primitivity of non-European states
at the same time that it renders necessary the intervention of European states to break
the mold of unchanging eternity which encapsulates them. The AMP is subsequently
characterized by Marx as a primitive stage in the evolution of economic organization,
72
Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India,” Marx on Colonialism and Modernization ,
Shlomo Avineri, ed., (New York: Anchor, 1968), p. 94.
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which culminates in the “modem bourgeois mode of production.”73 But the most
striking aspect of Marx s conceptualization of the AMP is its lack ofprivate property' in
land, such that it could be viewed almost as a primitive form of communism 74 For if it
is the aim of Marx s history is to show how, through a series of dialectical movements,
the relationship between humans and private property moves from the absence of private
property to its necessity and then finally to its negation again, then why would the
possibility that the societies characterized by the AMP might be closer to communism
that the capitalist states of Marx’s time never arise? Why would Marx so quickly
conclude that societies characterized by the AMP were simply lost in their own
stagnation, instead of considering the possibility that the forms of property within the
AMP might represent a step beyond capitalist relations? The answer to this perhaps lies
in the fact that these societies were easily dominated by the Europeans, such that those
who conquer always represent the more advanced, more powerful. The weak, of course,
are always the backward.
But the point of this excursion has not been to demonstrate that Marx was
Eurocentrist. Rather, it was to show that since Marx was not free from a certain mode
of perceiving non-European others, he is subsequently blocked from considering other
73 Marx writes, “In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois
modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic
development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form
of the social process of production...” A Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical
Economy
,
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 21.
74 Marx writes, in a letter to Engels on 2 June 1853, that “On the formation of Oriental
cities one can read nothing more brilliant, graphic and striking than old Francois
Bernier. . . . Bernier correctly discovers the basic form of all phenomena in the East . . to
be the absence ofprivate property in land. This is the real key even to the Oriental
heaven...”
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theoretical possibilities. In addition, the mode of cultural perception which this cursory
examination ofMarx seems to elicit is that of the forcefit— having developed a theory to
explain the development of human society, Marx is hard-pressed to give it up when
confronted with data which simply do not fit his theory. Given the handy defeat at the
hands of the British fleet, it is perhaps easier to simply view Chinese society as an
outmoded historical possibility, instead of confronting head-on the meaning of the utter
difference which the Chinese (and indeed, most non-European societies) seem to
represent theoretically. As Marx has captured the materiality of Chinese society within
the strictures of his theory, we already suspect that, had he written specifically on the
philosophy of the Chinese, he would have characterized it too as stagnant, the
frozen/ossified ideological reflections of a stagnant Chinese economic order.
4.11 The Chinese Ideology
In The German Ideology, Marx describes the historical development of the forces
of production, to show that rather than being a consequence of the development of the
historical idea, they rather preceded it. Instead of consciousness instantiating itself in
various material forms, these forms are what generate corresponding forms ot
consciousness.
75
This is, of course, a familiar aspect of Marxian theory. The task before
us here is to generate, from this, what Marx’s conceptualization of what the
Chinese
ideology might be, given that the discussion in The German Ideology is limited to
the
development of European societies. Further, what merits discussion are the
75 Marx writes, “Consciousness is, therefore, from the very
beginning a social product,
and remains so as long as men exist at all.” The German Ideology ,
(New York:
International Publishers, 1970), p. 51.
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consequences of our intuited version ofMarx on Chinese philosophy for philosophical
interaction between the philosophies of West and East.
First, since the Asiatic mode of production is characterized by inertia and a
resistance to change, Chinese thought must be so as well. In fact, since “Men are the
producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc...”
7 *1
and Chinese “men” are trapped within a
historical mode of production which gravitates away from change and has remained
unchanged for centuries, Chinese thought must possess the same characteristic. Marx
writes:
Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their
corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the
semblance of independence [from material existence]. They have no
history, no development; but men, developing their material production
and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence,
their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined
by consciousness, but consciousness by life.
77
And if this is the case, then Chinese thought does not change , since the material
conditions of Chinese existence do not change. The Chinese are simply doomed to
reproduce, within the unending confines of a social closed circuit, the same ideas. So
long as they remained trapped within the Asiatic mode of production, the Chinese are
compelled to an endless repetition.
Further, the form which Chinese philosophy takes will work to reproduce the
Chinese society from which it emerges. But if Chinese society is correctly understood to
be “Oriental despotism,” wherein individuals see themselves as possessing a
relationship
to the unity of the group made real in the figure of the despot (emperor), then
Chinese
76
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77
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philosophy will take the form of being an endless series of paeans and rationalizations of
the despotic order. Consequently, the fate of Chinese thought is also to be caught within
an infinitely repeating cycle: the Asiatic mode of production generates a mode of thought
which reinforces the Asiatic mode of production, and so on. What could possibly break
this endless repetition?
The answer is, of course, the introduction of external ideas, concomitant with the
introduction of external modes of production. To call it an introduction is, however, to
be politically disingenuous, since this is tantamount to claiming that the Chinese need
some form of cultural imperialism to drive their thought out of the quicksand of Asiatic
ideology. This admonition is particularly difficult to accept, given our contemporary
fetish of “respect for the other.” But it is, nonetheless, an inescapable consequence of
accepting Marx's diagnosis of the material realities of Chinese society. Indeed, given the
lack of structural change which accompanied the “introduction” of Buddhism into China,
one might argue even more strongly that a period of colonization is ineluctably
necessary, in order to produce the material changes which must serve as the real bases
for a change in ideology.
But what we have discovered here is still, paradoxically, nothing new. These
conceptualizations of Chinese society— its static, unchanging character, the primarily
ideological function of its “philosophy” as a mode for justifying and perpetuating the
continued existence of the Chinese state, are all descriptions of Chinese
thought which
we find even now. We have thus moved from an understanding of Chinese thought,
marked by Leibniz, where Chinese thought is seen as fundamentally
compatible with
European thought but still in need of European enlightenment,
to a position where.
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although European thought is still needed for the development of Chinese thought,
Chinese thought is fundamentally opposed to the bases of European thought.
In light of these considerations, the question of cultural “contact” becomes
unavoidable, for not only is Marxism the official state philosophy of the contemporary
Chinese state, but contact with the West brought other philosophies as well. But what
sort of meaning could this cultural contact have? If, in the very determination of the
contours of Chinese thought, it is relegated to existence as an anachronism, this
communication is foreclosed. The only workable possibilities entail some form of
colonization, whether this is anchored on the truth of Christian texts or the intellectual
and material advancement of Western thought and ideals. Part of the suggestion here is
thus that the success or failure of “intercultural” (philosophical) communication requires
first of all the abandonment of conceptualizations of the cultural other which maintain,
on one level or another, that the other exists in an other space and an other time. The
assertion of cultural difference on these grounds and the recognition of other cultures
which is grounded in spatio-temporal alterity is destined to deny, at the outset, the very
attempt to recognize the other. For if the other is so very far away, the other
could only
be, in the terms of the metaphor of visuality, indistinct.
168
CHAPTER 5
CHINESE PROMISES
5.1 The Other’s Borders
A moment ago we were saying, in effect, that a philosophical discourse or
discussion always bore in a certain way on the limit of the philosophical,
on the border between what is philosophical and what is not. . . we feel
strongly the seriousness of the question of whether philosophy was bom
in Greece or not, whether it is European or not, whether one can speak of
Chinese philosophy, whether one can speak of African philosophy, or
whether the destination of philosophy is marked by a singular language or
a network of singular languages. ... Which means that, at the same time,
one feels led to reaffirm that philosophic* has a Greek or Greco-European
source with all the consequences that that entails, and inversely, since
philosophy is the question of its own limit within itself, then at that
moment there is not only no reason that precisely the non-European may
not accede to philosophy, but no reason that the non-European may not
be the place of the philosophical question about philosophy.
—Jacques Derrida, “Passages— From Traumatism to Promise"
Derrida’s philosophical task has always been to locate, beneath the presence of
the claim to truth, the subtle workings of the assumptions necessary to make those
claims which undermine their veracity. This method of philosophical deconstruction,
when centered upon philosophical praxis itself, encounters the limits of philosophy. What
is to count as philosophy if philosophy as such is concerned with everything? Certain
schools of Anglo-American philosophy tend to emphasize that the philosophical project
is concerned with conceptual analysis and the elucidation of propositions, all the while
blissfully (and perhaps willfully) ignorant that the methodological tools they employ are
derived from the logical analysis of the English language. This type of blindness leads,
of course to the strange claims made with respect to the thought and culture of the
other
as witnessed in the discussion of Brannigan in chapter two. But it
also leads to a certain
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instability in the boundaries of what is to count as philosophical discourse. Derrida is
thus led. in the passage cited above, to suggest that philosophical theorizing is always
concerned with effacing the “wound'’ testifying to the trauma of its emergence. 1 In the
case of our present focus, the notion of cultural difference and its utilization as the
grounds for a philosophical cartography, the point here is not to prove that Chinese
philosophy is valid as philosophy, for as suggested, the valorization of Chinese thought
as philosophy ascribes to it the paradoxical status of being simultaneously both
philosophy and non-philosophy, surely an unbearable contradiction. Furthermore, the
need for this valorization succumbs to the problematic it wishes to redress. For though
the attempt to recognize Chinese thought as philosophy perhaps has its benign origins
in the desire to affirm the cultural other, the claim that these culturally other modes of
thought are '"truly philosophy after all” and the deployment of axiologies and
demonstrations that the ancient Chinese had their own versions of utilitarianism simply
translates into the Westernization of the world; everything is ultimately “just like it is
here.”
The resolution of this problem lies, not in the determination of the proper status
of Chinese thought, but rather in the analysis of what is at work in the philosophical
desire which generates this contradiction. What lies behind the desire to demarcate
certain philosophies as lying outside the limits of the Western? What confers the status,
beyond the purely contingent features (such as the language it is written/spoken in, the
1
Although he does not develop further his analysis of the relation between philosophies of the
West and non-West, see his remarks about the philosophical effacement of its origin in
Points: Interviews, 1974-1994 , Elizabeth Weber, ed., Peggy Kamuf et. al„ trans., (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995), especially pp. 372-395.
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nation-state in which it is written/spoken, etc.) of Western, Chinese, etc.? What is
effaced in the desire to maintain that Western philosophy as such is distinct from that
other, Chinese philosophy? The previous two chapters have argued that the conferral of
cultural alterity and the displacement of Chinese society and thought is accomplished by
means of a spatial and temporal distancing which establishes a fundamental separation
between two spheres of culture. Once accomplished, this separation, far from being
recognized as the work of a theoretical act. is maintained as a fact of the world. But
once the facticity of this separation is called into question, the suggestion arises that
Western self-identity, far from being an immediate, given self-consciousness, is instead
the result of a historical process of grappling with the question of the other. This
process is predicated upon the manner in which the West has been able to pick out and
determine those who are to be identified as its others: the act of classification has
profound consequences. But this positioning of the other does not simply result in the
other’s pure victimization: the practices which work to demonstrate that the other is an
anachronistic society located at the end of the earth opposite from the West are also
constitutive of the West’s own self-identity. Being able to identify the other and to
delineate its characteristics— these acts locate the identifier in a position of theoretical
supremacy. Consequently we have seen a sort of “sefr-confirmation at work in the texts
of “Western" philosophers as they have sought to apprehend the non-Western, a self-
confirmation which is paradoxical in that this Westemness is generated by the very act of
classifying the non-Westem. For Leibniz, Hegel, and Marx, the ability to locate the
frozen social structures of the Chinese put them in the more advanced culture and thus
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compelled them to assume the mantle of being representatives of the pinnacles of human
innovation.
Certainly, the thinkers of the nineteenth century lived in the heyday of the
Industrial age, when optimism ran high as to the possibilities inherent within the West's
technological and social developments (even though, of course, there were pessimists
like Nietzsche who were always spoiling these inflated self-images). It was possible then
to believe that concomitant with the conquest of the globe was the incontrovertible proof
of Western superiority, whether one saw this as a mission from the Christian God or
simply a dialectical necessity. But with the onset of global wars and the wars of
resistance fought against colonization came the unsettling suspicion that something was
wrong, that perhaps the guiding principles of Western societies were dangerous as well
as innovative. For the development of increasingly sophisticated weapons of war
suggested, not the ushering in of the golden age of humanity, but perhaps the beginning
of a long and painful era of protracted war. In this context, it is perhaps not unthinkable
that Western thinkers would be driven to a revaluation of its own cultural principles, a
revaluation made in light of the cultural principles of the non-Westem societies which the
West believed it had already superseded but which it had nonetheless incorporated.
Colonization entails a necessary contamination of both cultures; neither is pure any
longer.
But it will perhaps be said that this is all historical speculation. Is it not easier to
claim that the cultural promises of the West were not simply the expressions of an
anxiously self-assertive, historical moment, but rather the descriptions of the fact of
really existing, cultural differences? Could one not claim that the West was simply too
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eager to put what it had found into practice, and that Western expansionism was thus a
form of impulsiveness? If the analysis given thus far is to attempt anything, it is to
demonstrate that the naturalness of these cultural differences is anything but the
expression of a simple, empirical fact, and that these differences are instead, consciously
or not, created. But if this is the case, then what remains of the Western desire to
identify its culture and differentiate it from that of the other, once this “Western” culture
has been shown to be something stained with blood and tinged with the guilt of global
devastation?
To be sure, this guilt is not meant to identify the poles of a dichotomous
depiction of the non-West/West relation, whereby the West is always already guilty of
“Orientalist” or “Imperialist” sins, while at the same time the “Oriental” position marks
the location of the perennial yet innocent victim. Rather, the point here is that the very
identification of the other has profound consequences for the self-understanding of the
West. Thus, instead of the Imperialist West acting to subjugate the peoples of cultures
other than itself, we find that the situation is such that the West, in attempting to come to
terms with what it seems to be, comes into a measure of self-identification only through
that attempt to reconcile itself with the presence of cultural others. The West's self-
identification is possible only vis-a-vis the identification of a stable other which responds
to the West as the mirror of its own self-presence.
It is in this context that China functions within the imagination of the
philosophers of the early twentieth century who attempted to deal with the “problem of
China.” For it is these philosophers who must come to terms with the fact that not only
is the West no longer the source of world-historical inspiration, but that the very ideas
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spawned and propounded by the West are seemingly in need of serious revision. The
idea of “scientific progress,’' for example, in the light of the development of the
machinery of war, is hardly part of the process for the actualization of global harmony if
utilized m the conflicts of world wars. But despite accusations of misuse and
misapplication, certain Western ideas nonetheless seem to present themselves as truths,
as the expressions of facts about the world or the actualization of an ideal world, which
only a madman would deny. In our present time, in which liberal democracy has
proclaimed the end of history and its victory as the truly viable form of representative
government and human geneticists busy themselves with unraveling the cabalistic coding
of human DNA, we find that these ideas which are supported and given their legitimacy
by the fact that they have proven themselves historically “true”— democracy and
science are perhaps the only remaining unsullied ideas in the Western reservoir of
global contributions. It is precisely these contributions which are to be examined in this
chapter and the next. For if it is the case that democracy and science, far from being the
harbingers of the golden era, are instead the preponderances of the historical logics of
the past, then it is perhaps our duty to bring these under examination.
To sketch out a preliminary analysis, what we will find in the work of Dewey,
Russell, and Beauvoir, the philosophical figures with whom this chapter is concerned, is
that the West’s relation to the Chinese other is that of a patient mentor, who seeks to
guide the backward Chinese into a state of enlightenment. For Dewey and Russell, this
position takes on the character of advocating various movements toward the
development of democracy and the adoption of the methods of Western science.
Beauvoir, given her Marxist orientation and writing in a period after Russell and Dewey,
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sees the Chinese promise as the possibility that the Chinese can successfully create a
communist society, where the promises of Marx are made real and reveal their historical
truth. In all three cases, however, the “Chinese promise” consists of the hope that the
Chinese can cash in all that is of value in the Western ideals of progress, democracy, and
science, without committing the egregious acts of violence to which the West seems to
be prone. Thus China represents a space where the West and Western ideas, having
failed to live up to their potential and possibilities, can be tried again. China is another
backdrop for the reenactment of the Western. But let us turn our attention to this
triumvirate, to see whether what I have just sketchily argued finds support.
5.2 Dewey’s Chinese Mission
Ex-President Sun Yat-Sen is a philosopher, as I found out last night
during dinner with him. He has written a book, to be published soon,
saying that the weakness of the Chinese is due to their acceptance of the
statement of an old philosopher, ‘To know is easy; to act is difficult/
Consequently they did not like to act and thought it was possible to get a
complete theoretical understanding.... So he has written a book to prove
to his people that action really is easier than knowledge.
—John Dewey, from a letter to his daughter,
written in Shanghai, May 13th, 1919.
While lecturing in Tokyo at the National Imperial University, John Dewey was
approached by a small delegation of his Chinese former students who came to offer him
a visiting professorship for the 1919-1 920 academic year. Dewey accepted the offer,
and proceeded to stay in China for two years, touring extensively and giving lectures on
his favorite topics of philosophical interest— democracy, education, and the power of
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the methodology of scientific inquiry formulated by Francis Bacon.
2
The delegation
which approached him was headed by Hu Shih. a former doctoral student of Dewey's in
philosophy at Columbia coUege who had subsequently become a professor of philosophy
at National Beijmg University.' Hu had prepared the way for Dewey’s visit by giving a
series of lectures on pragmatic philosophy and writing a series of articles published
before Dewey’s visit.4 Because ofHu’s work on behalfofDewey, the visit itselfwas
quite a success, in which many of Dewey’s lectures drew thousands of audience
members, not including those who had to be turned away for lack of standing room.
Smce Dewey was generally regarded at the time as a preeminent “Western”
philosophical figure at the cutting edge of philosophy (he was also the first foreigner to
be invited to lecture at a Chinese university), it had been the hope ofHu and others who
were members of the fledgling cultural reform movement 5 that Dewey’s presence would
lend support to their efforts to transform and modernize China by a drastic
reconfiguration of what they felt was an outmoded culture, incapable of sustaining itself
2
For a detailed account of Dewey's visit to China and the specifics of his trip, see
chapters one and two of Barry Keenan. The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational
Reform and Political Power in the Early Republic
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977), pp. 7-51, as well as chapter ten of George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind
ofJohn Dewey
,
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), pp. 186-205.
5
In a manner not unlike the training ofgraduate students as professional acolytes, Dewey’s
Chinese students returned to China eager to fulfill their mission ofbringing the Western ideas
ofdemocracy and education to their home culture. Seeing the glowing reviews of their
commitment to progress and solving China's problems with their newfound ideas in Thomas
Berry, “Dewey's Influence in China,” John Dewey: His Thought and Influence , John
Blewett, ed., (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960).
4
Barry Keenan, The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational Reform and Political
Power in the Early Republic
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 12.
5
The same movement to which Lu Xun and Li Shicen (mentioned in chapter two) belonged,
although their goals were very different from the goals ofHu and his associates.
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in the post-World War world. Given that Dewey’s visit coincided with the eruption of
the May Fourth riots in Beijing, riots which were destined to become the archetype for
future public protests (including the “pro-Democracy” movement in Tiananmen in 1 989).
Dewey’s presence in China at the time served as a catalyst for sentiments of reform and
change sentiments which affixed themselves onto the twin myths of “Science” and
“Democracy” as the pathways out of China's backwardness. 6
Dewey himself understood well the historical moment in which he found himself.
In one of the many articles he wrote for The New Republic
,
he proclaimed:
Simply as an intellectual spectacle, a scene for study and surmise, for
investigation and speculation, there is nothing in the world today— not
even Europe in the throes of reconstruction— that equals China. History
records no parallel. Can an old, vast, peculiar, exclusive, self-sufficing
civilization be bom again? Made over it must be, or it cannot endure. 7
But if China is to be given a cultural makeover, this makeover is to be a Western one.
Dewey hoped that by bringing in the Western ideas of science and democracy to a
Chinese culture in the throes of a radical transformation, attempting to shed the last
vestiges of a decayed imperial state apparatus, he could help to bring the developments
of Western philosophy to bear upon the problems which Chinese society faced. This was
in keeping with his understanding of what the philosophical project itself was, namely.
6 A view which is still dominant in the politics of resistance in China, as can be evidenced
from the writings of the dissident physicist Fang Lizhi, who, in “Chinese Democracy:
The View from the Beijing Observatory” writes that “The greatest contribution of the
May Fourth and New Culture movements was to promote the absorption by Chinese
culture of democracy and science, two things it has in short supply.” Bringing Down the
Great Wall: Writings on Science, Culture, and Democracy in China , (New York:
Norton, 1990), p. 39.
7
John Dewey, “Young China and Old,” Characters and Events , Joseph Ratner, ed.,
(New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 256.
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that philosophy emerges from "the stresses and strains in community life” which demand
a solution. "Philosophy” is simply the name given to the practice of attempting to solve
the problems faced by society. 8 Thus, after meeting with Sun Yatsen. the "father” of the
Republic of China, Dewey labeled him as a philosopher because of Sun's devotion to the
solution of China's social and political problems.
This conception of philosophy put Dewey in good (Chinese) company, since
almost 2500 years ago, the Conftician school of Chinese thought had attempted the same
sort of enterprise, focusing on the advocacy of the correct philosophical principles which
would help to restore the social order lost due to the absence of a strong centralized
government in the Warring States period. In fact, during the first months of Dewey’s
visit, comparisons with Confucius were often explicitly made in introducing the
philosopher to the crowds before which he was to speak. Since Chinese historians had
calculated that Dewey's sixtieth birthday coincided with the exact birthdate of Confucius
2470 years earlier, Dewey's presence in China was interpreted as a propitious omen for
positive change in China.
4
Dewey took full advantage of the influence he wielded,
lecturing on the almost unimaginable possibilities of social change afforded by the
adoption of Western methods of science and the political principles of democracy.
Indeed, this adoption was presented as the only workable solution to Chinese problems.
But although Dewey advocated the Chinese adoption of Western science and its
methods as part of the remedy of the problems faced by Chinese society in his time, what
8
See the introduction to Reconstruction in Philosophy for this conception of the
philosophical enterprise.
4
Barry Keenan, The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational Reform and Political
Power in the Early Republic
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 10-1 1
.
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he ultimately saw as fundamental was the adoption of the Western political philosophy of
democracy. This is not to say that Dewey believed that Chinese culture was. before
contact with the West, undemocratic. Rather, he believed that China merely lacked the
“organs" by which a political democracy is sustained. 10 What, for Dewey, marked the
fundamental contradiction of Chinese culture, then, was the contradiction between “her
deepest traditions, her most established ways of thinking and feeling, her essential
democracy,’ and the lack of the governmental apparatus which would permit the
expression of this democracy. 1
1
Although he does not specifically identify the missing
organs of the Chinese social body, one presumes that they would have to include such
indispensable features as suffrage (universal or not) and the election of government
officials.
In addition. Dewey considered the development of a system of democratic
education as crucial to the modernization of China and to the successful integration of
China into the sphere of West-dominated global politics. Only through a systematic
evaluation of China's cultural heritage could those working for the transformation of
China hope to achieve success, since part of the Deweyan conception of social reform
consisted of a cultural experimentalism. utilizing aspects of the culture of the past to
10 Dewey writes, “For while China is morally and intellectually a democracy of a
paternalistic type, she lacks the specific organs by which alone a democracy can
effectively sustain itself either internally or internationally,” “Transforming the Mind of
China.” Characters and Events
,
Joseph Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol.
one, p. 292.
11
“Transforming the Mind of China,” in Characters and Events , (New York: Octagon,
1970), p.292.
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benefit the present.
12
As a result. Dewey's conceptualization of the Chinese philosophies
ol Confucianism and Taoism focused on the immanence of these ways of thought within
Chinese culture— the modernization of China will require that the specificity of the
Chinese “philosophies of life” be reckoned with. With the establishment of the proper
school systems and the judicious importation of Western ideas. “Young China” would
develop into “a new culture, in which what is best in Western thought is to be freely
adopted— but adapted to Chinese conditions, employed as an instrumentality in building
up a rejuvenated Chinese culture." 13 The Western ideas of democracy and science are
thus understood as merely tools. Developed within the West, they are nonetheless
universally useful, adaptable to suit any cultural setting, where they may be deployed as
the instrumentality for cultural advancement.
In and of itself, Dewey's attitudes toward the Chinese were unusual for his time,
since the majority of “China-watchers” at the time were of the opinion that the Chinese
were simply incapable of governing themselves. For Dewey to have advocated that the
solutions to China’s problems had to proceed from the Chinese was certainly admirable,
even though it came as a consequence of his belief that the proper application ofhuman
intelligence was the only thing necessary for the development of the proper solution to
most social and political problems.
14
But apart from Dewey’s sense of cultural tolerance.
12
Barry Keenan, The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational Reform and Political
Power in the Early Republic
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 49.
13
John Dewey, “New Culture in China,” Characters and Events, Joseph Ratner, ed.,
(New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 277
.
14
See the discussion in Thomas Berry, “Dewey’s Influence in China,” John Dewey: His
Thought and Influence, John Blewett, ed., (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), p.
225.
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there are certain aspects of the Deweyan program which raise curious problems for the
assessment of Dewey's democratic mission in China.
5.3 Cultural Difference and the Instantiability of Democracy
Situated at the end of World War One. Dewey clearly believed that the liberal
ideal of democracy, as best represented in the social and political institutions of the
United States, was the most viable form of political organization for the assured
preservation ofhuman freedom which manifests itself as “growth.” He writes:
Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a purpose.
That purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities ofhuman
individuals without respect to race, sex, class, or economic status....
Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found
in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial
arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth
of every member of society. 1
"
Democracy, coupled with the spirit of inquiry embodied in the scientific method,
whereby disputes could be resolved by an appeal to empirical testing and observation,
was to provide the basis for a new era ofhuman civilization. Dewey saw democracy as
central to the development ofhuman society because it represented the transcending ot
the outmoded and despotic forms of government which restricted the benefits derived
from scientific progress to those who, by virtue of their social position, were able to
arrogate these for their own profit.
16
But what is most puzzling about the notions of science and democracy which
Dewey utilizes and attempts to instantiate is their seeming cultural “detachedness.”
Science and democracy may have arisen in the West as a result of a peculiar and
13
John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon, 1957), p. 186.
16
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems , (Chicago: Gateway, 1946), p. 174.
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sociohistorically specific confluence of circumstances, but they seem to be detachable
from the specificity of their cultural and historical origins. Like the historical importation
of the concept of the zero from India to China in the eighth century, Dewey seems to
think that the political and theoretical concepts of democracy and science can be
successfully integrated within a culture in which they did not emerge and which is,
furthermore, fundamentally different.
And thus we must once again take into account is an irreducible, assumed
separation of Eastern and Western culture/philosophy. This separation is, for Dewey,
the greatest of cultural differences. He writes:
There are great differences in the mental dispositions of European and
American peoples; the philosophies of life of even the English and
Americans are much more unlike than they are usually assumed to be.
But all such differences pale into insignificance as compared with the
differences between the civilizations of the West and Asia— between the
philosophies to which these civilizations have given birth.
17
and elsewhere: “China is another world politically and economically speaking, a large
•i 1
8
and persistent world, and a world bound no one knows just where."
Given this problematic dichotomization of the world, the question of cultural
translation again emerges: if the difference between Asia and the West is so great,
exactly how is it possible to instantiate Western science and democracy in a Chinese
setting? Is not the adoption of Western democracy and science tantamount to the
complete restructuring of China as a “Western' culture? For after all, the cultures of
17
John Dewey, “The Chinese Philosophy of Life,” Characters and Events , Joseph
Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 200.
18
John Dewey, “Conditions for China's Nationhood,” Characters and Events , Joseph
Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 240.
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China and the West represent the “greatest” of all cultural differences. What is it about
democracy and science which transcends the specificity of the culture from which they
emerged?
The answer to this lies, I suspect, in Dewey’s assumption that notions like
“democracy,’ “science,” “freedom.” “truth,” etc., are understood to be universal human
notions, delinked from their cultural origins. In other words, these ideas transcend
specific cultures
,
escaping determination by the cultural spaces from which they
emerged. Thus, the application of democracy, for example, simply requires that it be
reworked into the existing structures of a society. Once accomplished, this democracy
remains universal, in that it will still preserve a universally human freedom of expression
and thought, despite its instantiation within a culture different from the culture of origin.
Similarly, Western science can be adopted outside of the West because what it
represents, namely, truth and knowledge of the natural (i.e. non-cultural) world, is
presumed to be a universal value, free from the moorings of specific socio-cultural
practices and ways of knowing. The universality of science as a directed activity which
aims at the truth of the world catapults it outside of the pull of the gravity of culture and
into the space of transcendence.
Are there then, perhaps, concepts which find their origin in the sphere of Chinese
thought which possess a similar possible instantiation in West? In what, indeed, lies the
specificity of Chinese culture? Or does the “greatest of all differences” lie merely in the
fact that the contingency of history selected the West for the development of science and
democracy while relegating the East to life without these universal values? For it would
seem highly improbable that only the West was able to develop tools universally useful
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for all humans, across all cultures. What can be detached from the specificity of the
Chinese setting?
The primary marker of the cultural difference between the West and China seems
for Dewey to be simply one of density. Dewey writes, “It is beyond question that many
traits of the Chinese mind are the products of an extraordinary and long-continued
density of populations." 19 The phenomenological fact of a life lived in close proximity to
so many people, for Dewey, helps to explain the “conservatism” of the Chinese. For if
one must live one's life always surrounded by others, the social fact of such a densely-
populated existence must of course manifest itself in the development of a philosophy
where “saving face,” the preservation of one’s social identity is paramount. Innovation
and creativity thus take a position of secondary importance in the face of the all-
important opinion of the others with whom one lives.
The fact of living is such close proximity to one's neighbors leads then to the
sense of Chineseness:
To be Chinese is not to be of a certain race nor to yield allegiance to a
certain national state. It is to share with countless millions of others
certain ways of feeling and thinking, fraught with innumerable memories
and expectations because of long-established modes of adjustment and
intercourse.
20
This sense of Chinese community with which the Chinese seem to be singularly blessed
would appear to work precisely against the emergence of the universalist political
philosophy of democracy. For if what is most important for the instantiation of
19
John Dewey, “Chinese Social Habits,” Characters and Events, Joseph Ratner, ed.,
(New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 213.
20
John Dewey, “Growth of National Chinese Sentiment,” Characters and Events ,
Joseph Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 231.
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democracy is a valuation of the growth of the individual in all its singularity, then
Chinese social existence, which could be understood as predicated primarily upon the
subsumption of individual development in order that the “sense of unity of civilization, of
immemorial continuity of customs and ideals’' might prevail, works against the growth
of the individual, seeing it as a sacrifice necessitated by the continuation of the Chinese
patterns of social existence.
The harmonious nature of Chinese social life then affords us with what the
Chinese have to offer the West: a sense of “calm and patience, a willingness to take only
the steps... which are immediately necessary”21 which would have a “wonderfully
healing effect” on the national consciousness of Western nations. Furthermore, the
Taoist’ philosophy of wu-wei2 ' a sort of cultivated passivity of the present whereby
one consigns one’s self to the fact of one’s inability to seriously affect or alter the
unfolding of the course of events in the world is understood to be “a profoundly valuable
contribution to human culture and one of which a hurried, impatient, over-busied and
anxious West is infinitely in need.”24
But what the Chinese have to offer the West, in exchange for the democracy and
science of the West, does not seem to be so readily detachable from its Chinese origins.
21
John Dewey, “The Chinese Philosophy of Life,” Characters and Events
,
Joseph
Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 210.
22
It is unclear as to what Dewey means by “Taoist” here, although I am inclined to
understand it in a strict sense, referring to the tenets of the philosophical “figures” Lao Zi
and Zhuang Zi.
23
Wu-wei is a Daoist term which literally means “lacking effecting” and generally refers
to the practice of the serenity afforded by a spiritual “doing nothing."
24
John Dewey, “The Chinese Philosophy of Life,” Characters and Events , Joseph
Ratner, ed., (New York: Octagon, 1970), vol. one, p. 206.
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For since both the cultivated fatalism of Taoism and the sense of Chinese social harmony
have their origins in the social facts of Chinese existence, it would be difficult to argue
that the “over-busied and anxious’' West could simply “adopt” these philosophies
without having had some experience of Chinese life. Indeed, since Dewey’s philosophy
accords “experience” an undeniably crucial role in the formation of knowledge, for
Dewey to argue that the West “needs” something of Chinese calm and patience is
tantamount to arguing that the West “needs” Chinese experience. Also, why would
Dewey argue for the adoption, by the West, of a social harmony and inner calm if the
price to be paid for this calm is the stifling of individual creativity for sake of the stability
of the social order?
I would thus argue that although logically there ought to be some concept, some
Chinese body of philosophy and knowledge which could be of use to the West, that
possibility is foreclosed by Dewey’s understanding of the difference in cultures between
the West and China. China remains in the state of becoming like the West. Like a child,
Chinese society has not yet matured into the “adult” forms of Western liberal
democracies. As a result, China can only offer the West a bittersweet nostalgic
moment— the recognition of the West’s own “youth," transcended and irrepeatable
moments of Western past. While the Chinese might have been able to maintain a stable
social order until contact with the intrusive imperialist policies of the West, the West has
managed to produce the adult forms of democracy and science which are. by virtue of
universalist possibilities, patterns for the rest of the human world.
This, then, is the presumed “difference” between Western philosophy and Eastern
philosophy which emerges from our examination ol the case of Dewey, the theoretical
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developments of Western philosophy have allowed it to produce conceptual structures
and ideas which transcend the specificity of its mother-cultures. Although Dewey might
argue for a successful “borrowing” from the philosophy of the Chinese, the fact of the
ontological assumptions he makes about the integrity of the spheres of culture frustrates
his desires. The assumed culturelessness of Western science and democracy as
conceptual forms and methodologies is frustrated by a naive and uncritical understanding
of the concept of culture and the notion of cultural difference implied by that concept.
For while democracy and science are universal, Chinese ideas, on the other hand, are
always already bound to their cultural origin. The philosophical project of modernity,
then, consists precisely of the erasure of the specificity of cultures under the
universalizing impulses of Western ideas, concealing its ethnic tracks.
Perhaps the tragic failure of the notions of culture and cultural difference
embodied here can be seen in what is generally understood to be the ultimate failure of
the democratization of Chinese society, for the hopes which had been pinned to Dewey’s
visit and the ideas he expounded were to go unrealized, as the Chinese revolution of
1 949 took Chinese society down the Marxist path prepared by Mao and the members of
the Chinese Communist Party. Dewey’s supporters were silenced, and Dewey himself
was branded a reactionary by later Chinese thinkers, who felt that Dewey s belief in the
subsumption of class categories by the proper functioning of democracy was merely
another manifestation of the inherent “errors” of idealistic philosophies.
2
' The Chinese
adoption of Marxism, a philosophy of which Dewey was strongly critical, although he
25
Barry Keenan, The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational Reform and Political
Power in the Early Republic , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 4.
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agreed with a great number of its insights, must surely have been saddening to Dewey,
who must have thought that with this political change, the prospects of the emergence of
a truly democratic Chinese society had gone unfulfilled.
But what of Western science? It might be palatable that democracy is simply a
Western notion which cannot be successfully transplanted without the danger of
rejection by the social host body, but surely the techniques and practices, as well as the
knowledge gained by science, are able to transcend the specificity of culture. After all,
since science generates knowledge about the material world, does it not produce truth?
The divergence of a magnetic field will be equal to zero whether one is Chinese or
American, whether the laboratory is in Beijing or Boston, will it not? Or is the account
this straightforward? Let us examine an advocate of science in the Chinese space
—
Bertrand Russell— to see whether his accounts of the Chinese difference and the
promises which limited Westernization of Chinese culture offers contributes to a
resolution of this issue.
5.4 The “Delicate Enjoyment” of the Chinese
But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the simple enjoyment of life,
will find more ofthese things in China than in the distracted and turbulent
West, and will be happy to live where such things are valued. I wish I could
hope that China, in return for our scientific knowledge, may give us
something ofher large tolerance and contemplative peace ofmind.
—Bertrand Russell The Problem ofChina
Written shortly after Russell’s return from a year of lecturing in China, during which
he had almost died from a bad case ofdouble pneumonia.
26
these words evoke a sense ofthe
26
For a succinct account of Russell’s trip to China, see Caroline Moorehead, Bertrand
Russell: A Life
,
(New York: Viking, 1993), pp. 321-333.
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power Chinese culture possessed, for him. as a fetishized curative to the social ills of Western
society. Indeed, the opening chapter of the book paints an interesting psychological portrait
of Russell s state ofmind as he journeyed from the politically disappointing war-tom Russia
into the alien culture of China and its “life of enjoyment.'’ Traveling along the Volga,
Russell encountered a group ofnomadic Russian peasants, an encounter he relays in the
opening chapter of The Problem ofChina : “The flickering flames lighted up gnarled, bearded
faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, and children as sedate and slow as their
parents. Human beings they undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me
to grow intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one ofthem.”27 It is this meeting
with the “inexpressive, inactive from despair” nomads which leads Russell to then question
the role of the social theorist— he begins to suspect that Bolshevism and its “gospel of
industrialism and forced labour” (which he had previously endorsed) is radically dissociated
from the actual life experiences ofthe people in the name ofwhom it is practiced.
Disillusioned, Russell imagines that politics is simply a “grinning devil,” hell-bent on torturing
the populace and the extraction of personal profit. In this manner, the chapter concludes with
9 R
the statement that “It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek out a new hope.”"
The textual stage is already set, then, for Russell's discovery ofa marvelous culture,
alien and isolated from the West, wherein the Chinese, by refusing to pursue the “Western'’
goals of“progress and efficiency” have created in the place of the technological developments
ofWestern cultures, a culture in which enjoyment is central, prioritized over ideals such as
“progress and efficiency.” He writes: “By valuing progress and efficiency, we [in the West]
27
Bertrand Russell The Problem ofChina , (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), pp. 18-19.
28
Bertrand Russell The Problem ofChina, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 20.
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have secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we brought disturbance,
secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a life full ofenjoyment.”29 The Chinese way
of life is thus markedly different from that which characterizes Western nations. Lacking
science and the ruthless drive toward conquest and development which (necessarily?)
accompanies scientific progress, the Chinese had preserved, until forcible opening by Western
powers, an ancient civilization of “perfect candour and courtesy,” wherein the ‘typical
Chinaman.” unlike the “typical Westerner [who] wishes to be the cause ofas many changes
as possible in his environment,” desires instead to “enjoy as much and as delicately as
possible.” It is this cultural difference, Russell believes, which “is at the bottom ofmost ofthe
contrast between China and the English-speaking world.”’" One wonders whether this
contrast would exist between the Chinese and the French. What becomes ofthe West-East
division in this instance?
The difference between the cultural spaces ofthe West and China is thus established
along the lines ofenjoyment, wherein, in a paradoxical reversal ofthe recent American
obsession with the Japanese inability to “enjoy themselves,” the West is portrayed as
industrious to a fault, preventing Westerners from fully enjoying the lives made possible by
progress and technological innovation. The Chinese possess, contrary to Western
industriousness, a cultural character such that “they are capable of wild excitement, often of a
collective kind,”
31
and are “. . .of all classes, more laughter-loving than any other race with
which I am acquainted; they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be
29
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina, (London; Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 13.
30
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 202.
31
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina, (London: Allen and Unwin. 1922), p. 212.
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softened with a joke.”32 The cultural contact between the West and China promises to infuse
Western culture with some of this Chinese ethics of enjoyment. As Russell notes, one of the
questions which Westerners who have lived in China inevitably face is one which threatens
the tedious stability of the Western obsession with progress, competition and the unknowable
future: “Is it prudent to lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that
may come at a future date? Should our lives be passed in building a mansion that we shall
never have the leisure to inhabit? The infusion of Chinese cultural values, and hence,
Chinese enjoyment, is thus the antidote to the cultural defects of the West, its failure to enjoy
and the subsequent lack of meaningfulness in such an existence.
What we have here is, of course, a paradigmatic case of orientalism— the
conceptualization of the West as the active “disturbance” in the stable, timeless culture of
China locked within its own, “frozen” time, the delineation of the essence of Chineseness by
someone who approaches Chinese culture as the representative of the powerful British
empire, but who seems blissfully ignorant of this role. 34 As a purely anthropological and
philosophical observer, Russell’s insights are true, we would presume, because he is
objectively positioned with respect to Chinese culture. But the consequences here reach
farther than just the straightforward indictment of Russell as ensnared in the power
32
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina
,
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 200.
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This fact is significant, even though one might wish to argue that since Russell was
generally critical of the political policies of the British state and went so far as to proclaim
himself a Communist, that he is less implicated in the power relationships indicated by his
position as representative of that British state. The significance lies in the fact that Russell
speaksfor the West, and more precisely, speaks as a representative of what he understands as
Western desire. In The Problem ofChina, then, Russell is always already a cultural
representative.
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relationships of orientalism. For since Russell understands his position as articulator of the
Chinese character as someone who is present within the culture as an outsider
,
he speaks
from a presumed position of exteriority because he understands himselfto be someone who
does not belong to Chinese culture— an observer in a strange land. This presumed position
of cultural exteriority thus leads him to an examination ofChinese thought and society as
though it were something with which he were not engaged, despite the fact that while Russell
was in China, a “Russell society” devoted to the study of his philosophy was formed and
there was even the publication ofa Russell Monthly
,
35
What is thus significant about Russell’s presumption ofa position of cultural
exteriority is the fact that it belies the very real interfusion of cultures which accompanies the
avowal of an absolute cultural difference. In other words, although Russell (and others)
might pretend that what they have to say about China are simply the descriptions ofan alien
culture distinct from their home culture, these pronouncements actually work to reinforce and
create those distinctions. This is not to say that the Chinese language is the same as the
English language but, rather, to suggest the possibility that the presumably a priori existence
of “cultural difference” is instead maintained even in the face of its collapse into impossibility.
As ideas ‘Ravel” across cultures which are understood to possess their own internal
principles ofcoherence, regulating the social organization ofthese cultures, the increasingly
visible and obvious permeability of the membrane of cultural difference must be reinforced by
the introduction of distinctive essential differences between “us" and “them." We have
already noted that, for Russell, the Chinese difference is conceived along the axis of
35
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enjoyment. There is, however, another crucial difference for Russell between the cultures of
the West and that of China. This is the development, in the West, ofscience.
5.5 What the Chinese Need
What immediately strikes an attentive reader ofBertrand Russell's The Problem of
China is the feet that Russell persistently locates China and the Chinese within a cultural
sphere which is geographically and socioculturally distinct from that ofthe West clearly
demarcated not by stagnation due to a Confiician-mandated herd-instinct (as we find in
Nietzsche), but by the lack of science and the scientific method. He writes:
It is science that makes the difference between our [Western] intellectual
outlook and that of the Chinese intelligentsia.
... What we have to teach the
Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about government, but science and
technical skill. The real problem for the Chinese intellectuals is to acquire
Western knowledge without acquiring the mechanistic outlook.36
and later in the text: “The distinctive merits ofour civilization, I should say, is the scientific
method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life. It is these
two that one must hope to see gradually uniting."’ 7 This is hardly an unusual assessment of
“pre-Modem" China; one easily finds echoes of it in the sentiments ofthe modernization
movements beginning in the 1920s up until the present time, from the writings ofLu Xun to
the thought ofFang Lizhi, for whom the universal nature of scientific laws and the universal
adoption ofdemocracy is what constitutes “modernity."
36
Bertrand Russell, The Problem ofChina , (London: Allen and Unwin. 1 922), p. 8 1
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See, for example, the essay, “Chinese Democracy: The View from the Beijing
Observatory,” as well as “A Note on the Interface Between Science and Religion." where
Fang argues, not that the Chinese did not possess science, but that Chinese science lacked,
from its inception, the “proper” notion of universality. Bringing Down the Great Wall:
Writings on Science, Culture, and Democracy in China , (New York: Norton. 1990).
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But what is unusual about Russell's conception of China as lacking “science” is the
fact that what Russell consequently advocates is the Chinese adoption of Western methods of
science such that the Chinese remain Chinese. Science, Russell believes, is simply another
‘foreign influence” which cannot alter the fundamental Chineseness of the Chinese:
There have been foreign influences— first Buddhism, and now Western
science. But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western
science will not turn them into Europeans.
... What is bad in the West its
brutality, its restlessness, its readiness to oppress the weak, its preoccupation
with purely material aims— they [the Chinese] see to be bad. and do not wish
to adopt. What is good, especially its science, they do wish to adopt. 39
What is interesting in this observation is the failure to recognize the fact that one ofthe
reasons which the Chinese wish to adopt science is that this “science” had impressed itself
upon Chinese society in the form ofcannon fire upon Chinese port cities. Far from being
simply a disinterested desire for the “good” of Western science, the Chinese understand all
too well the possibilities of this Western knowledge-practice. But can this desire for the
power of science be dissociated from its potential for misuse? What Russell desires most
from the meeting ofEast and West is that the Chinese “imperturbable quiet dignity, which is
usually not destroyed even by a European education” be coupled to the progress represented
by the methodology and discoveries of Western science so as to “produce a genuinely new
civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to create.”
40
Thus, if science
is to be imported, Russell seems to believe that the Chinese will be able to resist its misuse
and will instead direct it toward the enhancement ofthe “delicate enjoyment” of the Chinese
populace.
39
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The problem here is that, although Russell desires the Chinese adoption ofWestern
science without the accompanying “Western” bloodlust and imperialist aggressiveness, which
has unfortunately been the companion of Western science, the cultural formations which gave
rise to the development of Western science cannot be simply excised from its practice (in the
West) in order to produce pure scientific methodology. 41 In other words, it is perhaps the
case, contrary to Russell s faith, that the practice of science is as peculiarly a culturally-bound
artifact as is say, the musical form of the concerto. 2 Although Russell sees science as having
developed in the West, he believes it can be detached, as a culturally-neutral form of
knowledge and knowledge-practice, from the socio-cultural politics of the West. It is
interesting to think for a moment about the strange logic of this desire. How much does it
depend upon a particular conceptualization of the relationship between the cultures ofEast
and West0 The cultural unidirectionality of this desire can be revealed by simply reversing its
flow. Consider, for example, a homologous desire, reversed in cultural direction, which
might be something like this: although Confucianism is accompanied in Chinese culture by
stagnation and the erasure of individualism, I nonetheless desire that the West should adopt
41
This ought not to be taken as though I am making an argument for differences in cultures.
I am simply trying to draw out the implications of Russell’s advice, given his assumptions
with regard to the cultural differences between the West and China.
42
Actually Russell, in “The Origins of Philosophy,” in The Wisdom of the West, Paul Foulkes,
ed., (London: Macdonald, 1959), identifies both science and philosophy as precisely the
results of the unique convergence of social and cultural factors in the culture of ancient
Greece. The universalist conception he has here might be simply “youthful optimism ” He
writes in “Philosophy begins when someone asks a general question, and so does science.
The first people to evince this kind of curiosity were the Greeks. Philosophy and science, as
we now know them, are Greek inventions. The rise of Greek civilization which produced this
outburst of intellectual activity is one of the most spectacular events in history. Nothing like
it has ever occurred before or since,” p. 10. The suggestion here, that philosophy and
science were bom out of the asking of a general question, and that the Greeks were the only
ones in history to have done this is, of course, laughable.
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Confucianism, since Confucianism is the source of profound ethical principles which would
be of great benefit. Further, the West can adopt Confucianism without adopting any of its
negative consequences, since Confucianism, as a system of umversalizable ethical principles,
is separable from the culture out ofwhich it emerged.
Now, if it is ridiculous to conceive of Confucianism as free from its cultural origins,4
'
is it any less ridiculous to think of Western science, the distinguishing characteristic of the
West, as being free from its cultural moorings? It is perhaps difficult to conceive ofthe
knowledge-claims of science as somehow bound to the specificity of particular “cultures,” but
I believe that this is an implicit consequence of Foucault's work and underlies contemporary
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge.44 There exist assumptions about the world in
the claim that the divergence of the magnetic field is equal to zero which cannot be erased by
appeals to facticity. In fact, one of the differences often presumed to delineate the difference
between Western and Chinese cultures are the attitudes and assumptions made about the
makeup and nature ofthe external world.45 Russell’s seeming belief in the culturelessness of
4j
This absurdity can be observed by simply examining the great lengths to which Confucian
moral philosophy is demonstrated to be a product ofa particular, Chinese convergence of
historical exigency.
44
Although Foucault does not himself notice this consequence, I understand his work on the
organization ofknowledge and the formation of discourses to lead precisely in this direction.
For if it is the accidents and contingencies in the history ofknowledge production which lead
to the emergence ofwhat appear to be transcendent realms of“pure” knowledge, then the
specificity of the culture in which this discursive function operates is crucial. As for the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life: The
Construction ofScientific Facts , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). exemplifies
an attempt to reconceptualize the idea of scientific ‘Tact.” Latour and Woolgar s point is not,
as commonly assumed, the ultimate relativism ofknowledge claims, but rather to suggest that
the rather cavalier fashion in which we accord “truth” to the claims of science needs serious
reconsideration.
45
This can be seen in the Ellen Chen’s introduction to her translation of the Tao Te Ching,
(New York: Paragon, 1989), where she draws a distinction between the destructive attitude
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scientific practice then, is certainly suspect, and reveals precisely what he pretends to
disavow: his own cultural embeddedness.
Where does this leave philosophy, then? Without the “revitalizing” influence ofthe
West and its Science, China and the Chinese are understood to be stagnant. The “problem of
China,” then, is that its traditional civilization and hence, philosophy, had become, according
to Russell 'unprogressive, and had ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and
literature. ... The influx of Western knowledge provides just the stimulus that was needed.”46
What China needs, then, is an infusion ofthe West, a shot in the arm to bolster the Chinese
cultural immune system. To do justice to Russell however, the question ofcultural contact
with China does not revolve solely upon the provision of Western scientific knowledge to
China. As we have already seen, what China can provide for the West is a more “ethical”
outlook on sociality, since 'the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends
of life,” and ‘the natural outlook ofthe Chinese is very pacifistic.”47 Although Russell often
speaks as though it were ‘too late” for the West, in a manner which suggests that the West is
too fond of its aggressive practices ofdomination made possible through science, it is not too
late for China, which is not yet modem, and which should set before itselfthe aim of ‘the
preservation ofthe urbanity and courtesy, the candour and pacific temper, which are
characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and an
application of it to the practical problems ofChina."
48
ofWestern science toward the natural world, as opposed to the Chinese vision ofharmony
with the natural world. See especially pp. 31-43.
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“primitiveness” is also part and parcel ofthe orientalist machine, as astutely noted by Rey
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Does Russell's conceptualization ofChina permit this possibility, however? Is not the
‘urbanity and courtesy, the candour and pacific temper" of the Chinese precisely the effect of
Confucianism? After all Russell believes that Confucius' system of ethics “has succeeded in
producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners and perfect courtesy.,rl9 But if it is
Confucianism which effects the stagnation of China, if“Confucius does not satisfy the needs
ofa modem man. even ifhe is Chinese,”50 then is not Russell's dream impossible? What it
demonstrates then, is not so much the fact ofthe cultural differences which demarcate the
West from China, but the contours ofa certain form of Western desire, whereby China
functions as the space of the fantasy of self-fulfillment. Since, after all. they want science, the
Western practice of science is valorized, and theoretically separated from the real practices of
conquest and war which accompanied it in the Western setting.
In addition, what would seem to be the outcome ofthe encounter between East and
West, at least from Russell's point of view, is not the preservation of cultures but rather the
radical loss of the integrity ofEastern and Western cultures, a sort ofhomogenization, the
possibility ofwhich he has already precluded in his description ofthe Chinese as
“unchanging.'’ The adaptation ofboth cultures, accomplished by each taking from the other
what it is needed to fill a certain lack, accomplishes the work ofpushing human society
toward a uniform level. The West needs the enjoyment of the Chinese; the Chinese need to
be brought into the twentieth century with the structures of Western science. The
transcendence ofthe structural flaws ofboth Eastern and Western cultures is to be
Chow in her insightful book. Primitive Passions , (New York: Columbia University Press,
1995).
49
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accomplished by the appropriation ofwhat is lacking from the other. But if this is case, one
could argue that Western philosophy must be necessarily incomplete as well requiring
supplementation from the philosophies ofthe East, an infusion of Confucianism. Taoism, and
so forth. In this sense, as a supplement to the West, Confucianism represents a kind of
philosophical progress. But at the same time, Confucianism is understood as a force of
stagnation, an outdated philosophy of ancient China which prevented the rise of science and
modem progress. We seem to be faced, then, with a serious contradiction, which completely
undermines the validity and value ofany "insights'' which Russell might have had into the
problem of China. What China needs is science, prevented from emergence due to the
cultural force of Confucianism, which has produced the ethical stance ofthe Chinese, which is
precisely what is needed by the West which, fortuitously, does have science.
Science, then, as a cultural import, is as problematic as democracy. The assumptions
made as to the cultural detachedness of scientific practice, as well as the assumptions made
with regard to the integrity ofthe cultural spaces themselves indicate that, far from being a
simple question ofhuman advancement, the prescription of cultural deficiencies points at a
mode of self-understanding which fails to attain a level of critical evaluation. The suggestion
here, then, is that the mere recognition of other cultures is itself part of the problem of
multiculturalism. It is not so much that all cultures need to be respected for what they are,
but a question ofwhy we would ever think it necessary to divide the world in terms of
culture. I am not arguing that this problem is simply one of false perceptions which require
the light of truth to dispel it. There is more to the matter than this, and as we examine the
case of Simone de Beauvoir, we will address the question of desire and the cultural other in
more detail.
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5.6 The Chinese Orientation
The sky has cleared during the day; it is a cool but bright evening as at seven
thirty we climb the stairway leading to the Tien An Men terrace: a hundred
delegates have been invited to come and watch the fireworks from there. We
go over to the balustrade. There are four hundred thousand people gathered
on the square and on the avenue: “Caviar.” says Sartre, peering at all those
dark heads pressed close together.
—Simone de Beauvoir. The Long March
Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre journeyed together to China for the months of
September and October, 1955. Sartre's culinary metaphor above, for the experience of
seeing an immense Chinese crowd massed for the celebration of the birth of the People’s
Republic of China, is Beauvoir’s only mention of his presence in China in her “book on
China.” The Long March
,
written in 1 957. Putting aside the rather troubling implications of
this metaphor for the uniformity ofthe Chinese crowd, Sartre’s reduction ofthe Chinese
crowd anecdotally locates the focal point ofa certain, contradictory strain which runs
throughout the body ofBeauvoir's 500-page work. To put this tension simply, and in a
preliminary form, let us say that her text is continually engaged with the dialectical
relationship of the affirmation of individuality in the face of a seemingly homogeneous human
mass and the loss ofthat individuality before the dead weight of a long and heavy tradition.
Beauvoir’s resolution of this individual/social dialectic is, ultimately, to identify the Chinese
Liberation of 1949 as the flashpoint in which Chinese individuality manages to finally assert
itself after endless centuries of Confucian suppression. The new Chinese state marks a break
in the Chinese dialectic and signals the overdue assertion of a properly Chinese identity
brought on by the fact that, at long last, the Chinese have been forced to confront an “other”;
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the West will not allow itself to be absorbed or ignored like the perennial “barbarians” who
have periodically appeared in the pages of Chinese history. 1
Despite the Marxist orientation of this flashpoint in Chinese history, the position
which Beauvoir takes here is not an unusual one to take in an analysis of Chinese subjects: we
have already been presented with various conceptualizations ofthe homogeneity of the
Chinese, and seen the normative assessment of Chinese tradition as based upon a Confiician-
induced stagnation which guarantees that homogeneity, whether it is based primarily upon the
cultural (as, say, in Dewey and Russell) or upon the material (Marx). What is subsequently
different about Beauvoir's contradictory descriptions ofthe state ofthe new nation and its
“culture" is the fact that they reveal perhaps more clearly than before, a sociopolitical
fetishization ofthe Chinese other. In other words, what I will attempt to argue here is that
Beauvoir's understanding of Chinese thought and culture, as well as its material structures
and bases, has more to say about Beauvoir and her understanding of the world than it does
about China. Further, since Chinese society has been fetishized as the glimmerings of the
material and social fulfillment ofthe promises ofMarxism, her reading of Chinese society and
culture provides us with an instantiation ofthe desire of the West, a desire which functions to
give the West and Western culture its meaning. Thus, what I will be dealing with in this
section is notfact— I do not wish to quibble with the numbers, statistics, names and dates
51 She writes, for example, that “The Chinese had the keenest contempt for all
barbarians— for that is to say, whoever was not Chinese— this contempt which
restricted the world to the Empire alone did away with the necessity for the empire to
assert that it was superior. For lack of a relationship with something other than itself, it
never took a stand, never achieved the identity that is wrought of choice alone.” The
Long March, Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York: World, 1958), p. 252.
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which she rattles off in summary fashion with little of the usual scholarly apparatus. 52 Instead,
what I hope to show is that these inconsistencies and errors of fact point to the fact that China
is cathected for Beauvoir as a Western objet petit a, an unattainable object of Western
desire.
53
Thus, China becomes a strange place where “
. .there are no social cleavages; the
community of interests, the economic solidarity of all individuals make the collectivity into a
homogeneous and concrete reality.
.
..”
54
In Beauvoir's imagination, China has made real the
ultimate democratic dream: the existence ofa real (communist) community and solidarity.
without the totalitarian erasure of the individual necessitated by the demands ofthat
collectivity. China thus conceived is the answer to one of the central philosophical
problematics of existentialism: how to relate and preserve the individual in the face of its
radical erasure by that which threatens to engulfand overwhelm it.
What is of course, the focus of this chapter and its guiding vector of analysis, is the
position of the culture and philosophy of the Chinese. But although the philosophical
orientation ofthe author might have changed, the trajectory of this epistemological object
52 • • • •
" If so desired, these “inaccuracies” can be noted by taking into account Rene
Etiemble’s scathing essay “Simone de Beauvoir, the Concrete Mandarin,” translated into
English by Germaine Bree in Critical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir, Elaine Marks, ed.,
(Boston: Hall, 1987), pp. 58-76. Although it might be, in certain instances, strategically
useful to undermine the traditions of citation and so forth. I feel that the lack of such in
Beauvoir’s text results in the assertion of a kind of ethnographic authority which belies
any claims to “objective description.” Since there is no justification or attributions of
“facts,” Beauvoir is free to invent the Chineseness needed for her arguments.
53
This objet petit a is the Lacanian formulation of the strange object which serves to direct
our desires— it stands in for what we desire— but as soon as it is attained, ceases to become
what we desire. What makes it a strange object is that although it can seemingly be identified
as the object of desire, it is not really the object of desire, for once we have it, it ceases to
fulfill that function.
54 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March, Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 491.
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called Chinese philosophy remains unaltered, for despite the radical divergence between the
views ofDewey, Russell and Beauvoir, what appears is once again the stale, stagnant
Chinese Confiicianist. headed for that necessary and ineluctable confrontation with the
dynamic manifestations of Western thought. This time, however, the figure of Chinese
philosophy, representing the inertia-dampening strictures ofConfucian society mandated by
the wiU-to-remain-in-power ofthe aristocratic elite, is counterposed against its dialectical
opposite in the figure ofMao. For it is Mao Zedong and his successful application of
Marxist-Leninist theories to the concrete historical position ofChinese culture which permits
the development ofa vitalized universalizing principle within the “culture” ofthe new
People’s Republic. This regime, for which Beauvoir is a strident apologist, has raised from
the ashes of the devastated Imperial China the material possibility of a real socialist future, in
which nothing is contingent, where even the newly planted trees derive their meaning from
the (glorious?) future they portend. The "stalled" dialectic which once functioned to
maintain the structures ofChinese society immutable has roared into life by a timely
transfusion ofthe volatile ideas ofMarx.
Under this sort ofhermeneutical framework, “Western" philosophy is always already
“progressive” and its inherent dynamism is reaffirmed in the power ofMarxist theory. The
social success ofMarxist theory in China simply underscores the underlying commitment of
Western philosophy to the progressive and democratic development ofhuman societies and
their organization. Injected into the Chinese social body, it has brought new life to the
55 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 32.
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society, irrevocably “shattering" long-dead institutions and jump-starting the machinery of
Chinese society:
the ancient structures have not been repainted, they have been irrevocably
shattered, hitherto it was always a sterile impetus that was given to the wheel
revolving around a stationary hub; today, the entire machine is in motion, and
China is going forward. She has ceased living from day to day. from hand to
mouth, dreaming ofa mythical Golden Age; she is oriented toward the future
and is driving toward.' 6
All of the material facts of Chinese society attest to this impetus, whether it is the
universalization of the spoken language and the debates to abolish the traditional writing
system in favor ofan alphabetic orthography, the drive toward freedom ofmarriage and the
official encouragement ofromantic love as its basis, or the innumerable transformations in the
management of nature. With the introduction of Western ideas have come societal changes
on a scale and intensity unimaginable under the auspices of stuffy Confucian orthodoxy.
At the risk ofredundancy, but in the desire to remain clear, the question is not
whether or not the emergence of a Chinese nation-state predicated upon the tenets of
Marxism-Leninism has or has not been beneficial to the citizens ofthat state. Rather, the
point is to explore the ways in which the emergence of this state possesses an ethnic character
or, better, the ways in which the theoretical attempts to comprehend certain “Chinese"
historical events are themselves indelibly marked by an ethnicity blind to itself, able only to
recognize the homogeneous ethnicity ofthe other. Describing the social body of post-
Liberation China, benefiting from its shiny pink graft of Western philosophical skin, as some
sort of “historical progress” ignores the fact that there is no transcendental objective point at
56 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long, March, Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York: World.
1958), p. 483.
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which one can view human history. In fact, part ofthe argument that the utilization of grand
narratives in philosophy is outmoded lies in what is covered over by the acceptance of this
theoretical stance. For Beauvoir’s case, understanding the transformation of the principle of
Chinese society from Confiician to Marxist fails to acknowledge the presence ofthe ethnicity
of the speaker, universalizing the position of the Western subject, even as it attains to the
objective contemplation of the alterior culture ofthe Chinese.
5.7 culture/Culture
The first distinction which needs to be made in an analysis ofBeauvoir's text is
between culture and Culture. Beauvoir uses the word “culture” in at least two
distinguishable senses throughout the text of The Long March? 1 The first sense (culture) is
the general sense of“culture” as that body of social knowledge which encompasses the way
of life ofa people, their institutions, rituals, ways of eating, and so on. This sense, culture,
might be exemplified by statements such as:
. . .all of China is firmly united in this: everything that can possibly be eaten, is
* 58
eaten.
and
The Chinese have had the habit of expectorating for thousands ofyears and
they find spitting in public perfectly normal even during a rather ceremonious
occasion
—
quite as normal as we find blowing our nose.
54
or
57 One might, of course, argue for more, but I think that the two senses I track here are
sufficient for the purpose here, which is namely to bring into relief certain assumptions
about cultural homogeneity and the non-permeability of cultural spaces.
58 Simone de Beauvoir. The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 80.
59 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March, Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 431.
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The Chinese, however, escapes this conformism: he does not care a fig
whether he is or is not the same as the others; his behavior is natural, hence as
varied as life itself is various.
60
These anecdotes rely upon some notion of Chinese culture as praxis, as a peculiarly Chinese
mode of life the details ofwhich can be observed and reported.
On the other hand. Culture is to be distinguished from culture in that Culture refers
to something like “high culture” as opposed to “popular culture” or, put in Beauvoir's
Marxist lexicon: “revolutionary culture” as opposed to “bourgeois culture.” Thus, her
analysis of Confucianism produces statements like: “The Confucian functionaries made
culture a class privilege.”
61
and, in considering the movement to write in vernacular Chinese
(baihua) as opposed to the traditional Classical Chinese (guwen), injunctions like “A higher
culture must be made available to everyone.”6 ^ Obviously the exclusion ofthe peasants from
“culture” cannot mean that these peasants are excluded from the way of life which
characterizes all Chinese. What she means here is, of course, that the peasants are prevented
from being active participants in the production of“high culture” or Culture.
It is thus precisely the beneficial consequences ofa semantic and ontological fusion of
culture and Culture which. Beauvoir thinks, the new communist regime offers to the Chinese.
Since Culture under the old Confucian order had become frozen and its refinements “ill
concealed] the monotony ofa civilization mired down in immanence.” and indeed “ceased to
60 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 498.
61 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 235.
62 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 249.
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budge ages ago,’" what is necessary is that Culture be consciously constructed from culture.
thus creating a truly universal “culture ofthe Chinese people" which at one and the same time
is both universally accessible to anyone who is "Chinese" and manages to preserve at least
some part ofthe “higher" artistic value typically ascribed to Culture. Once this
simultaneously national and popular culture has been attained, the next step in this cultural
dialectics is its globalization:
The day it will come— when they are the equal of the world’s most
advanced nations, there will not be any more drawing distinctions between
China and the West: everyone shall share in a universal culture. This assumes
its particular figure in each particular country: no question but that China shall
put her impress upon it; but her originality lies ahead of her, not behind; she
shall forge it out of a living future. She is not to be defined or checked by a
dead past.
64
The true promise offered up by the establishment of a communist Chinese state then, is that of
the ultimate democratization of social life. No longer will the bohemian cafes of Paris be the
sole guardians of high culture while the working class Algerian poor subsists in its hovels,
reading, watching and enjoying the culture of ideological mystification permitted it by the
bourgeois powers that be. The enjoyment ofPuccini will no longer serve to mark classes
from each other and the peoples ofeach society will enjoy their own peculiar “national"
manifestation of the one global, proletarian culture. This is the dream offered up by
Beauvoir’s consideration ofthe revolution in Chinese C/cultural politics.
In discussing the transition from a politics of Culture to a politics of culture however,
Beauvoir’s analysis ofthe situation in post-Liberation China poses more than a few
63
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difficulties. Barring the dismantling ofthe Confiician social strictures which made the
possession of Culture the privilege of the aristocratic and powerful, the next major obstacle to
be overcome is educational. Here, she admires the steps the regime is taking toward
universal literacy: the young are teaching the old to read, and by encouraging the
development ofa people's culture
,
the regime is hoping to nurture the outgrowth ofa
C/culture which would truly express the pulse ofthe newly developing society.65 But since
this new society cannot be simply produced from nothingness, there must be discernible links
between the culture of traditional China and the culture ofthe new communist regime. Thus,
one of the cultural efforts of the Ministry of Culture has been the simplification ofthe literary
classics, in order that the newly educated masses might have access to them. Beauvoir agrees
with this strategy of Cultural simplification:
Many readers totally lack in background, and these great books of the past
are difficult and disconcerting ifone comes to them unprovided with a key; it
is absolutely necessary to place them and explain them. At a time when
millions ofmen are only beginning to obtain an education, an excess of
subtlety would be harmful: explanations must be simple and unequivocal.
They can be contested later by minds that have acquired a culture founded
upon the solid bases being laid down today.66
In addition to a simplification ofmeaning and the suppression oftextual “subtleties,”
there is also the indispensability of screening the content of Culture for signs of social
“disease”:
The Chinese who is just now opening his eyes to culture, for whom the mere
deciphering ofa text is still something akin to performing a miracle, takes
every written word as gospel truth: he is as incapable of ferreting out error as
65 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March
,
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World, 1958), p. 310.
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he is of spotting the cholera microbe in apparently clear water; it is for the
regime to see that he is given a wholesome diet. 67
Kept in the dark for so long by the Cultural elite, the “common man" thus battles both
illiteracy and the “lack of political background or sophistication’68 in the quest for cultural
authentication. The ignorant one needs the guidance ofthose who are able to discern the
cultural truth behind what appear to him/her as beguiling golden words.
The problem here is that Beauvoir assumes that this epistemological differential
between those who “lack sophistication" and those who are capable of “explaining clearly
without equivocation simply withers away after the ignorant one has been raised to the
appropriate level of Cultural consciousness. Once this level of Cultural proficiency has been
attained, the ignorant one will be able to ‘ferret out" error: s/he will have learned the proper
difference between truth and falsity. The fusion of Culture with culture consists of a sort of
consciousness-raising : once the masses understand the proper distinction between that
which is true (read: infused with the correct revolutionary consciousness) and that which is
false (read: infected with reactionary bourgeois tendencies), the stage will have been set for a
true equality on the plane of ideas.
Obviously, Beauvoir did not have access to knowledge ofthe future and the
disastrous consequences ofthe assumption that society can be divided into the spheres of
those who know and those who do not; she could not have foreseen the events ofthe
Cultural Revolution, wherein precisely this power differential was utilized in socially
67
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devastating political battles. But the problem is deeper here and points toward a discussion of
the implicit homogeneity which functions beneath the surface ofculture-discourse. How is
that which is proper to the “essence" ofChinese discerned by those who know? What does
the attempt to produce a ‘truly Chinese” culture entail? Can this assumption, that there are
Chinese who are at the same time, not Chinese, yield any significant theoretical insights?
Does the production ofa truly Chinese culture necessitate the assumption that that culture
must be homogeneous, albeit in a “revolutionary fashion? Do the members of a culture ever
in fact consider themselves to be part ofa homogeneous group? Does not this presumption
ofcultural homogeneity mitigate against the emergence ofunique individualities, precisely
the task of Beauvoir’s existentialist project?
5.8 Homo(hetero)geneity
At the risk of lapsing into the superficial wordplay ofbad postmodernist writing, I
wish to risk a definition, in order to facilitate the process of unraveling Beauvoir's text.
“
Homo(hetero)geneity ” refers to that utopian societal vision ofmeaningful (heterogeneous)
individual existence which is somehow incorporated within a homogeneity of social interests.
without losing its heterogeneity. The embedding of “hetero” within “homogeneity " serves to
mark this existence of the unique and distinctive individual within what is presumed to be a
universal social interest. An example of this type of conceptualization ofthe situation ofthe
Chinese appears early on in the text, as Beauvoir describes the appearances and manner ofthe
“Pekingese”
69
:
69
Beauvoir’s term for the inhabitants of Peking (Beijing). Despite the fact that the word
might generate some interpretive confusion in the mind of the reader, since it is also the
name given a breed of dog, I have chosen to retain its usage wherever it occurs, to
preserve the flavor of Beauvoir's text as translated into English.
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Men are not all the same station in China, but Peking offers a perfect image of
a classless society. Impossible to tell an intellectual from a worker, a
charwoman from a capitalist wife. This is in part owing to the notorious
uniformity of dress.
... The fact is that in Peking blue trousers and jackets
seem to be as ineluctable as black hair: these two colors go so well together,
blend so happily with the lights and shadows ofthe city that there are
moments when you would think you were walking through a scene from
Cezanne. But this crowd’s unity stems from a deeper source: nobody is
arrogant here, nobody is grabby, nobody feels himselfabove or below
anybody else— Here, the cleavage between social categories is not
apparent: those one stands among are a multitude of individuals, infinitely
unalike. Through their features, through their structure, Chinese faces are
exceedingly varied; and as their expression conform to no ritual of class each
ofthem evokes a unique self and tells a story all its own. 70
What, exactly, is going on in this passage? The eradication of visible class distinctions
(no one is wearing a Chanel dress or wearing an Armani suit) produces the impression ofa
seemingly nondifferentiable human crowd; no one is socially different from anyone else. The
passage goes farther, though, and asserts that the nondifferentiability derives from a certain
psychology as well; no one is “grabby," or “arrogant." But what is ultimately the outcome of
this phenomenology is that one is forced to notice the infinite variety of individuals with
which one is confronted; no one looks the same as anyone else, and each person becomes the
embodiment ofa unique life history made visible because of a certain homogeneity. The
prima facie homogeneity of social existence is precisely that which enables the true
manifestation and preservation of individual heterogeneity.
Although it might be possible to accept the uniformity of dress, everyone garbed in
the same style, blue garments as either the mandate of the government intended for the
eradication of the marking of class divisions by dress or a collective manifestation of
70
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individual choice, it is difficult to accept that social stations would be. as a result, completely
unmarked. It is far more likely that Beauvoir is simply within a social space which is
governed by rules of differentiation with which she is unfamiliar; being from the exterior of
Chinese society, she is not privy to its social codes. It is similarly impossible to accept the
claim that no one is “grabby” or “arrogant’'; this generalization suggests that Beauvoir has
access somehow to the essence ofthe culture ofthe Chinese, and that, instead of being the
manifestation of social rule of“being polite to strangers,” this politeness constitutes an
essential component ofChinese psychology. Indeed, this psychological observation misses its
own point of reference: as a white, European woman in the midst ofa crowd of Chinese.
Beauvoir could hardly have hidden who she was. Thus, this phenomenology reveals, not
who the Chinese are as such, but who the Chinese are for Beauvoir.
When Beauvoir writes then, in reference to the Beijing crowd described above, that
“Homogeneity does not signify sameness.”71 she means to suggest that although these
Chinese might look the same and thus give off the semblance ofhomogeneity, closer
examination reveals individual differences which belie this homogeneity, generating an infinite
divergence of individuals. But if this is the case, what is the import of maintaining that
homogeneity nonetheless exists? Would it not be easier simply to consign it to the garbage
and admit that only the material fact of inhabiting “Chinese territory'’ confers Chineseness?
Does living in China transform Beauvoir from ‘Trench” to “Chinese?’ Would learning to
speak the language accomplish this shift in cultural identity? Would spitting on the street with
71
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greater frequency while beginning to eat everything that can be eaten accomplish this
transformation?
On one level it is tempting to suggest psychological reasons for Beauvoir's desire to
identify what Chineseness is. We could suggest that, faced with a bewildering array of
unfamiliar people and practices, and the consciousness ofhaving traveled a great distance
from home, the identification ofwhat constitutes the Chinese other is a necessary form of
psychological defense against the cognitive shock of being immersed with what one “knows”
is completely different from that with which one is familiar. The problem with this sort of
explanation is that it too easily reduces the act of cultural essentialization to a cognitive reflex;
we cannot help but think that the Chinese are somehow marked by a Chinese essence.
Consequently, the only viable recourse for combating the thorny problem of essentialism lies
in re-education: once properly taught to view the other as not possessed of a mysterious,
alterior essence, the xenophobic consequences ofour instincts can be ameliorated; science
will have conquered nature once again.
This solution reproduces, as a matter of course, the irremediable split between those
who know and those who are ignorant, echoing the paradoxes faced by certain brands of
feminism and Marxism: why is it that, once educated as to the true nature of their position
within capitalist and patriarchal society, individuals who have much to gain by challenging
these social systems nonetheless refuse to do so? The answer to this is, of course, that this
attempt at the subversion of the dominant social system fails to come to terms with the desire
of the individuals it seeks to reform. Instead ofbeing viewed as subjects with a vested
interest in who they are and indeed, want to be. these theories flatten out subjectivity by
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suggesting that mere exposure to the light ofreason suffices to dispel the patriarchal and
bourgeois clouds of mystification.
In the case ofBeauvoir, what I wish to suggest is that the reason why the Chinese
must possess an ethnicity is twofold. First, the existence of a unique Chineseness allows
Beauvoir to imagine that China represents the meaning ofMarxism; the new China makes
real the promises ofMarxist theory. Second, concomitant with the Marxist fantasy ofChina
as socialist revolution incarnate, is the fact that the ability to recognize that China as such
confers upon Beauvoir the identity of the Western intellectual. In other words, what the
desire to see China succeed as socialist amounts to, for Beauvoir, is the affirmation that one is
theoretically correct,from the perspective of Western theory. At this point, these claims
clearly remain at the level of conjecture. What I wish to examine next then, is Beauvoir's
conception ofChinese philosophy, both with respect to how she identifies it as Chinese
,
as
well as how that identification reveals something ofthe logic ofher “Western" desire.
5.9 The Confucian Orientation Reoriented
The infamous VII. 1 passage from the Confucian Analects (a work composed of the
sayings of Confucius and his disciples composed over a two hundred year period ending in
about 249 BC 72 ) seemingly summarily describes the Confucian (and hence, Chinese) attitude
toward tradition: “The Master said: ‘I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I
say and devoted to antiquity. I venture to compare myselfto our Old P'eng.’”73 Ifone takes
this passage at face value and subscribes to the notion that it might be possible to simply
72
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‘transmit” cultural knowledge to a new location without ever “innovating” or distorting the
spirit ofwhat is transmitted, then this passage reinforces the standard image of Confucianism
as dedicated to a rigid conformity with ancient tradition, maintaining it even in the face of it
increasing obsolescence. Although Beauvoir understands Confucianism to be a force of
stagnation, she herself tacitly repudiates this version of Confucius, writing that although
Confucius ought not to be called “revolutionary” for his ideas, “Certainly, there was
something new in Confucius’ doctrine; every thinker is an innovator.”74
But on what basis then, does Beauvoir establish the antinomy between the Confucian
(and Taoist) philosophical tradition and the work ofthe twentieth century Marxist-Leninists?
Since Beauvoir is a good Marxist, this antagonism is ofcourse located in antagonistic class
interests. This class struggle finds its expression in the conflict between the bureaucratic elite
supported by Confucian ideologues and the peasantry: “Subordinating a huge population to a
handful of bureaucrats, immolating the living world to defunct ancestors, Confucian ideology
undertook to annihilate the individual at the very moment when, fighting out oftradition’s
grip, the individual was becoming aware of himself. . ,.”7 ‘ This Confucian control over
culture took the form ofthe inaccessibility of Culture to the population at large. This cultural
segregation, however, “favored the emergence ofa folklore while the universalization of
culture deprived us of one in France.”
76
Advocacy of the rejection of Confucian tradition
74 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
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75 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 269.
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then, means the acceptance of a universalized popular culture for the first time in Chinese
history.
In addition to Confucius. Beauvoir also rejects Taoist and Buddhist philosophies as
ultimately forms of mystification, offering the people the cultivation ofa stoic attitude of
resignation as the only means ofcountering the misery of their lot. Taoism, for example,
“.
. .invited the Chinese to break loose from his mortal confines, to transcend himselfby
plunging into dream, while Buddhism is “.
. .a quietism also, which abandoned the terrain to
Confucianism. This triumvirate of Chinese philosophy (or perhaps more properly, Chinese
ideologies) produced philosophers who, ‘look the stagnation their country was sunk in for an
image of eternity. Spent after their bickering over details, they would all heave the same sigh
of relief: ‘The Tao is everlastingly unalterable.’”78 If left alone, this self-sustaining, closed-
circuit of a society would have maintained its unchanging course for, having foreclosed the
emergence ofan active bourgeoisie by imperial mandate,
74
there was no internal contradiction
to spur the dialectic into action. But since Chinese isolation ended abruptly after contact with
the expanding colonial powers, changes in the situation of the Chinese were inevitable.
This is not to say there do not, for Beauvoir, also exist historical occurrences of
resistance to the ideological dominance of the Confucian order. The materialist tendencies of
Mencius, the most prominent disciple ofConfucius, are noted in this regard, as well as the
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attack on Confucianism by Mo Ti, founder of the Mohist school. Although Beauvoir resorts
to citing Mencius in the final pages of the book to defend the communist government against
the defenders of bourgeois liberties who criticize it, Beauvoir's primary understanding of his
work is as a simplistic form of materialism, wherein human beings are completely determined
by the material environment of their existence and
. .the notion ofhuman nature operates a
little like the unknown in an equation: it helps solve the equation, but does not appear in the
answer.”
80
The treatment ofMohist philosophy is equally problematic in that, although it is
true that Mohists saw themselves as reacting to excesses ofConfucianism, it would be a
mistake to say that Mohism was primarily a doctrine of the people. Beauvoir thus juxtaposes
what she believes to be a philosophy of the people against a philosophy ofthe elite: “There
are some who claim that Confucianism subordinates politics to morals; Mo Ti long ago
denounced this lie. He was thoroughly aware that the privileged do not model their order
after any pure idea ofGood but that they call good the order they choose to institute.”81
Beauvoir's reading ofMohist thought is flatly repudiated by reference to the Mohist text
itself. In the section entitled ‘Identification with the Superior,” Mo Ti’s basic argument is
that the emperor is chosen by Heaven (Tian) to enforce standards set in accordance with the
patterns ofHeaven: “Knowing the cause of the confusion to be in the absence of a ruler who
could unify the standards in the world, (Heaven) chose the virtuous, sagacious, and wise in
the world and crowned him emperor, charging him with the duty of unifying the wills in the
80 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), p. 283n.
81 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March , Austryn Wainhouse, trans., (New York:
World, 1958), pp. 262-263.
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empire. Although it may appear as though this passage supports Beauvoir’s interpretation
that the populace was subject to the whim of the powerful the passage itself suggests that
there is some notion ofGood (read here as “standards”) which Heaven attempts to
instantiate. The role ofthe ruler, then, is not purely that ofthe totalitarian ruler who may
define standards as he pleases, but rather one of applying a recognized virtuousness in the
preservation of social order and the maintenance ofHeaven-given standards ofconduct and
life.
Since, according to Beauvoir, both Mohism and the materialism ofMencius were
historically unable to overcome the dominance of Confucianism, the necessary impetus for
social change in China had to come from the exterior. Brought into increasingly worse
military conflicts with the West, the nascent Chinese bourgeoisie (which owed its existence to
the burgeoning of China-West trade) “divested the [Confucian] clerks of their monopoly over
culture and set about modernizing it” because “From its birth at the close of the nineteenth
century it [the Chinese bourgeoisie] realized that, on the scientific and technical planes, China
absolutely had to stand on an even footing with the West.”83 To further this goal, the Chinese
bourgeoisie “sent its sons abroad,” and the rapid influx of Western ideas and methods
ultimately brought with it the liberatory theories ofMarx.
But with the victory ofMarxism in China, what becomes ofthe tradition which had
dragged China down into the abyss oftechnological and scientific backwardness? One might
think that there would be a certain tension between philosophies as antithetical as Marxism
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and Confucianism at least in the manner in which Beauvoir renders them After all “. .these
ancient doctrines are incompatible with Marxism from the simple fact that they imply a
classless world and deny history."84 But the ideological tension which exists is not
, for
Beauvoir, between Marxism and Confucianism but rather between Marxism and
. .the
amalgam ofpragmatism and idealism Hu Shih borrowed from Dewey.”85 The ideological
conflict in Chinese society has progressed from the nonexistence of struggle against imperial
Confucianism to the struggle ofthe bourgeoisie against Confucianism to the vanquishing of
Confucianism and the emergence of conflict with new, sinified Western bourgeois ideology. 86
Chinese philosophy, which had never been capable ofreproducing social stagnation is at last
superseded, but only by means of Western ideas.
5.10 Cultural Integrity, Broken Promises
There is thus no seeming escape from the Western. No matter how Chinese thought
or society might develop, it is always in Western terms, along the lines laid down by Western
ideas. The problem here is not one of “cultural purity.” The goal has not been to assert that
the Chinese need to be authentically Chinese in both thought and culture. The result would
only be an increasing fragmentation of the globe at the same time that technological advances
ofboth West and East are shrinking the experience of distance. Rather, ifthe development of
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any culture,” any society in this period can be shown to be always already intertwined with
the ideas and practices of what is assumed to be an other culture, ought not the task to be the
maintenance of cultural purity, but rather the celebration of its impurity?
But what ofthe desire to be identified as the representative ofsome culture? We
have seen that in the cases ofDewey, Russell, and Beauvoir, the delineation of the difference
which establishes the separation of Western and Chinese cultures also marks a certain
manifestation of this desire. This desire is perhaps best understood as being the honest desire
to help what is perceived as a backward culture, as well as the desire to come to terms with a
Western self-understanding. In the light ofthe violence perpetrated by the West, the desire of
the subjugated to nonetheless adopt the guiding principles of the West, be it science or
political theory, suggests that this violence was the unfortunate result ofthe acts of
unscrupulous individuals. What the “West” means is thus not the violent subjugation ofwhat
it has determined to be the non-West, but rather, “progress,” “enlightenment,” and “truth.”
The desire to recognize China as a space wherein the story ofWest can be replayed, this time
with a different ending, is thus not purely the desire for the uplifting of the natives; it is also
the desire for self-fulfillment, a desire for Western absolution from the sins of its fathers.
A promise entails a responsibility to someone else. In the case of China, it would
seem that the Chinese promise is a Western promise made to the future generations of all
humanity, enacted in Chinese space. But to say that someone or something holds promise is
to suggest that from the privileged vantage point ofmore advanced education or
development, one can perceive the potential inherent in the nascent and the as-yet-
undeveloped. Does that which holds promise ever attain to the level of the evaluator? In our
times, where the Chinese are being established by the media and world governments as the
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violators ofhuman nghts and the perpetrators of inhuman restrictions on the lives of its
citizens, when it is continually held up as the epitome of anti-democratic, we would have to
say that those who might have thought that the Chinese held some promise for them were
mistaken, whether they pinned Marxist, or more liberal hopes to them. This is not to suggest
that I am attempting to be an apologist for the Chinese government. Rather, this concerns the
perennial play ofpower in the delineation ofan “us” and a “them.” In the case ofthe promise
of civilization, be it Western or Chinese, the task is determine what obstacles remain in the
path of the goal of global unity. As I have been suggesting here, part of the problem is the
assumption that both the conception of culture and the desire to announce oneself as the
bearer ofa culture is an unproblematic desire. For what this desires works to maintain is a
perpetual abyss between the worlds of " tus’ and “them.” a distinction which has always (must
it?) announced itself in the form of a hierarchical power. Thus, what remains to be done is
the unraveling ofthe desire to make this distinction, to demonstrate its complicity in the
practices ofboth West and East which serve to dominate those marked as others. The us-
them dichotomy must be broken down, for ifwe continually pin the promises ofhuman
civilization onto the shirts of others, we may find that that hope has been misplaced, not only
in “them.” but also in “us.”
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CHAPTER 6
SEXES AND CITIZENS
6.1 The Social and the Political
Up to this point, we have been considering the function and field of cultural
alterity in what might be argued to be a more theoretical context— the focus of the
analysis has been upon the cultural coherence and integrity of Western philosophy as
juxtaposed against what is designated as Chinese philosophy. Although the analysis has
been grounded in the texts of the thinkers examined thus far, it has also remained
primarily centered on the philosophical implications of their claims as to the foreignness
of the Chinese space and the radical differences in the thought of those who inhabit that
space. What concerns us now is how these theoretical considerations play themselves
out in the realm of the social and of the political— arenas long disdained by certain
schools of academic philosophy. Specifically, this chapter will attempt the beginnings of
an examination ofhow the difference between the cultures of China and the West
translates into a systematic practice of self (and other) understanding such that any
meaningful differences in social and political structures are always perceived as being
grounded along the divide of the cultural. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that a
process similar to the one which underpins the desire to differentiate between the
Western and the non-Westem on the plane of the philosophical exists as well in the ways
in which the other is gendered and in the manner in which the political space of the other
is understood. The end result will be, hopefully, to point out directions in which the line
of thought taken here can be made relevant and not remain solely within the sanitized
environment of the theoretical.
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This chapter will thus be composed of two primary parts, held together by the
infamous events in Tiananmen Square in May and June of 1989, when the Chinese
government committed acts of violence against “its own people,” people who had built a
symbolic liberty statue and who claimed only to be seeking the advancement of
democracy within China. For it is this “democracy protest,” with its iconic “Goddess of
Liberty” which seemingly conjoins the identity of Chinese women and the meaning of
democracy when imported into “foreign space ” Both are primary examples of the
Chinese difference articulated in the field of gender and politics. The Chinese other has
always been (and will doubtless always be) marked by the insistence that its political
forms are unique to its social space and that its people are motivated by a different
understanding of the bodies they inhabit. Whether this insistence takes the form of the
assertion that with its practices of taiqi and other bodily forms of meditation, the Chinese
possess a means of becoming more properly attuned to the rhythms and energies
contained within the human body, or the vacuous observation that the Chinese are “not
used to democracy”' because they have lived with the collective experience of centuries
of dynastic rule, the point has been to reinforce the notion that there is an unbridgeable
gap between our cultural experience and theirs. Furthermore, the myth of the demure
and mysterious “Asian woman” is also firmly rooted in the difference in character
between the spaces of the West and China— cultivated as the result of centuries of
Confucian confinement to the home, forbidden to engage in the public sphere, the
provenance of men, how could Chinese women be otherwise?
1 An actual comment, overheard on a long plane flight, accompanied by an extensive
explanation of the fundamentally Confucian nature of Chinese culture.
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But do these explanations work? Or do they simply shift the burden of
accounting for difference to the untouchable field of a culture vastly different from “our
own?” In the case of Western philosophy, I have argued that part of the reason for
claiming that the other’s difference was grounded in the material facts of culture was to
accomplish a sort of theoretical positioning which allowed, not only ideological
justification for the colonization of the other, but also the emergence of an historical self-
understanding which positioned the West at the cutting edge of history and progress.
Similarly, I will argue in this chapter that the identification of Chinese social space and
Chinese women as being culturally different hardly functions as “objective” ethnography
or social science, but is also constitutive of Western desire and self-understanding.
Further, the identification of the social and cultural difference of the space of the other is
not limited to its occurrence to the West; it is a practice done on both sides of the divide.
This will be demonstrated by examining the case of historical roots of “democracy with
Chinese characteristics.”
6.2 “...and this good news”
After he had failed the imperial civil service examinations for the third time in
1 837, Hong Huoxiu, the third son of a farming family from Guangdong province, falls
into a delirium which lasted for forty days.
2
During this delirium, he journeys to a
heavenly realm, in which he is reprimanded by his heavenly father, austere in his black
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robes and beard, for being remiss in his duty— Hong has failed to drive out the devils
who fill the realms of Heaven and Earth and everything in between. Given a sword, a
wife, and moral instruction, Hong proceeds to enact his heavenly father's will,
performing so well on the battlefields of Heaven that he is ordered to return to the
earthly realm, there to continue his war against the evil demons. Thus, Hong recovers
from his seemingly deathbound illness, reciting poems which he has composed during his
stay in Heaven to his family, and excitedly sharing his new name: “Heavenly King, Lord
of the Heavenly Way, Quan." His relatives, fearing that he has become incurably insane,
watch the entrance to his room, but the rechristened Hong Xiuquan seemingly regains his
faculties and returns to his job as schoolteacher.
Seven years later, after failing the examinations once again, Hong rereads the
Christian tracts he acquired during his last trip and unlocks the secret of his delirium-
dream: his dream-father is none other than the Christian God; his dream-brother, who
had given him daily moral instruction, was Jesus Christ; and his dream-given mission to
wage war on corrupt evil demons— the Manchurian Qing dynasty. Thus, fully believing
that he was, in fact, the younger brother of Jesus, and never doubting his own divinity,
Hong Xiuquan instigated the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864, which embroiled sixteen
provinces in civil war, destroyed more than six hundred cities, and took the fives of at
least twenty million Chinese.
It was, of course, inconceivable to Western missionaries that Hong s claim could
be true, that he could indeed be the younger brother of Christ, this claim being at best a
spurious revelation and probably blasphemy. The Rites Controversy (in which Leibniz
was deeply engaged) over the religious status of ancestor worship and reverence for
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Confucius having been decided long ago in favor of those who pronounced the Chinese
to be yet another band of heathen unbelievers. Christian doctrine in China was seen as
truth to be dispensed readymade and inalterable, and not a flexible doctrine to be adapted
to fit Chinese sociopolitical conditions. With Western support— how could the Western
powers, after aU, lend support to someone who claimed to be the second son ofGod?—
the dynastic forces were finally able to suppress the rebellion, reducing a mad. starving
Hong Xiuquan to eating weeds inside the city walls of his besieged capital city of
Nanjing, believing it to be manna sent from his Heavenly Father to sustain him. One
wonders what Leibniz would have thought, had he seen these results of the transmission
of Christianity into the space of the Chinese other and its adaptation by Hong.
But even if Christianity was to fail as an idea which could topple a Chinese
dynasty, the idea of democracy was much more potent, greatly benefiting perhaps from
the initial weakening of the dynastic regime during the Taiping Rebellion. What finally
fundamentally transformed the structure of Chinese society was the attempt, initiated by
Sun Yatsen, to reincarnate the Chinese nation as a democratic republic. The attempt to
overthrow the now-corrupt Qing dynasty succeeded in 191 1, but the installation of
democracy was thwarted by military leaders with imperial ambitions, inadequate party
organization and discipline, and poor indoctrination, remnants of the overthrown
dynastic order.
3
Proclaimed the first President of the provisional Republic of China in
1911, Sun resigned his position to Yuan Shikai who, despite a pretense at accepting
democratic ideas, nonetheless attempted to install himself as a new emperor in 1915. By
3
Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise ofModern China , Third Edition, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), p. 519.
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the time of his death in 1925, a “democratic” Republic of China was not yet reality, and
Sun s last words were an exhortation to continue the work of democratic revolution:
The Revolution is not yet completed. All my comrades must strive on.”4
But if Hong Xiuquan had misunderstood the Christian message as intended by
the translators and publishers of those fateful tracts he read, giving it a Chinese
reconfiguration, then what ought we to make of the translation of the idea of democracy
into that strange, Chinese setting? We know, reading the recent media concerned with
the death of Deng Xiaoping, that Mao later “perverted the idea of democracy,” and that
his emphasis on “proletarian democracy” is not, after all, “real” or “Western”
democracy. 5 Democracy in a Chinese context has always been (or portrayed as?) a
distorted version of its Western counterpart. The question, then, of determining just
how Sun understood democracy is significant, for as the first ardent advocate of the
creation of a specifically Chinese democracy. Sun's conception sets the stage for the
articulation of a nation-culture firmly grounded upon the fundament of Western
democratic ideals, but deliberately constructed with a distinctly Chinese architecture in
mind. If one believes that sociocultural spaces are intact spheres which possess their
own modes of signification and possibility, then Sun’s translation of Western democracy
into the Chinese social framework of signification represents the moment of democratic
penetration— it is Sun who actively works to introduce the virus of democracy into the
4 Sun Yatsen. The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1 970), pp. xi-xii.
5
Nicolas Kristof writes in The New York Times of 23 February 1997 that: “...Mao and
Mr. Deng both refused to try real democracy (and, of course, Mao meant proletarian
democracy rather than any kind of Western approach), p. 4:5.
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Chinese social body, providing it with the Chinese masks which facilitate its social
absorption and reproduction. In the interests of an excursion into the meaning of
democracy as an idea capable of cultural migration and with an eye for the Chineseness
of its articulation in that geopolitical space called “China;’ I want to turn to his lectures
on democracy, given in March and April of 1924, one year before his death. An
examination of this Chinese text on democracy might provide us with a preliminary
sketch of some of the salient features of this Chinese version of democracy, features to
be examined ultimately as part of the circuits which signify cultural difference.
6.3 Freedom, Terror, Power
The first lecture of the series is largely composed of a materialist account of the
development of human societies and the concomitant evolution of political forms. Sun’s
historical narrative takes us from the “origin” ofhuman social organization, the practical
decision to band together to fight off wild “beasts” and other dangerous vicissitudes of
nature, to the emergence of a precipitous tide of democratic thought marking the future
form of human societies. Interposing theocracy and autocracy as intermediary forms of
sociopolitical organization between the primitive defensive pact and the democratic ideal.
Sun concludes that the mode of social organization of the future must be grounded
firmly in the democratic ideal of the sovereignty of the people, since this represents the
highest stage of the evolution of the forms ofhuman society. 6 Indeed, this principle of
the “People’s Sovereignty” functions as the middle and central term of Sun's famous
revolutionary slogan, the “Three Principles of the People.” These “Three Principles”
—
6
Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 19.
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“People’s Nationalism. People's Sovereignty. People’s Livelihood”— are watchwords to
be placed alongside such famous democratic slogans as “liberte. egalite, ffatemite” and
“of the people, by the people, for the people.”
But Sun goes farther, asserting that this notion of the sovereignty of the people,
(in a word, democracy, 1 ) ought not to be understood in the terms through which it has
been understood in the West. Having established the historical necessity which fuels the
promulgation of the democratic ideal in Lecture One, Sun carefully distances himself in
Lecture Two from the political ideologies which undergird Western instantiations of
democracy, claiming that the inordinate (primarily French but ultimately Western)
emphasis on “liberty' and “equality” does not apply to Chinese sociopolitical space:
The peoples of Europe suffered so bitterly from despotism that as soon as
the banner of liberty was lifted high, millions with one heart rallied about
it. Ifwe in China, where the people have not suffered such despotism,
should make the cry of liberty, no attention would be paid to it. 8
Not only does “liberty” not apply to Chinese space, it would also be unrecognized;
liberty is radically foreign as a political slogan and ideal. In fact, given China's status at
the time as a semi-colony of the European powers. Sun is quick to point out that the
notion of liberty in its Chinese space refers to the liberty of national self-determination,
and not the liberty of individual self-determination so fundamental in Western thought.
Thus, instead of “liberty” becoming a revolutionary principle in and of itself, it is
understood as inherently embedded within the idea of Chinese nationalism: ‘“Liberty' in
7
The term's “people’s sovereignty” and “democracy” are rendered in Chinese with the
same term, minquan. Thus, it is to be understood that the terms democracy and
“people’s sovereignty” are, to Sun, essentially the same.
8 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 31.
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the French revolutionary watchword and ‘People’s Nationalism' in our watchword are
similar. The People's Nationalism calls for freedom of our nation.”9
Moreover, the fact of China's impending colonization means that what is
necessary for a Chinese democratic revolution is precisely the suppression of individual
liberty in the interest of forging a national, unified consciousness; the “sheet of loose
sand that represents a shifting and disurufied Chinese sociality must be compressed into
a firm rock upon which one can build. The task of national liberation from imperialist
influence requires that national freedom be given priority over the preservation of
individual liberty.
10
For Sun, it is ridiculous that a Chinese democratic revolution might
be essentially built upon the notion of individual liberty and self-determination, since not
only does the formation of a unified national consciousness condition the very possibility
of individual liberty, but also because part of the reason for China’s semi-colonization
can be traced to the fact that Chinese individuals are “too free” already, and have always
enjoyed a high level of individual freedom. 1
1
Similarly, the privileged position of “equality” in Sun's revolutionary rhetoric is
recast, both because it applies differently to the space of Chinese sociality, and because
the Western formulation of equality is basically inadequate, since he believes it to be
theoretically incorrect. A Chinese democratic government, if constructed upon the
Western conception of equality, would be unstable and weak. Thus, in Lecture Three,
9 Sun Yatsen. The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 38.
10 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), pp. 36-7.
11 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood.
1970), pp. 33-35.
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Sun argues against the idea that equality between citizens of a state is conferred by
Nature, (the incorrect Western formulation), arguing instead that what is given to human
beings is fundamentally inequality
,
since science has proven that “there is no principle of
natural equality."
12
As a result, any democratic movement must take into account the
fact that equality between individuals is not their “natural" state, but that the aim of the
institution of democratic state structures is precisely the imposition of an artificial
equality in the face of what is given by Nature. The problems of the autocratic and
theocratic state structures lie not so much the fact that they are inherently structures of
inequality, but that these structures magnify and intensify the “naturally" existing
inequalities between individuals, producing despotic forms of “artificial" inequality. 13
Given that the natural state ofhuman social existence is inequality— a
hierarchical ordering of human individuals ranked by natural abilities— the founders of a
democratic republic must be careful not to impose a “false equality" in their zealousness
to correct the social iniquities of artificial inequality. False equality occurs when the
hierarchy of inequality is eliminated artificially by the unilateral “dumbing down" of the
more skilled and talented among the citizenry. Like the nightmarish world envisioned in
Kurt Vonnegut’s short story “Harrison Bergeron,"
14
where a ruthless “United States
Handicapper General” is put in charge of assigning the appropriate handicaps to those
12 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 43.
13 Sun writes: “Nature originally did not make man equal; but when autocracy developed
among mankind, the despotic kings and princes pushed human differences to an extreme,
and the result was an inequality far worse than Nature's inequality, p. 40.
14
Kurt Vonnegut, “Harrison Bergeron.” Welcome to the Monkey House , (New York: Dell
1950), pp. 7-13.
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who are not of average height, intelligence, strength, beauty, etc., the world of false
equality is a dystopia governed by the least common denominator of human ability where
the strengths and talents of specific individuals are forcibly suppressed into order to
preserve an ideal of equality. Such a state. Sun believes, was precisely that established
by the French Revolution— a false equality which necessitated the execution of many of
the “good ears and eyes’' of the people in the pursuit of the formation of a state of
absolute equality.
15
Given that this preliminary French taste of democracy ultimately
resulted in the collapse of the newly-formed Republic and the institution ofNapoleon as
emperor. Sun concludes that the historical record proves that adherence to an ideal of
false equality does not aid the pursuit and development of stable forms of democracy.
A true equality must therefore account for the fact of natural inequality, as well
as avoiding the terrifying excesses of the belief in absolute freedom and equality. True
equality thus has its foundation in the establishment of a universal political equality.
Ib
That is, all citizens are provided with a base level of political power from which they are
free to develop their own unique skills and fives. True equality does not, like false
equality, necessitate the abstract universalization of the citizen; it does not require that
everyone be equal in every respect. What it requires is that everyone be given equal
access to the machinery of democracy and the composition of the government. Like a
high-powered machine, the strong democratic government is simply a tool wielded by its
owner. Those who actually govern are held in check by the fact that they are culpable to
15 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood.
1970), pp. 70-72.
16 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood.
1970). p. 45.
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the people for their actions. In a fashion analogous to the possession of an automobile
(the owner of a car does not
,
for example, necessarily know the best way to drive or fix
it ) the citizens are the owners of the government; it is their possession. 17 This emphasis
on the control inherent in the idea of ownership is what Westerners have missed in their
democratic theorizing and has consequently led them to fear the formation of a powerful
government, fearing that if the government is invested with too much power, the return
to despotic autocracy is ineluctable. Coupled with the historically-conditioned Western
fear of the loss of liberty, the failure to theorize the difference between the political
power of the people and the administrative power of the government has resulted in the
relative weakness of Western democracies, which fail to explore fully the possibilities of
democracy.
Well-versed in the materialist methods of Western thought. Sun locates the origin
of these Western emphases on “liberty” and “equality” and the Western insistence on the
necessity of a weak central government in the West’s historical conditions, arguing that
Western democratic revolutionaries focused inordinately on these two ideas because they
experienced a far more oppressive autocratic state than did the Chinese.
18
The relatively
greater oppression which European peoples experienced thus led them to place primary'
emphasis on securing greater liberty and equality for themselves as individuals and to
believe that the weaker the central government, the better the democracy. The Chinese
conditions, however, are just the contrary— the Chinese have historically enjoyed
17 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), pp. 126-129.
18 Sun Yatsen. The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood.
1970), pp. 28-29.
233
greater equality and less oppression. The size and form of the administrative structures
ot Chinese dynastic rule have produced a situation in which all citizens are more or less
equal, apart from the imposition of taxes, and a state in which there is very little direct
presence of the autocratic iron fist. Further, the encroachment of foreign powers and the
imminent threat of the reduction of the Chinese nation to the status of a pure colony
mitigates the power of the argument that a Chinese democracy must coalesce around a
weak central government; such a democracy would not last. The attempt to simply map
the structural and ideological Western path to democratic revolution directly onto
Chinese sociopolitical space then, is necessarily doomed to failure, since Western and
Chinese political spaces are inherently different .
19
The crucial effect of this difference has been that in Western democracies, the
overarching emphasis on liberty and equality and the strident maintenance that in order
for popular sovereignty to exist, government must be weak, results in the insistence on
delimiting the power of the government. This insistence. Sun believes, has its origins in a
fundamental mistake in the Western conceptualization of democracy— the Western
failure to differentiate properly between sovereignty and abilityf Western democratic
theorists have mistakenly assumed that the democratic rule of the people consists solely
in keeping a tight rein on the powers of government, instead of properly understanding
that those elected to government positions are chosen on the basis of their ability to
19 Sun Yatsen. The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 88.
20 He writes: “Westerners have not drawn a clear line between sovereignty and ability, so
they have not yet solved the problems which have arisen out of democracy these
two or
three hundred years,’' p. 106.
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govern. Thus, the kernel of democracy is contained, not in the edifices of a weak central
government, but rather in the fact that those elected to government positions are “gifted
men, in whose skills at governing the people place their unwavering trust. 21
Thus in Sun s conception, a real democracy places democracy first, as the
precondition of liberty and equality, and not the other way around. True democracy
derives its strength from the bond of trust which exists between citizen and rulers, trust
derived from the fact that those chosen to rule are chosen precisely because they possess
the ability to govern well. After all, since what is given to the human condition is a
natural inequality of skills, we cannot expect that all citizens will be equally capable of
the tasks of government. Some citizens will be better skilled at governing than others.
A Chinese democratic government which is built with these considerations in mind will
be necessarily stronger than the democratic governments of the West, since the Chinese
people will have completely and trustingly placed the power of governing in the hands of
those who are most capable of it.
6.4 The Voting Machine
Disregarding the question of the accuracy of Sun’s analysis of Western
democracy, what must be noted throughout his lectures is his insistence that the Chinese
sociopolitical space is inherently different from the space of the West. The social terrain
is more level (the Chinese have enjoyed greater social equality) and more open (the
Chinese have possessed greater individual liberty than Westerners). Further, although
Westerners might have originally conceived the notion of democracy, the fact that
21 Sun Yatsen. The Principle ofDemocracy , F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), pp. 101-109.
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Western political theorists are still engaged in rereading Plato and other democratic
theorists of antiquity suggests to Sun that Western political thought has not kept pace
with Western science. Why follow in the footsteps of Western theorists who. two
thousand years later, have still not succeeded in comprehending the work of their
ancients? Indeed: “...the advance of Western political philosophy has not kept pace with
the advance of Western material science. There has been no radical change in political
thinking for two thousand years. What is needed in the Chinese space is thus a
democratic government which instantiates, as the logical result of sociopolitical
evolution, the democracy inherent in Chinese culture. This democratic government is to
be built, not on the bedrock assumption ofNature-given individual liberty and equality,
but upon the sacrifice of a portion of that liberty in the name of the forging of a national
will, a will of the Chinese people.
Proof positive of the inherently democratic nature of Chinese culture is
established by demonstrating the existence of the democratic impulses embedded within
Chinese philosophical thought. Thus, by means of a democratic relay traced through
various historical examples ultimately linked up to the thought of Confucius and
Mencius, Sun attempts to argue both for the historical necessity of democracy, as well as
for its intrinsic presence and suitability for the Chinese:
Confucius and Mencius two thousand years ago spoke for people’s rights.
Confucius. . . was pleading for a free and fraternal world in which the
people would rule.... Mencius... in his age, already saw that kings were
unnecessary and would not last forever.... Thus China more than two
milleniums ago had already considered the idea of democracy, but at that
time she could not put it into operation. Democracy was then what
22 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 84.
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foreigners call a Utopia, an ideal which could not be immediately
realized.
2 '
In Sun s conceptualization, democracy has always already been a Chinese idea. The
exigencies of history have prevented its realization in China until now, but given the fact
that the West has now been able to found democratic republics, China ought not to resist
the democratic tide, but give itself over to it completely.
Recognition of the necessity and superiority of democracy as a political form
does not subsequently entail the mindless adoption of Western structures. For since Sun
maintains the essential difference of the Chinese sociopolitical space, the straightforward
adoption and practice of Western democratic methods is dangerous:
What methods shall we use in applying the democracy which we have
adopted from the West? Only after we have thought through these
methods will democracy be adapted to our use. Ifwe insist on using
democracy without careful preparation beforehand, we will find it
extremely dangerous and liable to kill us. 24
Protection from the dangers of democracy is to be secured by, not curtailing the powers
of a democratic government, but by creating the strongest possible government coupled
with the meritocratic selection of government members. What guarantees the
Chineseness of the Chinese form of democracy will be precisely the absolute
identification of the will of the Chinese people with those who govern. The new and
improved, democratic and strong Chinese nation is to be built upon the firmament of a
government voted into office on the basis of their ability to govern well, and not upon
the unstable foundations of the ideas of individual liberty and equality. It is the
23 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), pp. 11-13.
24 Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans., (Westport: Greenwood,
1970), p. 132.
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construction of democracy which conditions the possibility of social liberty and equality,
and not the reverse. Chineseness is actualized, not in the free expression of individual
wills loosely governed by a weak central government, but by the complete identification
of the government with the will of the Chinese people, an identification which,
paradoxically, is the very basis of freedom itself.
This identification of the will of the people and the government of the democratic
state is not new. Indeed, Rousseau, in The Social Contract
, maintains that the act of
voting serves to determine what the general will of the people actually is. In the event of
discovering, after voting, that s/he had not voted for the winning side, the voter ought to
come to recognize that “...I have made a mistake, and that what I believed to be the
general will was not so. Ifmy particular opinion had prevailed against the general will, I
should have done something other than what I had willed, and then I should not have
been free.’"' Thus, the act of voting, although an individual act, is nonetheless only the
vehicle whereby the “will of the people” as a democratic governmental directive makes
itself real. The fact that, for example, a presidential candidate lost although I voted for
him/her, simply demonstrates that I have been mistaken as to what the general will of the
people is in its actuality.
In his “discovery” of the theoretical separation between the sovereignty of the
people and the administrative power of the government elected by the people. Sun can
be seen to make the same assumption. Sun's advocacy of democracy takes the form, in
numerous points in the six lectures, of suggesting that the instantiation of democracy in
25
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract , Maurice Cranston, trans., (New York:
Penguin, 1968, pp. 151-154.
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China is essentially “making king” the four hundred million people of China (which, we
assume, are those who he believes should possess suffrage). 26 Despite the fact that Sun
adds the three additional powers of'“recall,” “initiative.” and “referendum” to the
mechanism of'’"universal suffrage” as guarantors of popular control over the government
which rules m the name of the people, what underlies the power accorded to these
mechanisms is the fact that they serve as expressions of a unified will of the Chinese
people. The meaningful absence of any discussion on how to deal with dissent among
the people— the usual theoretical considerations of the advantages and disadvantages of
simple majority, supermajority, proportional representation, and all the other practical
possibilities for administering the vote— suggests either the failure to make such
considerations or, in light of Sun’s advocacy of a strong, unified China, the belief in the
singular and unanimous unity of a “will of the people,” the heterogeneous opinions of
four hundred million individuals fused into one homogeneous collective will. 27
The belief that the government acts on behalf of the will of the people, however
determined, is a central component to the democratic machine, as can be witnessed by
the necessity, even in the most “repressive” of governmental structures, of making
reference to the “people” as an abstract body whose interests are served by the actions of
26
See. for example, Sun Yatsen, The Principle ofDemocracy, F. W. Price, trans.,
(Westport: Greenwood, 1970), pp. 96, 105-106, and 134.
27
In his preliminary elaboration on the power of the referendum, for example. Sun writes
that “If everybody thinks that an old law is not beneficial to the people , they should have
the power to amend it and to ask the government to administer the revised law and do
away with the old law,” p. 134, [emphases added]. The choice of “everybody” and not
“some of the people,” coupled with the fact that that the old law is understood to be not
beneficial “to the people” instead of simply “to them” strongly suggests the theoretical
assumption of a separation between the “people’ s will’ and “the people themselves.
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the government. What appears as an operative difference between those democracies
which are “repressive” and those which are “truly democratic” is the activity of voting.
Non-democratic governments are those which either do not permit the holding of
elections or, if they are permitted, either deny their results or “rig” them. 28 Thus,
although the New York Times article evaluating the death ofDeng Xiaoping claims that
the democracy which Mao constructed in China ‘"was much more popular with
ordinary people than most communist countries” (one must ask why “communist” is
necessary here), that democracy is necessarily “perverted” because the people do not
?Q
vote.
But although the act of voting might be understood as central to the democratic
essence of a state, the fact that those countries which do not engage in the practice of
holding elections are nonetheless considered to possess a culture (indeed, the failure to
hold elections is sometimes considered to be rooted in the practices of that culture itself)
indicates that the holding of elections cannot function to mark cultural difference. Even
if, as in the case of the democratic apparatus advocated by Sun. the results of the
elections make real the will of the Chinese people, this Chineseness is not produced by
the voting process, but is rather permitted its most real existence by this vote. In other
words, the utility of democracy is precisely the fact that it permits the apparently truest
manifestation of the will of a people to emerge. Thus, the paradoxical relation of
28 • •
This is, of course, a hypothesis, but one which I suspect will be easily be supported by
a quick perusal of popular media presentations of those states which are labeled “non-
democratic.”
29
Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Communist Dynasty Had Its Run. Now What?” The New
York Times
,
23 February 1997, pp. 4:1, 4:5.
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democracy to freedom hinted at earlier in the discussion of Sun's emphasis on national
liberty over individual liberty is intensified by the further paradox that it is precisely the
‘universal applicability of democracy as a governmental ideal which enables the
differentiation of individual states— each the bearer of a (culturally?) unique will, each a
geopolitically distinct entity which realizes the unity of a popular will while maintaining
that unity as differentfrom the will of others.
But Sun was seemingly mistaken about the possibility of instantiating democracy
in Chinese space, for what emerged was the “non-democratic" structures of the
“communist" People's Republic. Following the defeat and retreat to Taiwan of the
Guomindang, the party oppositional to the Chinese Communist Party, the new nation-
state established on the mainland was built along the guidelines of Marxist-Leninist (and
later Mao Zedong) thought. I have already hinted at the fact that the identification of the
People's Republic as “non-democratic" is problematic, but the question we are faced
with now is why this identification would have occurred. Why would this communist
regime be identified as non-democratic if, as the New York Times claims, it was “more
popular with ordinary people” than most regimes? Does this popularity not suggest the
possession of one of the salient features of “democracy?" What is needed apart from
popular support for the status of democracy?
It is a commonplace of contemporary nation-states to promote propaganda which
confers upon its enemies the status of being, not only different, but completely despotic
and totalitarian, whether this is done by a nation-state which claims that its enemies are
false, bourgeois democracies or by a nation-state which claims that its enemies are
totalitarian states ruled by the iron fist. In the case of China, there is certainly nothing
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unusual in the everyday claims that it is a regime which stifles the expression of
individuality in the interests of the collective. But the question remains as to what is
operating behind these banal and relatively uninteresting claims. Why would we feel it so
necessary to proclaim that the Chinese other is a communist totalitarianism whose
populace desperately desires democracy. What does this tell us about the desires which
ground the identification of the cultural other and about “our relationship with this
other?
6.5 The Mobius Band
As a preliminary hypothesis, my reading of the relationship between China and
the West is, to borrow its formulation from Zizek, that they “relate to each other like
two surfaces of Mobius band: by progressing far enough on one surface, we suddenly
find ourselves on the opposite surface.”
30
The Mobius band is a shape obtained (in its
simplest form) by taping the ends of a strip of paper together, after twisting the strip
once, so that no matter where one begins, one can trace an unbroken line around both
sides of the paper. Thus, the Mobius figure transforms a two-sided strip of paper into a
shape with only one side. The imagery of the Mobius band is used by Zizek precisely to
show that what often appears farthest away (onto logically, epistemologically, culturally,
and so on) is also that which is, with a twist in perspective, closest. Examined from the
point of view of traditional sinology and official political analyses, the Chinese are vastly
different from us Americans— They are the direct inheritors of an ancient culture utterly
different from ours, they do not live in a free society characterized by democracy (and
30
Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases ofEnjoyment, (London: Verso, 1994), pp.2-3.
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therefore want it), their language is pictographic and thus leads them to remain focused
on the immanent, whereas we in the West live in a historically youthful culture, we
actually have democracy, our alphabetic language frees us from the distraction of the
image to ponder the abstract forms of things. But is there really just absolute difference
between the West and China, between the adherents of Taoism and Hegelian monists?
Or might there be all-too-dangerous similarities, rather than pure difference, between the
rigid social ethics of Confucius and those of Aristotle, between the totalitarian state
structure of China and the structures of American democracy?
The point here is not to collapse the perceived distance between China and the
West but to recognize that this distance is symptomatic of the very perception of alterity
itself. In other words, it is perhaps not the case, as in popular phenomenological
accounts of alterity, that alterity comes after the fact of distance between us and the
other, that we notice the other only because we notice that they are far away. This might
have been the case before the dramatic increase in the interfusion of human populations
and the development of transportation technologies destroyed the idea of geographically-
isolated human communities. Now, it might perhaps be more fruitful to think of the
reverse— it is the very presumption of alterity which forces us into constructing and
maintaining some form of distance. It is only because we already expect the Chinese to
be different from us that we are able to encode the proper sorts of distance between
them and us. One finds the same sort of popular logic at work in the demarcation of
ethnic boundaries in cities where populations of various ethnicities are forced to live in
close proximity with one another. Here, the lack of a physical distance forces the
transposition of intercommunal distance onto the plane of “culture. What marks the
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difference between “us” and “them" is an infinite chasm that yawns between what is
understood to be two mutually incomprehensible cultural spaces. As a result, it makes
no difference whether or not China actually “lies at the other end of the world"; the
presumed cultural gap between China and the West is such that no bridging is seemingly
possible.
Thus, the presumption of the independence of cultures can be seen as a historical
relic, a residue from times in which physical distance could be directly mapped onto
cultural distance. Given the globalization of capital and the ensuing interfusion of human
populations from previously isolated and thus “distinct” cultures, the preservation of a
notion of cultural purity is a sign that this cultural purity has already been lost. Rather
than being a battle call to preserve vanishing cultures, the concern over cultural purity is
a form of nostalgia generated by the perceived hopelessness of maintaining cultural
identity. What, then, is the nostalgia at work in the Western (here specifically,
American) desire to see democracy flower in China?31
6.6 In the Delivery Room
It is evident that although the current focus on China is on its “human rights
violations," the attitudes which American spectators displayed as the events of June 1989
unfolded betrays something else— a certain fascination, not only with the culture of the
Other, but also with democracy. For in June 1989, China offered Americans a rare
31
The dedication ofMerle Goldman’s recent book. Sowing the Seeds ofDemocracy in
China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1 994), reads: ‘Tor my children. . . who may someday see democracy flower in China." One
wonders why her children have such a vested interest in witnessing the flowering of
democracy in China.
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historical possibility— those with television sets could witness a media-mediated version
of their own traumatic birth, the emergence ofdemocracy in a nation known to be
communist. And why not? The Berlin Wall had fallen, Eastern European nations were
embracing the market, and there, on the television screen, the abstract idea of democracy
possessed the immediate reality of the nightly news. “Look! They want what we
have!”— an attitude which betrayed an underlying belief not only that democracy was
about to be bom again (and in a country on the “other side of the world), but also that
this was what democracy was all about. Forgetting, of course, that a similar-sized
protest outside of the White House might be met with the same sort of government
crackdown.
But the opportunity of narcissistic enjoyment offered by the spectacle of
Tiananmen to Americans was shanghaied— democracy did not prevail, and the ensuing
months brought only the depressing news of the harsh government persecution of
dissidents, executions and jailings. The excitement generated by the chance for
Americans to relive the birth of their own political system evaporated into cynicism as
what followed Tiananmen was not, as is usual in moral parables, the punishment of the
evildoer and the vindication of righteousness, but actually the reverse. In the years since
1 989, the West has witnessed (to its horror?) the spectacular growth of the Chinese
economy, and the American popular press is filled with stories about the capitalistic self-
destruction of Chinese culture in the midst of an all-consuming passion to make money,
become wealthy, and acquire the latest in consumer goods/~ Thus, the narcissistic
32
See, for example, the entire 1 April 1996 issue ofNewsweek which opens its discussion of
the “China Question” with: “After 500 years of humiliation, a surging China is about to
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opportunity which China now offers Americans is perhaps something a little more
frightening— the birth of capitalism in all its attendant glory. 33
6.7 The Gaze of the Other
Surely there is something paradoxical here, for although a sizable proportion of
Western sino-analysis in the wake of Tiananmen suggests that the Chinese cultural
tradition was its underlying basis, it is precisely the loss of this culture that is mourned in
observations about China’s increasingly capitalist, market-driven economy. 34 Here we
might make the Zizekian observation that what “China” is doing is this: returning to the
West the repressed truth of its own democratic desire. 3 ' We in America want democracy
to spread to distant lands, we want them to become “like us,” but we simultaneously also
do not want them to become like us— we want to maintain the distance of alterity that
allows us to maintain our coherence as a cultural unity. And at the same time, the
success of “Chinese capitalism” horrifies us with the unthinkable implication that
democracy and capitalism are ultimately incompatible social systems. A successful
“true” democracy cannot serve as the support for a capitalist economy. After all. the
United States has had a long and painful history of supporting decidedly “non-
reclaim its historical position as one of the world's great powers. But will the reborn China
be a friend to the West— or a daunting foe?” p. 24.
j3
Witness, for example, Richard Madsen’s observation that “Knowledge of China is not
‘optional’ for Americans in the age of global telecommunication and commerce. We will
increasingly be forced to make important decisions about how our economic, political and
cultural institutions should relate to China. But ifwe do not understand the meaning of the
relationships, we will be at their mercy,” China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 26.
34
See, for example, Orville Schell’s piece “Twilight ofthe Titan: China The End of an
Era” in The Nation , 17 July 1995, pp. 84-98.
35
Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative , (Durham: Duke University Press. 1993), p. 208.
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democratic- regimes in Central and South America, in order to preserve the economic
stability vital to American business concerns.
Consequently, behind the economic competitiveness which grounds
contemporary American anxiety about China, there lies also a fear of the theft of
enjoyment, that somehow the Chinese might derail our democratic desire. It is as if,
given that democracy and capitalism are incompatible, the fear of China is based upon
the realization that it is only under continued totalitarian control that this economic
growth is able to take place. Hence, the current focus ofUS-China relations, the thorny
issue of “human rights,” has underlying it the admonition that China’s success is due only
to the fact that the Chinese state possesses a control over its population which is
impossible in the West because of its supposed “democratic heritage.”
What I am suggesting here is that part of the Western fascination with China is
that it embodies, as that distanced Other, what the West wishes it were (in the sense of
possessing a centuries-old continuous culture ), as well as what it once was— the
youthful child who still believed in democracy. This, in fact, is what constitutes the
relationship as fundamentally narcissistic, for it is not only its cultural ego-ideal which the
West seeks in China, but the fact that China offers a chance for the jaded “mature” West
to “flee to the child,” as Freud would put it. 36 It is almost as if, wearied by its tireless
role as the ethical imperative of the world. America looks at China the way an older
6
See “On Narcissism: an Introduction.” The Standard Edition ofthe Complete
Psychological Works ofSigmund Freud, James Strachey, trans., (London: Hogarth Press,
1 959), vol. fourteen.
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child, overburdened by familial demands, looks with envy at a younger child whose
temper tantrums are still treated with greater latitude.
But let us not forget that there is more than one gaze here and more than one
narcissism. In the case of China and America, what we have are two inseparable
fascmated gazes, both of which operate to sustain cultural distance in a narcissistic
fashion. Rey Chow, in her remarkable study on contemporary Chinese cinema, claims
that contemporary Chinese cinema represents the development of a sort of
autoethnography, an attempt to address the paradoxical relationship between nature and
culture as experienced in “third world” countries. 37 This autoethnography takes the form
of a desire to see a new China, a desire to finally come to terms with China's
contradictory position as both victim (of past imperialist aggressions), and as empire
(possessor of a five thousand year old “culture ). What we have here is more than
simply self-(re)defimtion, for this process takes place self-consciously
,
with the
awareness that what one does, what one chooses to display, is done so for the gaze of an
Other, here America and the West.
We can get a glimpse of the performative function embedded within Chinese
cultural production in the common use of the pejorative phrase: zuo gei waiguoren kan
,
which literally means “to do/done for foreigners to look at.” Indeed, it is the Western
media which are often blamed for the precipitation of violence at Tiananmen— forced to
ever higher spirals of tension generated by the consciousness that the gaze of the world
was upon them, it became increasingly difficult for both the protesters and the official
7
Rey Chow, Primitive Passions
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), chapter
one.
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state regime to back down from their respective positions. 38 Thus, although Zizek, in
reference to the West’s fascination with the dissolution of communism in Eastern
Europe, speaks of “two mutually fascinated gazes,”
34
it is not simply, as he supposes,
that these two gazes are both located within the West. For Zizek, the returned gaze is
the one which the West believes its Other to have, “the supposedly naive gaze by means
of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West, fascinated by its democracy.”40
The problem with the Zizekian perspective is exactly this: his developments of
Lacanian theory necessitates the existence of only one Symbolic Order, whereas the
fundamental basis for the construction of the cultural Other seems to require, particularly
in the case of China, at least two Symbolic Orders. These are, obviously, narcissistically
dependent on each other, but without the existence of the second, Chinese Symbolic,
one is left with no way of understanding what it means to zuo gei waiguoren kan, to do
something specifically for the gaze of the Western Other. In other words, Zizek'
s
understanding of the specular relationship between the West and its Others leaves
unexamined the fact that the West functions as the Otherfor its own others. Zizek'
s
world-picture is that of the narcissistic ego, gazing out at the world, seeing only itself,
whereas the picture of the world generated by the addition of another Symbolic is
perhaps more like that seen in Paul Klee s etching “Two Men Meet, Each Supposing the
Other to Be of Higher Rank,” where the image is that of two distorted, self-absorbed
38
For a typical appraisal of the role of the media in Tiananmen, see Madsen's China
and the
American Dream.
39
Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative , (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p.
200.
40
Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative , (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p.
200.
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figures, each mechanically performing the necessary ritual acknowledgment of the other,
lost in whatever interior worlds they possess and blind to the “facts” of the situation.
It is in this context that we might, following Chow's subtle analysis, understand
the function of the Chinese “arthouse” films which have been so popular of late. These
films, she is careful to point out, do not simply portray China to the West, but in many
cases, portray China to itself. That is, films like Yellow Earth
,
Raise the Red Lantern
,
Ju
Dou and so forth, are not pure cultural artifacts, but represent an active response to the
demanding Orientalist gaze of the West. Chow ultimately argues that the visuality which
emerges from contemporary Chinese cinema is one in which the traditional binary
opposition between observer/observed is consciously taken up. That is, in the
autoethnography that constitutes contemporary Chinese film, what we see is the
assignation of primacy, not to the act of observing, but to “being-looked-at-ness,” for as
Chow asserts, “being-looked-at-ness, rather than the act of looking, constitutes the
primary event in cross-cultural representation.”4 ' Obviously, this self-consciousness is
dependent upon the existence of the West, but the point here is that this self-
consciousness is not reducible to a function of the West. For if it is the case that the
West narcissistically enjoys what it sees of itself in the other of China, that relationship is,
on the other side of the mirror of Western narcissism, reproduced— it is only against the
measuring stick of “the West” that “China” can emerge as a national entity, as a national
“Thing.”
41
Rey Chow, Primitive Passions, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 180.
250
6.8 Zhaole: The Distance of the Other
And so today, China stands as the representative of “a new Asian hedonism.”
This zhaole, this “seeking enjoyment,” is curiously the opposite of the popular vision of
Japan, that nation of zealous workers unable to properly enjoy themselves. Here what is
at issue is that the Chinese enjoy themselves too much— they have lapsed into an
“ahistoricism” that renders life into a pastiche of moment-to-moment pleasure-seeking
.
42
In this case, where we might suppose that there ought to be some sort of relief in the
discovery that our way of enjoyment” here in the West truly is superior to theirs and
that, thank God, they have finally come to acknowledge our superior modes of
enjoyment, we find instead the expression of anger and regret that in the midst of this
enjoyment, “their culture” is being lost.
What is happening here is not simply the mourning of the loss of another culture,
but also an active desire to maintain the proper distance between us and the Chinese.
For unless we can suppose that they are indeed other to us, separated from us by a great
distance, the circuit of narcissistic projection threatens to collapse— the proximity of the
other prohibits the functioning of the social narcissism upon which social subjectivity is
grounded. In other words, the situation is the same as the scene from the James Bond
film Dr. No, where a meeting of the team of special agents out to infiltrate Dr. No’s
organization is abruptly disrupted by a young Chinese woman, presumably an operative
of Dr. No, who takes a snapshot of the supposedly secret agents, and thus reveals the
other gaze, the returned gaze of the object under investigation. The woman must be
42
Curiously, this could read as a description of the American cultural ethos, could it not
'
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chased and the photograph retrieved, not only because this photograph allows the agents
to be identified, but precisely because the photograph reconstitutes the active subjectivity
of the secret agents as the passive objectivity of a gazed-upon object. Thus, the
maintenance of distance from the cultures of the other is the result of a concern with
one’s own subjective stability. The concern over the decay of Chinese culture under
capitalist tendencies then, is at root an excessive obsession with America’s own “cultural
decay.” Furthermore, the obsession with Chinese democracy is thus the manifestation of
the concern over the thorny problems America faces in its own version of democracy.
What are the proper limits of “free speech?” Recently, the concern with American
democracy has focused on the fact that it has perhaps gone too far, supporting the
laziness of welfare recipients, opening the door too wide to foreigners who come in and
take American jobs while stubbornly refusing to assimilate.
But if this is true, that the perception of distance is part of the social mechanisms
regulating the perception and conceptualization of alterity, then we seemed to be faced
with a double-bind. We wish to maintain that the difference among cultures ought to be
“respected,” but we find that the very possibility of showing the proper respect towards
another culture ensures that it will always remain other, condemned, no matter how
many times we watch its ritual dances or eat its food, to an existence in the field of
alterity. In this, most multicultural of ages, it is perhaps disconcerting to suspect that
alterity is inescapable, but is that really the problem? Or is it more that, as we
become
more and more conscious of others, we are increasingly confronted with
ourselves
?
This
line of argument has hopefully served to point out the direction in
which the examination
of cultural intersections sheds some light on the desire for
democracy. As such, it is
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intended only as the first steps of a deeper analysis. To further suggest avenues of
debate, let us now to turn to a brief examination of the attempt to theorize the Chinese
body, specifically, the figure of the Chinese woman.
6.9 Our Sexes and Theirs
I wish I d been able to write the bodies of Chinese women: full-blown,
even buxom, from the effects of age or repeated pregnancies; but always
with oval contours, floating, barely touching the ground.
—Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women
The reason I have great trouble is that I have a body. When I no longer
have a body, what trouble have I?
—Dao De Jing, chapter thirteen
If the notion of democracy refuses to acknowledge the material bodies of its
abstracted “citizens,” the cultural body is not so easily ignored. For although it may be
argued that the “body” necessary for the conceptualization of democracy is an abstracted
one, with no special characteristics save for the fact that it belongs to some form of
political union, this abstracted conception of the body is concomitant with the status of
democracy as a universal concept which is capable of being applied within any social
context and which can. though it may require alterations, remain unstained by its
(Western) cultural origins. In other words, democracy, precisely because it
conceptualizes the human individual living within it as the universal citizen, devoid of any
specific features which might be cause for preferential treatment, can function perfectly
well if the bodies of its citizens are not marked by various identities (sexual, racial,
cultural, etc. ). But unlike the concept of democracy however, the body itself does not
escape the inscription of identity quite so easily and in fact, the presumption that the
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body which underpins democratic state structures is somehow freed from the ascription
of various social identities is itself problematic. 43 Far from being simply the contingent
containers of human “spirits,” bodies are codified into distinct (if often contradictory)
categories, each delineable by reference to certain markers. The ease with which one
might fill out a census form or answer the “personal data” questions on an application
attest to the fact of these codifications. The peculiar ease with which bodies lend
themselves to the processes of the social inscription of identity thus points us in the
direction of another difficulty which addresses itself to the “problem of China" and which
we might begin to analyze with reference to the theoretical flashpoint of democracy.
Apart from the image of the lone, unidentified man stopping, as if by sheer force
of will, a line of ominous tanks, the other predominant icon of the Tiananmen Square
demonstrations of 1989 was that of the “Goddess of Liberty,” a twenty-eight foot statue
erected by the students as a symbol of their protest. Although the obvious comparisons
were made between the American Statue of Liberty and this Goddess of Liberty, the fact
remains that this statue was predominantly read by both Western and Chinese thinkers as
Chinese. In his critique of Rey Chow's essay, “Violence in the Other Country:
Preliminary Remarks on the ‘China Crisis,' Zhang Longxi takes Chow to task precisely
for her refusal to recognize the Chinese body of the statue. Arguing that Chow s project
of deconstructing democracy requires the theoretical understanding of the Goddess of
Liberty as a white woman (and thus, ultimate symbol of freedom), Zhang cites various
43
See, for example, the discussion of “marked” and “unmarked” populations as part
of
the mechanism of racism in Robert John Ackermann, Heterogeneities , (Amherst.
University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), pp. 15-24.
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(Western!) sources to demonstrate the contrary: that the goddess instead possesses
Chinese features and is thus a uniquely Chinese image. 44 To pose an analytic question
but with very non-analytic purposes: just how is it that Zhang is certain of the Goddess’
Chineseness? What is it that renders this Chineseness visible? If the body is thus
somehow the site of the social inscription of identity, then the question which we face
now is that of the status of the peculiarly Chinese body. For unless we assume that there
are certain morphologies which can be adequately employed in the determination of
cultural identity, we must ask how Zhang recognizes the Chinese features of the
Goddess of Liberty as such. What is it, apart from the exigencies of physical
morphology, which outlines the contours of the Chinese body? What discursive
practices have constituted the Chinese body as such and is it productive or useful to
continue to subscribe to these?
The body has, of course, long been the province of feminist theorists, concerned
with demonstrating the social and non-natural sources of sex/gender differentiation. The
body, far from being a natural object with characteristics to be read off of its surfaces,
becomes instead the site of contestation, with various social pressures brought to bear
upon in, in order to produce sex/gender differences. What is central to the feminist
project of comprehending the body is the production of a counterdiscourse which can act
to liberate the feminine body from the social forces which seek to repress the meanings
coded onto that body. In light of this, I wish to turn now to the bodies of Chinese
women
,
for it is here that the bodily marking of both gender and culture are
44 Zhang Longxi, “Western Theory and Chinese Reality,” Critical Inquiry 19:1, pp. 1 19-
120 .
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concentrated, and thus here that the differences between the articulation of embodied
gender and embodied culture could be most fruitfully compared. To begin to offer an
analysis of precisely this “difference”— how the body is inscribed with cultural meaning
by processes different from those which inscribe sex/gender— let us look at Julia
Knsteva's About Chinese Women.
6.10 Escape from the Law of the Father
Following Lacan’s dictum that “The woman does not exist,”45 Kristeva
complements the psychoanalytic argument that since social space (the set of linguistic
structures which, taken together, might be said to constitute “culture”) derives its
existence from the “Law of the Father" made manifest in the castration complex, the
position ofwomen is thus not simply non-existence, but non-existence of a special sort.
The non-existence ofwomen within the spatio-temporal dimension of the Symbolic made
real by the Paternal Law is in fact guaranteed by its founding moment for if“women”
exist, it is only by means of a fundamental identification with the Father. This
identification is, however, tenuous, and broken as soon as woman recognizes the truth
about herself, that there is something to her that escapes this identification: the “dream of
the maternal body” and its complicity in the jouissance46 of the feminine. 47
4
" For a discussion ofthe meaning of this seemingly misogynist formulation, see chapter six of
Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases ofEnjoyment, (London: Verso, 1994).
46
“Jouissance” is a French term meaning “enjoyment,” but containing as well a sexual
connotation. The word is consequently untranslated in English editions ofLacan. For a
concise definition, see the entry for “jouissance” in Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary
ofLacanian Psychoanalysis, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 91-2.
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Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women, Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), pp. 34-5.
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What characterizes the position of women within the patriarchal structures of
society is consequently an exclusion from the position of power while simultaneously
functioning as the very condition of that power, for it is by excluding women from its
signifying frameworks that the Symbolic acquires its legitimacy— not everyone can be
the emperor. The political tallout from this is of course the subsequently doomed nature
of feminist projects which simply strive to assert the existence of women. For ifwomen
are excluded from the Symbolic as its founding moment, there can never be a “pklce
' ,
for
the articulation of what being woman means— it will always already be inscribed
within a masculine framework. The strategy of feminism then, ought to be grounded
upon disruptions to that framework, located for Kristeva in the semiotic, pre-Oedipal,
libidinal multiplicity which makes itself manifest in poetic language. 48 The expression of
poetic language is furthermore tantamount to the recovery of the maternal body within
the very terms of signification permitted by the strictures of the Symbolic, for if it is the
case that the birth of the subject is rooted in the separation from the maternal body, then
resistance to the Paternal Law which functions as the principle of the Symbolic can only
be grounded in the return to what has been repressed.
Putting aside the problems with this position, such as those articulated by Judith
Butler in Gender Trouble , there is something else which merits attention and which
returns us to an examination of the cultural body. This is the fact that the process
delineated above, the emergence of subjectivity in the repression of the maternal body,
seems to be a uniquely Western phenomenon. Kristeva is careful to restrict, in the
48
See the succinct discussion of Kristeva’s position in Judith Butler, Gender Trouble ,
(New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 79-91.
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opening chapters ofAbout Chinese Women, the conceptualization of the Symbolic as
rooted in the repression of the maternal to the West, for to begin with, “...the role of
women and, consequently, that of the family, have a particular quality in China which is
unknown in the monotheistic West.”49 This difference of role is situated. Kristeva holds,
in the originally matrilineal character of an ancient Chinese civilization living in a
different relation to the earth: “No Father, no undying Word. A Mother: the Ancestress
and a place of sexual jousting represent the logic and cohesion of the society.”50
Without the social differentiation of sexes, what emerges as the governing logic of
Chinese culture is, instead of a transcendent principle on the level of the Law of the
Father in the West, an immanence:
In other words, there is no isolatable symbolic principle to oppose itself
and assert itself as transcendent law. It seems hardly an accident that this
immanence was conceived by a society whose first family model is so
marked by matrilinear descent and by the alteration of the two sexes,
without an isolated symbolic authority aside from the principle of
genitality and the economic/territorial contract. 51
Even Mao acknowledges the position of the mother within the Chinese sexual economy52
and thus the otherness of China coheres around the enigma of “the Mother at the
center,” the lingering traces of matrilineal descent and its consequences for the structure
of the (Chinese?) Symbolic.
49
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Strangely enough, the ascription of “immanence as an originary feature of
Chinese culture does not require the machinery of psychoanalytic theory for its
discovery; we have already seen its origins in the process of properly differentiating
Western philosophy from Chinese philosophy. What is unique to Kristeva is here the
location of the source of this immanence in the socialized bisexuality of ancient Chinese
culture. A bisexuality which, to be sure, will be quickly colonized by Confiician
ideology, but one which, in its primitive form, does not repress femininejouissance in
the act of maintaining the Symbolic. Rather, since “She [the tribal mother] is portrayed
as the party whose right to jouissance is incontestable,”5 ’ the absence of a prohibition
upon the expression of feminine jouissance (the prohibitive ground of the Western
Symbolic) opens the space for a sexual relation which does not demand the negation of
one sex in the desire of the other, transforming the immanence of the Chinese ordering
principle into a “balance” within the relation between the sexes: “...this feminine
jouissance
,
that could become the support of the mystery [of the sexual relation], the
ultimate source of God, the Absolute, does not do so in China; for it is constantly
counterbalanced by the other, the yang
,
which certainly takes for itself and gives of itself,
but not every time.”
54
What is established here is the location of a form of male-female relation which is
untainted by the structures which dominate such relations in the “monotheistic West."
And as such, the possibility of a sexual relation unmediated by the Law of the Father
53
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conditions the possibility that the (Western) Symbolic is not the only way of doing
things, and that other possibilities exist for the emergence of the social and are perhaps
viable options to the patterns established in the West. Indeed, female masturbation and
lesbianism, practices and identifications which, for Kristeva, cannot be articulated within
the Western Symbolic, are commonly accepted practices in Chinese space which do not
possess the Western status of “perversion.” What is foreclosed in this ancient Chinese
“bisexuality,” is the attempt to escape the confines of one’s kind, an attempt to be other
than what one is:
Female sexuality and masturbation are not merely ‘tolerated’— they are
taken for granted and considered to be perfectly ‘natural.’ Sexual
treatises provide detailed descriptions of lesbian and masturbatory
techniques, some of them quite sophisticated. What is problematic is the
woman who cheats: the one who tries to pass for a man, who perverts the
yin/yang duality by acting as a rather brutal, domineering male seducer/"
But if we are already describing an Other-Symbolic, then what exactly has
become of sexual difference itself? After all, the formation of sexual identity is, in
psychoanalytic theory, dependent upon one’s relation to the Law of the Father and the
possession of the phallus. How is sexual difference understood within a Symbolic which
does not admit of such a Law and which is founded on what seems to be its radical
Other? Kristeva’ s text does not provide us with an answer, beyond the fact that the male
is “naturally yang” and the female “naturally yin" based upon a relationship to the
Mother and the earth. But if this is the case, how are these sexes intelligible? Without
the structuring fiction of Paternal Law. how does Kristeva penetrate to this mysterious
heart of ancient China’s delineation of the sexes without relying upon a theoretical
55
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), p. 62.
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position which does not apply? Kristeva herself acknowledges (albeit unintentionally)
that the Chinese elude the conceptual categories of Western psychoanalysis when she
writes that: “Our psychological ‘family’ has never existed in China/’56 How is it then,
that Kristeva’s investigations are capable of escaping that old Platonic paradox of
knowledge? How does one seek to know what one does not know?
But let us examine Kristeva’s text a little further, to see if we can find something
which might serve to rescue Kristeva from this variant of the self-referential paradox.
After having delineated the contours of a golden, happy time of ancient Chinese
matriarchy, Kristeva turns to the obvious problem of Confucianism. What Confucianism
amounts to, for Kristeva, is the absorption of a previously “incontestible” feminine
jouissance within the body of the Father, a move by which “society protects itself from
thejouissance that can drive it to madness or revolution: it keeps itself stable,
permanent, eternal.
"57
Founded upon the “cult” of ancestor worship, Confucianism
elevates the dead patriarch (after a “radical, if not abrupt” transformation from a
matrilineal society to one based upon the agnatic family) to a position of authority,
“obliterating” the difference between the sexes and “censuring” libidinal multiplicity
which formerly characterized Chinese relationships. 58 This shift from the maternal order
to that of the Father has the express effect of regulating Chinese women, the “nomadic
element” and transforms the position of Chinese women from one of “balance" to one in
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which (through footbinding, for example) Chinese women are expected to take
completely upon themselves the suffering which is necessary for the constitution of a
Chinese community.^
The status of footbinding for Kristeva, as a castration marking the Chinese
uncertainty over the state of the social and symbolic power which Chinese women
historically possessed in the matrilineal order, returns us, unfortunately, to the problem
of Kristeva' s theoretical positioning, since instead of attempting an actual analysis of the
Chinese family in light of this practice, she remains content to merely read from the
surface of Chinese history the truth of that Other, Chinese psychology. In other words,
her reading of footbinding as a form of castration effected upon women to restrict the
expression of feminine jouissance relies on a flattened picture of Chinese reality; the truth
of the Chinese psyche is determinable from the surface of its bodies, without any
recourse to the interiority of the Chinese subject.
The bodies of Chinese women in the “current” socialist period also attest to the
truth of their difference, since Chinese socialism has acknowledged the equality of men
and women and enforced it in the newly erected social structures which permit the
structural positioning ofwomen within positions of social power previously held only by
men. Along with equality of employment (Kristeva cites the example of a woman who
proudly declares that the new regime has given her access to the job of being an iron
worker), the laws of the new regime also make real the “right' of a Chinese woman to
retain her own name after marriage. Such leeway in the Symbolic structures ol power
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have the effect, not of “virilizing" Chinese women, as would be the case in the West, but
of perhaps permitting Chinese women to “function as an element— as a graphic mark in
a network of meanings— in the realms of both impulse and law.”60 This seeming
restoration of the nomadic aspect of the lives of Chinese women has the effect of erasing
the sexed aspect of their bodies or modulating it into a masculinity. Scattered
throughout the latter half of the book are references to the Chinese woman freed from
the sex of her body. A female Chinese supervisor on the bureau of Educational Reform
“smiles, rather like a man,"
61
young Chinese women engaged in a game of volleyball
possess “lithe, slender athletic bodies, looking rather like skinny boys,”62 and hidden
within clothes which: “do not suggest the shape of the body,” Kristeva “can only
suppose the narrow, fragile shoulders, the discreet breasts, the robust hips and belly that,
with the short, strong thighs firmly joined to the trunk, for the centre of gravity of these
creatures who walk so effortlessly.”6j Even pregnancy is apparently an irrelevant marker
of the sex of Chinese women, since despite the cotton dust which is so stifling as to
require the stopping up of ears and nose, pregnant women attend the machinery
designated to them as lighter labor. 64
60
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), pp. 131-132.
61
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), p. 174.
62
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), p. 195.
63
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), p. 158.
64
Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women , Anita Barrows, trans., (New York: Marion
Boyars, 1986), p. 161.
263
All of which is to render Kristeva’s position on the status of Chinese women and
the structures of the Chinese Symbolic increasingly untenable. Not only is there the
assumption that the categories of Western psychoanalytic theory can be applied to the
Chinese sociocultural sphere (despite an implicit acknowledgment of the nonexistence
within China of the Western psychological “family from which Western psychoanalytic
theory derives its conceptual apparatus and terminology), as well as the assumption that
the resultant psychoanalysis of Chinese sociality is to be read from the surface of Chinese
society, as it appears to Kristeva, but now we discover that the current phase of Chinese
society, some form of socialism, confounds the very sex of the body. These theoretical
difficulties, I wish to argue, derive from the fact that Kristeva “others” China at the
outset of her investigation. For if China and the Chinese are assumed to already be
other, what could any analysis be but a firming up of that alterity? This alterity can even
be seen to extend to her conceptualization of the place of ‘‘woman" within the Western
Symbolic, for as Judith Butler has noted, Kristeva “nevertheless concedes that the
semiotic [domain of the maternal body and poetic language] is invariably subordinate to
the Symbolic, that its assumes its specificity within the terms of a hierarchy immune to
challenge.”
65
If this is so, then even the Chinese, laboriously located within the matrix of
an Other, maternal order, are nonetheless still subject to the Law of the (Western)
Father. Thus, Kristeva' s “escape” to the realm of the Chinese Other, an attempt to
escape the Paternal strictures of the Western Symbolic, ineluctably return her to that
Symbolic. Her attempt to theorize the alterity of Chinese woman compels her to remain
trapped within the strictures of the West. The presumption that Chinese women inhabit
65
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a sphere completely separate from the cultures of the West serves only to render their
experience more incommensurate, more incomprehensible to that of the West. As such,
the other, Chinese woman cannot function except as an unattainable liberatory ideal.
6.11 Cultural Interfusion
Although the examinations in this chapter of the signification of cultural
difference at play between the social and political worlds of the West and China have
been extremely limited both in length and scope, pointing toward the necessity for
further analysis of the ways in which the assertion of the singular facticity of cultural
difference functions to obscure certain ideological and social processes, what this
preliminary leap out into the social and political points to is the fact that technological
“progress” has brought us to the point in which our notions of difference and distance
need serious rethinking. For these technologies have enabled the cultural interfusion of
social spaces to occur with a speed previously unimaginable— I can be in Beijing by
tomorrow, if I possess the economic means. Thus, given the inevitability of the
increasing heterogeneity of the population which inhabits any given social space, we
need to rethink the role and function of “culture” as a signifier of difference.
What I have argued here, hopefully on a convincing level, is that the failure to
acknowledge and deal with the problematic status of culture generates theoretical and
practical difficulties which would render it impossible for us to ever hope to understand
the cultural other. Worse, given the rapidity of cultural interfusion, what reason to I
have for believing that even those who profess to be ofmy culture are anything like me?
It would seem that the presumed homogeneity behind the assertion of the existence of a
culture works only to erase the heterogeneous, individual elements of a given society.
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even in one which, like the United States, prides itself upon having a “culture of
individuality and individual expression.' What could this culture be, given the fact that a
culture presumably contains people who all subscribe to a singular way of life?
Chantal Mouffe has suggested that the current limitations in the liberal debate on
democracy are the result of its inability to come to terms with the inherent and
unavoidable antagonism which conditions social existence.66 But far from constituting
the barrier to the realization of democracy, democratic theorists must come to terms with
the fact that pluralism entails a level of heterogeneity and conflict which can never be
eliminated. The emergence of universal unanimity could only signal the defeat of
democracy. In the case of cultural politics which (as demonstrated in the first section of
this chapter) has strong links to the democratic vision, what we need to come to terms
with is not the fact that the “other” is culturally different from us. Rather, what needs to
be rethought is the very antagonism implied in the assertion of the difference between
cultures. For this difference marks more than the vagaries of diet and dress. It marks
the very limits of the social. If “multiculturalism” is ever to succeed, what is necessary is
an understanding of the fact that multiculturalism does not signal harmony as much as it
does discord.
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